Closing in on Closure: Occupational Closure and Temporary Employment in Germany by Stuth, Stefan
www.ssoar.info
Closing in on Closure: Occupational Closure and
Temporary Employment in Germany
Stuth, Stefan
Postprint / Postprint
Dissertation / phd thesis
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Stuth, S. (2017). Closing in on Closure: Occupational Closure and Temporary Employment in Germany.
(Wirtschaftssoziologie und Politische Ökonomie / Economic Sociology and Political Economy, 1). Baden-Baden:
Nomos. http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201802
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Stuth, Stefan
Book  —  Accepted Manuscript (Postprint)
Closing in on Closure. Occupational Closure and
Temporary Employment in Germany
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Stuth, Stefan (2017) : Closing in on Closure. Occupational Closure and
Temporary Employment in Germany, ISBN 978-3-8452-8017-2, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft /
edition sigma, Baden-Baden,
http://dx.doi.org/10.5771/9783845280172
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/201802
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
 7 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
Stefan Stuth  
 
Closing in on Closure 
Occupational Closure and Temporary Employment  
in Germany 
 
  
 
 
 
 
This is the postprint open access version of  
Stuth, Stefan (2017). Closing in on Closure. Occupational Closure and 
Temporary Employment in Germany. Baden-Baden: Nomos / edition 
sigma. 
 
 
a.t.: Berlin, HU Kultur-, Sozial- und Bildungswissenschaftliche Fakul-
tät, Diss., 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Note:  
This postprint edition of „Closing in on Closure“ has a different layout 
then the published Nomos edition. To ensure comparable citation of 
specific pages irrespective of the edition used, the page numbers of the 
print version are shown in square brackets at the margins of the pages. 
 
All numbers in the table of contents refer to the page numbers in squa-
re brackets and thereby to the original pages of the print edition. 
 
This post-print open access version includes the appendix, which was 
not part of the original print edition.   
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
Stefan Stuth 
 
 
 
 
 
Closing in on Closure 
Occupational Closure and Temporary  
Employment in Germany 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
For Christian, Lena, Janine and Ana  
who helped me to keep on going
 Acknowledgements 
Writing and finishing a dissertation is a long process in which a lot of in-
dividuals contribute to the work in some way or other. Because I worked 
on my dissertation primarily in my leisure time but also because I became 
a father while still writing my dissertation, it took me nearly five years to 
finish it. I thus had plenty of time to meet helpful people. In this section 
I’d like to acknowledge their contributions. 
Most importantly, I’d like to thank my supervisors Jutta Allmendinger 
and Kim Weeden. Without their continuous support and sophisticated 
feedback I wouldn’t have been able to finish my dissertation. Their advice 
and incisive critique helped me to broaden my perspective for the prob-
lems at hand. It laid the very foundations for a sharpened line of argument, 
theoretically and methodologically. I thank the WZB Berlin Social Sci-
ence Center, which provided an excellent work environment that allowed 
me to engage in fruitful discussions with excellent researchers. I thank my 
colleagues Christian Brzinsky-Fay, Lena Hipp, Janine Bernhardt, and El-
len von den Driesch who commented on my drafts and with whom I en-
gaged in constructive discussions about my work. The superior research 
infrastructure of the WZB allowed me to partake in an English writing 
clinic in which researchers can get ongoing practical guidance regarding 
good and correct English writing based on their actual text drafts. I am es-
pecially grateful that Roisin Cronin, who held these weekly individual 
writing sessions, was not only patient in telling me not to make the same 
mistakes over and over again but also very successful in teaching me how 
to write well. Being part of the WZB also gave me the unparalleled oppor-
tunity to successfully apply for a 6-month WZB grant that allowed me to 
finish up my dissertation. Furthermore I am also much obliged to the Hans 
Böckler Foundation. Their funding of the project “The Institutional De-
terminants of Atypical Employment and Social Inequality in Europe” gave 
me access to the excellent research infrastructure of the WZB Berlin So-
cial Science Center.
1
 I would also like to thank Rose Batt who gave me the 
opportunity to be a visiting fellow at the ILR School at Cornell University 
where I had the opportunity to discuss my dissertation in two workshops. 
____________________ 
1  Grant # S-2010-342-4 
In Cornell I had the necessary quiet time to start the long and slow process 
of rewriting my German dissertation sections in English and to get my 
theory straight. 
Special thanks go to Jürgen Hoffmeyer-Zlotnik who convinced me in a 
very early stage of my dissertation to analyze detailed 4-digit occupations 
instead of occupational groupings as well as to Samuel Greef and Wolf-
gang Schroeder who allowed me to use parts of their exceptional survey 
data on occupational associations and occupation-specific trade unions. I 
am very grateful to the team of the research data center of the Federal Sta-
tistical Office and the statistical offices of the Länder. They were helpful, 
friendly, and were almost always able to speed up processes so that I got 
my results in time and was able to meet my deadlines.
2
 I would also like to 
thank Christian Ebner, Basha Vicari, Dörthe Gatermann, Steffen Kohl, 
Andreas Haupt, Martin Ehlert, Johannes Giesecke, Agniezka Althaber, 
Lena Ulbricht, Kyle Albert, Isabel Hageman, Clara Behrend, Lena 
Reichgard, Laura Jung and Daniel Staemmler who gave me advice, criti-
cal feedback or technical support. 
Last but not least I like to thank my parents and my wife for their sup-
port. Ana, thank you for your constant backing but also your impatience 
with me to finish my seemingly never-ending story. I also like to thank my 
friends Steffen, Dennis, Marko, Mike, Dirk, Norman, Robert, and Christi-
ane for their patience. 
____________________ 
2  All results have to be checked first whether they meet the German data security 
and privacy laws or not, before the researcher get his results handed out. 
 Table of Contents 
1 Introduction 21 
2 Beyond the Norm–Temporary Employment Contracts and    
Occupations  27 
2.1 Theories on the Determinants of Temporary Employment 28 
2.2 The (Neglected) Occupational Perspective on the Labor Market 31 
2.3 Occupations—An Elusive Concept 34 
2.4 No Trespassing—The Mechanisms and Sources of Occupational 
Closure 37 
2.4.1 Credentialism 40 
2.4.2 Licensing 43 
2.4.3 Occupational Specificity 44 
2.4.4 Occupational Associations 46 
2.4.5 Unionization 49 
2.4.6 Human Capital, Internal Labor Markets, and Occupational 
Closure 49 
2.5 Summary on Occupational Closure and Temporary Employment 52 
3 Case Selection 55 
3.1 Germany as a Textbook Example of an Occupational Labor Market 55 
3.2 The Norm of Standard Work Arrangements and the Deregulation of 
Employment Protection Legislation in Germany 57 
4 The Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of              
Operationalizing Closure Measures for Germany 61 
4.1 Credentialism—An Unbalanced Concept 61 
4.2 Licensing—Two Definitions, Two Worlds of Licensed Occupations 64 
4.3 Specificity—An Underexplored Niche 65 
4.4 Associations—Two Different Measurement Strategies 67 
4.5 Unionization—Industry-Level versus Occupational-Level Unions 68 
4.6 Additional Distinctive Features of the German Labor Market 68 
Table of Contents 
 
5 Data, Methods, Sample Selection, and Variables 71 
5.1 Methods 72 
5.2 Sample selection 76 
5.3 Variables 79 
5.3.1 The Credential Inflation Index—A New Approach to Capture 
the Supply of Occupation Specific Credentials 79 
5.3.2 The Standardization Index 85 
5.3.3 The Licensure of Tasks and Titles 87 
5.3.4 The Specificity of Occupational Tasks 88 
5.3.5 Occupational Associations and Occupation-Specific Trade 
Unions 90 
5.3.6 Control Variables 91 
6 Descriptive Statistics 95 
6.1 The Trends in Temporary Employment in Germany 95 
6.2 Closure Sources and Their Bivariate Association with Temporary 
Employment 100 
6.2.1 The Credential Inflation Index 100 
6.2.2 The Standardization of Occupational Credentials 103 
6.2.3 Occupational Specificity 105 
6.2.4 The Licensing of Occupations 108 
6.2.5 Occupational Associations 111 
6.2.6 Occupation-Specific Trade Unions 112 
6.3 Summary of the Descriptive Statistics 113 
7 Closing in on Closure—The Association between Occupational Closure 
and Temporary Employment 119 
7.1 Occupational Closure and Temporary Employment—Results 121 
7.2 Occupational Closure, Human Capital, and Internal Labor Markets 128 
7.3 Occupational Closure and Monitoring Costs 138 
7.4 Occupational Closure and Additional Distinctive Features of the 
German Labor Market – Region and Gender Composition 144 
7.5 Occupational Closure and High-Risk Populations 151 
7.6 Solving the (Academic) Credentialism Conundrum 155 
7.7 Sensitivity Checks 157 
 
8 Summary 159 
Table of Contents 
 
9 Conclusions 169 
10 Index  
References  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 List of Abbreviations 
BBiG Vocational Training Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz) 
BIBB/BAuA Employment survey conducted by the Federal Institute 
for Vocational Education and Training (Bundesinstitut 
für Berufsbildung (BIBB)) and the Federal Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (Bundesanstalt für 
Arbeitschutz und Arbeitsmedizin (BAuA)) 
CIX  Credential inflation index 
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education 
Gsoep German socio economic panel 
HwO Crafts Code (Handwerksordnung) 
IQV Index of qualitative variation 
KldB German Dictionary of Occupational Titles (Klassifikation 
der Berufe) 
MSE Mean squared error 
p10 The 10 percent percentile 
p25 The 25 percent percentile 
p50 The 50 percent percentile (median) 
p75 The 75 percent percentile 
p90 The 90 percent percentile 
R Correlation coefficient 
RDC  Research data centers of the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany and the statistical offices of the German Länder 
SD Standard deviation 
Vif  Variance inflation factor  
  
  
List of Equations 
Equation 1: The general form of the first step of the two-step 
multilevel model 74 
 
Equation 2:  
 
The general form of the second step of the two-
step multilevel model 75 
 
Equation 3:  
 
The credential inflation index 82 
 
Equation 4: 
 
The computation of the number of occupation-
specific credentials that are awarded by the 
tertiary education track 83 
 
Equation 5:  
 
The standardization index 87 
 
Equation 6:  
 
The relative uniqueness of tasks and skills in 
occupations using the index of qualitative 
variation 89 
 
Equation 7: 
 
The relative variety of tasks and skills within 
occupations using the index of qualitative 
variation 90 
  
List of Figures 
Figure 1:  Temporary employment in Germany, 1993 to 2008 57 
Figure 2:  The designer/graphic designer occupation as an 
example of the operationalization of the credential 
inflation index, in the year 2004 85 
Figure 3:  Temporary employment in the old and new German 
Länder, 1993-2008                                                 96 
Figure 4: Temporary employment differentiated by age, 1993-
2008 97 
Figure 5: Temporary employment differentiated by 
qualification, 1993-2008 98 
Figure 6: Temporary employment differentiated by public and 
private sector, 1993-2008 99 
Figure 7: Temporary employment differentiated by sex, 1993-
2008 99 
Figure 8: The distribution of the mean credential inflation 
index values over the deciles of the occupations for 
the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 101 
Figure 9: The mean rate of temporary employment 
differentiated by the deciles of CIX for the years 
2000, 2004, and 2007 102 
Figure 10: The mean rate of occupational incumbents with 
tertiary degrees differentiated by the deciles of CIX 
for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 102 
Figure 11: The distribution of the mean standardization index 
values over the deciles of the occupations for the 
years 2000, 2004, and 2007 103 
Figure 12: The mean rate of temporary employment 
differentiated by the standardization of vocational 
credentials in the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 104 
Figure 13:  The distribution of unique and common sets of tasks 
over the deciles of the occupations for the years 
2000, 2004, and 2007 105 
List of Figures 
 
Figure 14:  The mean rate of temporary employment 
differentiated by the deciles of occupational 
specificity (unique or common sets of tasks) for the 
years 2000, 2004, and 2007 106 
Figure 15: The distribution of narrow and wide sets of tasks 
over the deciles of the occupations for the years 
2000, 2004, and 2007 107 
Figure 16: The mean rate of temporary employment 
differentiated by the deciles of occupational 
specificity (narrow or wide range of tasks) for years 
2000, 2004, and, 2007 108 
Figure 17:  The mean rate of temporary employment 
differentiated by licensed and non-licensed 
occupations in the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 109 
Figure 18: The distribution of the mean licensure (titles) over 
the deciles of the occupations for the years 2000, 
2004, and 2007 110 
Figure 19: The mean rate of temporary employment 
differentiated by the deciles of title licensure for 
years 2000, 2004, and, 2007 111 
Figure 20: Occupational incumbents’ mean rate of temporary 
employment differentiated by their representation 
by occupational associations in the years 2000, 2004, 
and 2007 112 
Figure 21: Occupational incumbents’ mean rate of temporary 
employment differentiated by their representation 
by trade unions in the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 113 
Figure 22: The interaction between further education and 
standardization with regard to the probability of 
temporary employment 130 
Figure 23: The interaction between further education and the 
width of tasks with regard to the probability of 
temporary employment 132 
Figure 24:  The interaction between further education and the 
commonness of tasks with regard to the probability 
of temporary employment 133 
List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 25: The interaction between further education and the 
specific associations with regard to the probability of 
temporary employment 134 
Figure 26: The interaction between large companies and the 
credential inflation index with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 138 
Figure 27:  The interaction between the four levels of task 
complexity and title licensure with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 141 
Figure 28: The interaction between two levels of task 
complexity and title licensure with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 143 
Figure 29: The interaction between two levels of task 
complexity and the representation by specific 
associations with regard to the probability of 
temporary employment      144 
Figure 30: The interaction between the proportion of 
incumbents employed in the new Länder and title 
licensure with regard to the probability of temporary 
employment     146 
Figure 31:  The interaction between the gender composition of 
occupations and the credential inflation index with 
regard to the probability of temporary employment 149 
Figure 32:  The interaction between the gender composition of 
occupations and the degree of standardization with 
regard to the probability of temporary employment 150 
Figure 33: The interaction between the gender composition of 
occupations and the representation by trade unions 
with regard to the probability of temporary 
employment   151 
  
List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Description of individual-level and occupational-
level sample sizes of the full sample and the final 
sample (pooled for the years 2000, 2004, and 
2007) 78 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of occupational-level 
measures  114 
Table 3: Bivariate correlations of the occupational-level 
closure variables 116 
Table 4: Mean of the various closure sources by major 
occupation group 117 
Table 5: A description of the estimated logit coefficients 
of the 1,118 separate stage-one regression 
analyses 120 
Table 6: Pooled linear regression of temporary 
employment on the different sources of 
occupational closure, 2000, 2004, and 2007 123 
Table 7:  Pooled linear regression of temporary 
employment on the different sources of 
occupational closure—full model with 
standardized coefficients, 2000, 2004, and 2007 126 
Table 8: Pooled linear regression of temporary 
employment on the different sources of 
occupational closure—with interactions between 
further education and the closure sources, 2000, 
2004, and 2007 128 
Table 9: Pooled linear regression of temporary 
employment on the different sources of 
occupational closure—with interactions between 
firm internal labor markets (large organizations) 
and the closure sources, 2000, 2004, and 2007 136 
List of Tables 
 
Table 10: Pooled linear regression of temporary 
employment on the different sources of 
occupational closure—with interactions between 
managerial tasks (model 9), managerial/skilled 
tasks (model 10), skilled tasks (model 11), and 
routine/labor tasks (model 12) with the closure 
sources, 2000, 2004, and 2007 
 
 
 
 
139 
Table 11: Pooled linear regression of temporary 
employment on the different sources of 
occupational closure—with interactions between 
the new Länder and the closure sources, 2000, 
2004, and 2007 145 
Table 12: Pooled linear regression of temporary 
employment on the different sources of 
occupational closure—with interactions between 
gender type of occupations and the closure 
sources, 2000, 2004, and 2007 147 
Table 13: Explaining differences in the probability of 
temporary employment between young and 
middle-aged occupational incumbents within 
occupations using the different sources of 
occupational closure—a pooled linear regression 
with the individual-level stage-one logit 
coefficients of young occupational incumbents as 
dependent variable 153 
Table 14: Explaining differences in the probability of 
temporary employment between occupational 
incumbents with low- and medium-level 
qualifications within occupations, using the 
different sources of occupational closure—a 
pooled linear regression with the individual-level 
stage-one logit coefficients of occupational 
incumbents with low-level qualifications as the 
dependent variable 154 
List of Tables 
 
Table 15: Explaining differences in the probability of 
temporary employment between highly and 
moderately qualified occupational incumbents 
within occupations, using the different sources of 
occupational closure—a pooled linear regression 
with the individual-level stage-one logit 
coefficients of highly qualified occupational 
incumbents as the dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
156 
 
 
      
[21|22] 
1 Introduction 
 
 
Temporary employment contracts have increased in political and 
economic relevance in the last few decades. Policy makers have lessened 
the restrictions on the use of temporary employment contracts to allow 
employers to be more flexible when faced with external market shocks 
and to integrate more people into the labor market (Barbieri 2009; Hipp et 
al. 2015). The price of temporary employment is, however, low wages
3
, 
poor working conditions
4
, high labor turnover
5
, and limited career 
chances
6
 for the individuals who are actually temporarily employed (e.g., 
Kalleberg 2000, 2009, 2011; Standing 2011; Hipp et al. 2015).  
____________________ 
3  Contrary to the theory of compensating wage differentials, research shows a 
negative association between temporary employment and wages. The theory of 
compensating wage differentials suggests that higher wages compensate 
employees for negative job characteristics like high levels of job insecurity 
(Rosen 1986). However, most authors argue and demonstrate that the relationship 
between job security and income is inverted because permanent employees have 
better bargaining positions than temporary employees (Pfeffer and Baron 1988, 
pp. 294-295; Bentolila and Dolado 1994; Groß 1999; Booth et al. 2002; Hagen 
2002; Giesecke and Groß 2003; Polavieja 2003; Giesecke and Groß 2004; Groß 
and Wegener 2004, pp. 192-197; Mertens and McGinnity 2004; Giesecke 2006, 
pp. 259-299; Oberst et al. 2007; Campbell et al. 2007; Gash and McGinnity 
2007; Brehmer and Seifert 2008; Gebel 2009, 2010; Elia 2010; Schäfer 2010). 
4  Temporary employment contracts are also used to maintain a constant and high 
level of labor intensity by promising permanent contracts in exchange for 
constantly high levels of productivity (Loh 1994; Wang and Weiss 1998; 
Polavieja 2003, 2005). These arguments are in line with the efficiency wage 
model, which assumes that work motivation and productivity increase the more 
insecure the jobs are. The persistent fear of lay-offs motivates otherwise work-
shy employees and creates a constant pressure to work hard. 
5  Individuals have better chances of getting employment but at the same time face 
higher risks of being laid off (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992; Bentolila and 
Dolado 1994; Cabrales and Hopenhayn 1997; Boeri 1999; Goux and Maurin 
2000; Korpi and Levin 2001; Güell 2000a,b; Alda 2002; Blanchard and Landier 
2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002; Giesecke and Groß 2002; Giesecke and 
Groß 2003; Polavieja 2003; Boockmann and Hagen 2005a,b; Kurz et al. 2005; 
Giesecke 2006; Boockmann and Hagen 2006; Brehmer and Seifert 2008; 
Giesecke 2009; Gebel and Giesecke 2011). 
6  Temporarily employed workers have fewer opportunities for skills and career 
development (e.g., Booth et al. 2002; Boockmann and Hagen 2006, pp. 125-127; 
 
1 Introduction 
 
To understand who gets a “bad” temporary job and who gets a “good” 
permanent job, the majority of research focuses on individual-level or 
organizational-level explanations. These explanations stress the 
importance of firm-specific training, firm internal labor markets, and the 
complexity of work tasks. High amounts of firm-specific human capital 
and complex work tasks increase employees’ chances of becoming part of 
firm-internal labor markets that grant permanent employment contracts. 
Temporary employment is therefore often interpreted as a function of the 
firm-specific human capital that employees have acquired and the 
complexity of their work tasks (monitoring costs) (e.g., Uzzi and Barsness 
1998; Goldthorpe 2000; Sørensen 2000; Masters and Miles 2002; 
Kalleberg et al. 2003; Polavieja 2003; McGinnity et al. 2005; Giesecke 
and Schindler 2008). However, general human capital, namely 
occupation-specific skills, is conspicuously absent from the discussion of 
the determinants of temporary employment. Accordingly, empirical data 
on temporary employment on the occupational level are rare. However, 
Stuth et al. (2009, p. 24) found that, for female employees, temporary 
employment varied strongly on an aggregated occupational level. For 
example, among all railway signalers (rails) and architectural draftsmen, 
there were no temporary employees, whereas up to 15 percent of medical 
doctors and gardeners were temporarily employed. 
The exclusion of occupations results in two major shortcomings. First: 
It may lead researchers to overlook the role played by occupations in the 
fragmentation of the labor market. Labor demand and labor supply are 
coordinated by occupations, which fosters the occupation-specific 
fragmentation of the labor market (e.g., Kerr 1954, pp. 92-96; Stolzenberg 
1975, pp. 648-649; Bielby and Kalleberg 1981; Grusky and Sørensen 
1998, pp. 1210-1212; Grusky and Weeden 2001; Mouw and Kalleberg 
2010, p. 402). To illustrate my argument: When seeking to hire a new 
human resources manager, an employer might not so much be interested 
in whether the candidate has, for example, a tertiary-level degree or high 
levels of cognitive skills. The prospective employer may instead be 
____________________ 
Gebel 2010). However, the evidence is mixed. Some studies fail to show that 
present temporary employment contracts negatively affect later processes of 
occupational attainment or skills development (for career development see: 
Scherer 2005; for skills development see: Brehmer and Seifert 2008). 
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interested in the employee’s training, education, or experience as a human 
resources manager. These qualifications and skills are related to 
occupation-specific task fields, and thus, a candidate cannot be reassigned 
from one occupational task field to another without the loss of 
productivity from an organizational-level perspective or without the loss 
of earnings from an individual-level perspective. Hence, the pool of 
possible candidates is restricted to those who have the required 
occupational qualifications and skills. Second: Overlooking occupations 
may lead us to ignore important processes of occupational closure. In 
situations where the supply of employees with certain occupation-specific 
skills is scarce, or the demand exceeds the supply, processes of 
occupational closure may additionally alter the equilibrium between 
supply and demand to improve the position of the occupations’ 
incumbents (e.g., Weeden 2002). Hence, an employer’s decision whether 
to use permanent or temporary employment contracts is not merely based 
on the amount of specific human capital individuals possess and the 
difficulty of monitoring employees’ productivity; the decision may also be 
based on the availability of the required occupation-specific skills 
(Masters and Miles 2002), whereas this availability may in turn be a result 
of processes of occupation closure. 
To address the occupation-specific fragmentation of the labor market, 
as well as closure processes and their possible impact on the employers’ 
human resource strategies, researchers must refocus from individual-level 
or organizational-level outcomes to occupational-level outcomes. While 
research on occupational-level outcomes is steadily growing with regard 
to earning inequalities, no such research exists with regard to temporary 
employment. To address these shortcomings, I develop and evaluate an 
occupational-level approach to temporary employment and will focus on 
the question: Why is temporary employment more common in some 
occupations than in others? 
This occupational-level approach is derived from the literature on 
occupational closure and earning inequalities. Research in this relatively 
young tradition emphasizes that occupational fragmentation processes are 
artificially reinforced by the occupations themselves and thus significantly 
affect the hierarchy of occupational rewards (e.g., Weeden 2002; Groß 
2009, 2012; Giesecke and Verwiebe 2009; Haupt 2012,2014; Bol and 
Weeden 2014; Bol 2014). This reinforcement is based on closure 
mechanisms, which alter the equilibrium of occupation-specific labor 
supply and occupation-specific labor demand. These closure mechanisms 
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are triggered by closure sources: the institutionalized practices of 
occupations through which occupational closure is established and 
maintained (Weeden 2002)
7
. 
In adapting this approach to analyze the determinants of temporary 
employment, I address conventional closure sources like licensure, 
occupational associations, and unionization and develop a new 
credentialism measure that allows me to assess the hypothetical link 
between the availability of occupation-specific credentials and temporary 
employment. I also introduce a new closure source, occupational 
specificity, which allows me to capture the exclusivity of occupational 
task niches and occupational task specialization. Task specialization is a 
feature that is often hotly debated with regard to its effect on employees’ 
employment security (e.g., Emmenegger 2009; Streeck 2011). Based on 
these closure measures, I am able to address both shortcomings of 
conventional analyses of the determinants of temporary employment: the 
occupational fragmentation of the labor market and closure processes that 
may modify the occupational fragmentation of the labor market. Whereas 
the main thrust of this book is to establish the relevance of closure theory, 
I am also interested in expanding the conventional, organizational-level 
explanations (specific human capital, firm internal labor markets, and the 
complexity of work tasks) by analyzing their interrelation with 
occupational closure. An empirical relationship seems inevitable because 
both theories focus on credentials and skills but from different angles 
(e.g., Weeden 2002; Werfhorst 2011). 
The empirical analyses will focus on Germany as an ideal-typical case 
for studying the interrelationship between occupations, occupational 
closure, and temporary employment. Germany has an occupational labor 
market and is renowned for its strong link between the education and 
training system and the labor market (e.g., the apprenticeship training 
system), which reinforces the segmentation of the occupational labor 
market. Another reason is that employees’ attitudes toward temporary 
employment are strongly based on the normative framework of standard 
work arrangements: almost no employees want to have temporary 
____________________ 
7  To account for the fact that occupational closure may exist without occupations 
actively pursuing closure strategies, Kim Weeden suggested using the term 
closure source instead of the term closure strategies. 
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employment contracts. This is an important precondition for the analyses, 
which are based on the assumption that employees will always choose 
permanent employment contracts over temporary employment contracts. 
Another reason is that the institutional setting in Germany is characterized 
by a relatively strict employment protection legislation, which incentivizes 
employers to use temporary employment contracts to increase their 
external, numerical flexibility. 
I use a two-step multilevel approach and base the analyses on a special 
version of the German Microcensus that allows for the analysis of detailed 
occupations. Although other scholars have used the German Microcensus 
to examine closure and earnings (Bol and Weeden 2014; Bol 2014) or to 
examine closure and the duration of employment breaks for family 
reasons (Stuth and Hennig 2014), no one has used it to study the impact of 
closure on temporary employment and no one has examined occupational 
closure on the level of detailed occupations. 
The results provide evidence of great variation in temporary 
employment across the occupations, with a minimum of zero percent 
temporary employment up to a maximum of 64 percent temporary 
employment. The analyses confirm the argument that occupational closure 
influences employees’ risk of temporary employment. Thus, occupations 
can shelter their incumbents from temporary employment contracts. 
Specifically, the occupational specificity closure source and the modified 
credentialism closure source have substantive and statistically significant 
effects on temporary employment. For example, the findings support the 
argument that an inflationary supply of occupation-specific credentials 
results in an increased risk of temporary employment. 
In the next chapter, I will give a short introduction to the conventional 
theoretical arguments about the determinants of temporary employment 
and their shortcomings with regard to the relevance of the occupational 
level for the determinants of temporary employment. I will also introduce 
the occupational-level closure theory and the closure sources that I will 
use to establish the empirical link between occupational closure and 
temporary employment. In chapter three, I establish Germany as an ideal-
typical case for researching occupational closure and temporary 
employment. Chapter four critically discusses the conventional measures 
used for the various closure sources and introduces new measures and 
concepts. Chapter five describes my statistical method, a two-step 
multilevel model, and the sample selection on the individual level and the 
occupational level. It also describes the operationalization of the closure 
1 Introduction 
 
[25| 26] 
[26|27] 
sources and the occupational-level and individual-level control variables. 
Chapter six contains the descriptive statistics, and chapter seven delivers 
the results of the analyses. Chapter eight presents the summary and 
chapter nine the conclusions. 
  
2 Beyond the Norm–Temporary Employment Contracts and 
Occupations 
Modern Western industrial nations base their employment relations on the 
normative framework of standard work arrangements (Mückenberger 
1985; Kalleberg 2000). The term “standard work arrangements” refers to 
full-time work that is performed on an indefinite basis at the employer’s 
place of business under the employer’s direction (Kallerberg 2000, p. 
341). The social security systems of many industrial nations are based on 
the norm of “standard” employment. However, this norm is declining and 
temporary employment is in the ascent (e.g., Beck 1999; Kalleberg 2000; 
Heinz 2003, pp. 185-201; Gallagher and Sverke 2005; Blossfeld et al. 
2006; Kalleberg 2011; Allmendinger et al. 2013). Temporary employment 
contracts are defined as contracts that have a fixed termination date or a 
fixed reason for termination. These contracts dissolve automatically if the 
specified date is reached or a contractually defined reason ceases to exist 
(e.g., when an absent employee returns from sick leave). Temporary 
employment contracts provide organizations with the flexibility to cope 
with fluctuations in the demand for goods or services
8
, help them to keep 
costs low, and to gain advantages in the (global) economic competition 
(Abraham 1988; Bollinger et al. 1991, pp. 187-188; Davis-Blake and Uzzi 
1993, p. 193; Matusik and Hill 1998, pp. 681-682; Kaiser and Pfeiffer 
____________________ 
8  The literature on nonstandard employment differentiates between four basic 
organizational strategies for adapting to volatilities on the product market and 
economic cycles (e.g., Atkinson 1984; OECD 1986; Dragendorf et al. 1988, p. 
113; Rubery and Grimshaw 2003; Keller and Seifert 2007; Bukodi et al. 2008, 
pp. 5-6): Numeric external strategies allow organizations to adapt to changes by 
recruiting new employees from external sources if needed and just for the time 
needed (e.g., temporary employment contracts). Numeric internal strategies do 
not depend on external resources, but use and reorganize the internal resources 
the organizations already have (e.g., part-time work, overtime). An adaptation to 
economic cycles that follows the external-functional pathway outsources internal 
processes (contract work). An internal functional path adjusts the qualification of 
the employees (increasing productivity and fields of assignment) or stimulates 
internal mobility processes (see Giesecke 2006, pp. 46-47). 
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2001; Hagen and Boockmann 2002; Boockmann and Hagen 2003; Hagen 
2003; Pfeifer 2005, 2006; Struck 2006; Sesselmeier 2007; Hohendanner 
and Gerner 2010)
9
 . Temporary employment contracts also provide 
employers with an important instrument for human resources management 
(Bollinger et al. 1991, pp. 186-188). They are used to discourage 
undesired collective action that would lead employers to refuse to renew 
their employees’ contracts (e.g., Mückenberger 1989, Davis-Blake and 
Uzzi 1993; Uzzi and Barsness 1998; Nienhüser 2007). Used as a screening 
instrument, temporary employment contracts serve as prolonged 
probationary periods that help employers predict the long-term 
productivity of future employees (Doeringer and Piore 1971; Abraham 
1988; Korpi and Levin 2001; Boockmann and Hagen 2008). Temporary 
employment contracts that perform a screening function are thus often 
considered to serve as a bridge into permanent employment because they 
give potential employees the opportunity to demonstrate their skills and 
motivation (Abraham 1988; OECD 1998; Wang and Weiss 1998; 
Houseman 2001; Booth et al. 2002; Gangl et al. 2003; Zijl et al. 2004; 
McGinnity et al. 2005; DiPrete 2005; DiPrete et al. 2006; Gash and 
McGinnity 2007; Gash 2008; Gebel 2013). Additionally, temporary 
employment contracts are a necessary measure for employers who need to 
cope with internal personnel fluctuations due to, for example, sick leave 
(e.g., Seifert and Pawlowsky 1998; Houseman 2001). 
The various approaches that explain the use of temporary employment 
contracts focus strongly on organizations. Therefore, it comes as no 
surprise that the determinants of temporary employment are primarily 
derived from theories that focus on organizations: firm-specific human 
capital, firm-internal labor markets, and transaction costs. In the next 
____________________ 
9  Temporary employment contracts fulfill a buffer function that allows 
organizations to reconcile the available (future) manpower with the (future) 
product demand (Engels et al. 1986; OECD 1986, 1994; Pfeffer and Baron 1988; 
Abraham 1988; Bentolila and Bertola 1990; Bollinger et al. 1991; Davis-Blake 
and Uzzi 1993; Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1994; Booth 1997; Siebert 1997; Bender 
et al. 2000; Houseman 2001; Kaiser and Pfeiffer 2001; Hagen and Boockmann 
2002; Hagen 2003; Meyer and Pfeifer 2005; Pfeifer 2005, 2006; for a labor 
shortage perspective see: Barry and Crant 1994; Uzzi and Barsness 1998; 
Kalleberg et al. 2003). 
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section I will introduce these theories and will critically review their 
assumptions. I will point out that the theoretical focus on organizations is 
not sufficient to explain the variation in employees’ of holding temporary 
employment contracts. Employees may benefit from various sources of 
occupational closure; these closure sources change the equilibrium 
between occupation-specific labor supply and occupation-specific labor 
demand, which might change the organization’s management of 
occupational incumbents and thereby change their risk of temporary 
employment. 
2.1 Theories on the Determinants of Temporary Employment 
Who gets a temporary employment contract? There are three major 
theoretical approaches that explain when individuals are more likely to 
hold temporary employment contracts: human capital theory, internal 
labor market theory
10
, and the transaction costs approach. All three 
theories concur that individuals are less likely to hold temporary 
employment contracts if they have a high amount of firm specific human 
capital and if their productivity is difficult to monitor or to evaluate (e.g., 
Davis-Blake and Uzzi 1993; Barry and Crant 1994; Uzzi and Barsness 
1998; Masters and Miles 2002; Giesecke and Groß 2003; Kalleberg et al. 
2003; Polavieja 2003; McGinnity et al. 2005; Giesecke 2006; Giesecke 
and Schindler 2008). In these cases, both the employees and employers 
have an interest in long-term employment relationships. Employees seek 
stability whereas the employers want to exclude outside competition. To 
keep employees’ productivity high in the absence of competition, 
governance structures like career ladders with highly stratified and 
distinctive job titles are introduced, which results in the emergence of 
____________________ 
10  The internal labor market theory is just one of many theories that are usually 
subsumed under the label of “segmented labor market theories”. However, the 
majority of these segmentation theories (e.g., dual labor markets or open and 
closed positions) explain the characteristics of different labor market segments 
with the presence or absence of internal labor markets (Kalleberg and Sørensen 
1979, p. 359; Pfeffer and Cohen 1984, p. 551). By addressing internal labor 
market theory, I will focus on the common base on which all the segmented labor 
market theories rest. 
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internal labor markets (e.g., Edwards 1979, p. 21; Pfeffer and Cohen 1984, 
pp. 554-555; Goldthorpe 2000; Sørensen 2000; Polavieja 2003, p. 504). 
The most important theory used by researchers interested in the 
determinants of temporary employment is human capital theory, which 
stresses the fact that employees differ in their productivity due to training 
and education (Becker 1962, 1964, Mincer 1974). Becker differentiates 
between specific human capital that is acquired on the job and general 
human capital that is acquired through schooling (for example: education, 
training, and higher education). General human capital increases the 
productivity of employees in a broad variety of organizations. Since 
investments in general human capital would be lost if employees moved 
from one company to another, employers would only provide general 
human capital if they didn’t have to pay the costs (Becker 1964, p. 21). 
Specific human capital also increases the productivity of employees, but 
from the perspective of the employer ideally only within their own 
organization. If employees with specific human capital switch employers, 
this would result in a loss, not only for their employer, but also for the 
employees themselves, since their gains in productivity (and therefore 
earnings) through specific human capital are not transferable to other 
organizations (Becker 1964, p. 27). Becker argues that employers try to 
secure their investments in specific human capital and posits that wage 
premiums are the best means to doing so. However, many researchers 
have applied his arguments to the use of permanent and temporary 
employment contracts, which employers might also use to secure 
investments in firm-specific human capital (e.g., Giesecke and Groß 2003, 
168; Giesecke and Groß 2004; Mertens and McGinnity 2004; Kurz et al. 
2005, pp. 64-65; McGinnity et al. 2005; Giesecke 2006, pp. 210-213; 
Gundert 2007). 
The internal labor market theory builds on Becker’s analysis but 
explicitly focuses on employers who use long-term employment contracts 
to secure specific human capital within firms (Pfeffer and Cohen 1984, p. 
552)
11
. The long-term employment contracts are part of a governance 
____________________ 
11  There is also the notion of occupational internal labor markets (e.g., Kerr 1954; 
Kalleberg and Sørensen 1979, p. 359). However, research on firm internal labor 
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structure that is specific to internal labor markets (Doeringer and Piore 
1971; Braverman 1974; Marglin 1974; Edwards 1979; Gordon et al. 
1982). Internal labor markets have a complex set of rules that determine 
the movements of employees between different jobs within their 
administrative units (Dunlop 1966, p. 32). Jobs are arranged in an orderly 
fashion, starting with port-of-entry jobs. These lines of progression 
constantly provide employees with the specific human capital that is 
necessary to move up the job ladder (Althauser and Kalleberg 1981, p. 
130). They are combined with seniority entitlements. Both of these 
elements—the job ladder and seniority entitlements—bind the employees 
to the employers and the employers to the employees (Kalleberg and 
Sørensen 1979, pp. 359-360). The governance structures of internal labor 
markets protect their employees from the competition related to the 
external market (Thurow 1975; Sørensen 1983). Employees in internal 
labor markets thus face a low risk of temporary employment, whereas 
employees in external labor markets face a high risk of temporary 
employment.  
The transaction cost approach combines the asset specificity of human 
capital theory with the governance structures of internal labor market 
theory. Starting with Williamson (1981, 1985), theorists have 
differentiated human capital by the degree of specificity and additionally 
by how separable or non-separable work relations are. The work tasks 
performed by various individuals may be inseparable in the sense that 
individuals’ productivity cannot be assessed directly by measuring their 
output (e.g., teamwork) (Williamson 1985, p. 244). If employees have a 
high amount of firm specific human capital that is combined with work-
tasks that are difficult to measure or monitor, organizations have to use 
additional governance measures to ensure that employees remain loyal to 
the firm. This is achieved through social conditioning and the provision of 
considerable job security (Williamson 1985, p. 247). According to the 
transaction cost approach, the interplay between employees’ (absent) firm-
____________________ 
markets dominates, while the notion of occupational internal labor markets is the 
least developed and explored concept of all internal labor market conceptions 
(Althauser 1989, pp. 148, 156). 
2.2 The (Neglected) Occupational Perspective on the Labor Market 
 
specific human capital and employers’ difficulty in evaluating their 
productivity determines the individuals’ risk of temporary employment. 
2.2 The (Neglected) Occupational Perspective on the Labor Market 
While the previously mentioned theories frequently address specific 
human capital and transaction costs, general human capital is rarely 
considered by research on temporary employment
12
. The exclusion of 
occupations as a manifestation of general human capital results in two 
shortcomings. First: Occupations provide employers with important 
information about the suitability of candidates for job vacancies and 
thereby foster the fragmentation of the labor market. This fragmentation 
follows the lines of different occupation-specific skills. Second: 
Depending on the requirements of a specific job, the supply of employees 
with the required occupation-specific skills might be scarce and processes 
of occupational closure may additionally alter the equilibrium between 
supply and demand to improve the position of the occupations’ 
incumbents (e.g., Weeden 2002). Hence, an employer’s decision whether 
to use permanent or temporary employment contracts is not merely based 
on the amount of specific human capital individuals possess and the 
monitoring costs employers face; the decision is also based on the 
availability/scarcity of the occupation-specific labor supply. This section 
provides insights into the importance of both occupation-specific features 
of general human capital, which is usually neglected by research that 
addresses the determinants of temporary employment.  
1) Although I initially indicated that the bulk of research on the 
determinants of temporary employment turn a blind eye to occupations, 
most studies at least mention occupations in passing but treat them 
____________________ 
12  Some researchers argue that upper-secondary level occupational qualifications 
can be equated with firm-specific human capital (Giesecke and Groß 2002; 
Giesecke and Groß 2003; Giesecke and Groß 2004; Giesecke 2006; Giesecke and 
Groß 2007). However, they ignore the fact that these qualifications are not 
specific to one organization. I follow Becker’s original definition of general 
human capital, which is applicable in a broad range of employers, in contrast to 
specific human capital, which is ideally applicable only to one employer (Becker 
1964). 
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superficially; they only control for crude occupational categories like 
“technical”, “sales”, or “operative”, or they aggregate occupations in 
social classes like “skilled manual workers” or “professionals, 
administrators, and managers” (e.g., Goldthorpe 2000; McGinnity et al. 
2005; Gundert 2007). These kinds of generalized occupational categories  
“are merely linguistic proxies for an uncharted population of distinct occupational 
pursuits. […] It allows stereotypes to masquerade as knowledgeable descriptions” 
(Van Maanen and Barley 1984, p. 297). 
Research that utilizes such an aggregated view of occupations is likely to 
find no effects or only weak effects of occupations, because this view 
obscures the enormous heterogeneity within each of these “occupational” 
categories (see Freidson 1994, pp. 76-80; Hauser and Warren 1997; 
Grusky and Sørensen 1998, Grusky and Weeden 2001, 2002; Weeden and 
Grusky 2005a, 2005b, 2012; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009, p. 74). 
Other conventional human-capital-based measures usually include 
individuals’ education or their skills. Employers rarely use general human 
capital—in the sense of, for example, a university degree or technical 
skill—as a source of information when hiring new employees. The reason 
for this is that some individuals—for example, biomedical engineers and 
environmental engineers—have similar technical skills and university 
degrees, but these skills and degrees are related to entirely different task 
fields. The skills are thus not easily transferable from one task field to the 
other (e.g., Lazear 2003; Gibbons and Waldman 2006; Gathmann and 
Schönberg 2007; Kambourov and Manovskii 2009). Task-field-based 
obstacles in the transferability of employees’ skills result in the 
fragmentation of the labor market.  
“What the perfectly free market is for classical economics (see Kerr, 1950, p. 279) 
and perhaps for conventional stratification theory, and what the stratified market is 
for class theory (see Edwards, 1975), a ‘balkanized’ labor market composed of 
occupationally differentiated shelters is for occupational theory” (Freidson 1994, 
p. 82).  
However, researchers almost never consider occupations as an important 
source of labor market fragmentation. This omission is regrettable for a 
number of reasons. First, employers use occupations as predefined 
templates that signal proficiency in certain occupation-specific tasks (e.g., 
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Kerr 1954, pp. 92-96; Hall 1975, p. 71; Stolzenberg 1975, pp. 648-649; 
Mortimer and Lorence 1979; Tolbert 1996, p. 338; Grusky and Sørensen 
1998, pp. 1210-1212)
13
. Second, occupations mediate between employers’ 
demands for specific task-field related skills and employees who have 
these task-field-specific skills (e.g., Dostal et al. 1998, pp. 440; Abraham 
et al. 2011, p. 5). Third, employers may benefit from occupation-based 
signals of proficiency because they reduce search costs (Spence 1973). 
Fourth, employees also benefit from the template function of occupations: 
Employers who are in need of the occupation-specific skills now compete 
with other employers who also rely on occupations as prepackaged 
solutions and who are in need of these occupation-specific skills. It 
follows that employees are exchangeable depending on the supply of their 
occupation-specific skills, while employers also become exchangeable 
depending on their demand for the occupation-specific skills. Thus, there 
is a strong quasi-natural tendency of labor markets to become segmented 
along the borders of occupations (Stolzenberg 1975, pp. 648-649; see also 
Kerr 1954, pp. 92-96, Grusky and Sørensen 1998, pp. 1210-1212). 
2) “Organizational theorists, in particular, have almost completely ignored 
occupational phenomena, even though the interplay between occupation and 
organization clearly constitutes a central dynamic in the work lives of many 
individuals (Van Maanen and Barley 1984)” (Barley and Tolbert 1991, p. 3).  
However, the occupational fragmentation of the labor market has 
important consequences for the scarcity or abundance of the supply of 
occupation-specific skills. The fact that occupation-specific skills are both 
discretionary in character and transferable from one employer to another 
has a considerable impact on the bargaining power of employees 
(Freidson 1994, p. 42)
14
. This impact is particularly positive when the 
____________________ 
13  Post-occupationalists suggest (e.g., Casey 1995; Sennet 2000; Baetghe 2004) that 
specialization has limits and most firms will have a greater need for generalists in 
the future. Though it may be true that specialization has its limits, most firms will 
fall back on prepackaged solutions provided by the occupational division of labor 
instead of creating an independent system of job categories with their own in-
house staffing and training system. 
14  Kambourov et al. (2009) present empirical evidence that occupational experience 
(general human capital) is a major determinant of earnings while firm tenure 
(specific human capital) is only a minor determinant (see also Althauser 1989, p. 
153). 
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supply of occupation-specific skills is limited and the demand is high. The 
use of long-term employment relationships is therefore not only a result of 
the investments in firm specific human capital and does not only stem 
from problems of control and work complexity (e.g., Struck 2006, pp. 96-
97). Long-term employment contracts are also a human resources strategy 
used by employers to manage and secure scarce commodities like 
occupation-specific skills (e.g., Althauser 1989, pp. 154-156; Bridges and 
Villemez 1991; Masters and Miles 2002; Hohendanner and Gerner 2010). 
Conventional human capital theory allows for the scarcity of skills, but 
only in the short run. Skill scarcity generates high wages and thereby 
increases the mobility of employees, who will acquire the scarce skills in 
response to the market signals of high wages. However, there might be 
barriers established around occupations that prevent the restoration of an 
equilibrium between occupation-specific labor supply and labor demand. 
Hence, short-term rents are converted into long-term rents by preventing 
workers from responding to the market signal of high wages (Bol and 
Weeden 2014; Weeden and Grusky 2014, pp. 482-483). 
 
Conceptualizing employment “in terms of occupations sets off a 
different train of thought” than the conventional theoretical approaches 
described above (Standing 2009, p. 28). On the one hand, it is important 
for employers to secure scarce occupation-specific skills. On the other 
hand, occupations are surrounded by social and legal boundaries that 
might contribute to the development or preservation of this scarcity by 
reducing the occupation-specific labor supply and increasing/maintaining 
the demand for occupation-specific labor (e.g., Parkin 1979, p. 48; Van 
Maanen and Barley 1984, p. 290; Tolbert 1996; Weeden 2002). These 
social and legal boundaries might be (un-)intentionally established or 
reinforced by processes of occupational closure, which are therefore an 
important and additional determinant of temporary employment (Kerr 
1954; Hall 1975, p. 70; Beck et al. 1980, pp. 38-44; Murphy 1988; 
Weeden 2002, p. 59-60; Weeden and Grusky 2014;). Starting with a 
conceptual discussion of occupations, the following section will discuss 
the mechanisms and institutionalized sources of occupational closure and 
their theoretical impact on individuals’ risks of holding temporary 
employment contracts. 
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2.3 Occupations—An Elusive Concept 
Occupation is a loosely defined concept with a number of meanings
15
.  
“Sometimes we oppose occupations to guilds, construing occupations as a simpler 
form of identification with work. Sometimes we oppose occupations in the broad 
sense to professions, which specialize in certain kinds of expert work, and to 
crafts, which specialize in expert physical skills. Sometimes we think of 
occupations as grouped around common organizational positions, as in the 
occupation of foreman; sometimes we imagine them in terms of common physical 
capital, as in the occupation of drill press operator. Indeed, when we once begin to 
face the concept, it comes apart in our hands” (Abbott 1989, p. 274). 
For my purposes, I will define occupations as collective and competitive 
enterprises with specific tasks and skills. They compete with other 
occupations over the differentiation and combination of these tasks and 
skills (task niches) that are provided by occupational education and 
training programs
16
. There are three elements in this definition that are 
____________________ 
15  For the German discussion on the multitude of definitions see Henninges et al. 
1976; Stooß and Saterdag 1979; Beck et al. 1980; Dostal et al. 1998; Fürstenberg 
2000; Kupka 2005; Matthes et al. 2008, p. 6. 
16  Even if tasks and jobs are not occupational in nature, individuals who engage in 
similar activities have the potential to organize and initiate, or further advance a 
process of occupationalization (Krause 1971, pp. 86-88; Freidson 1994, pp. 58, 
76-78, 91; Weeden 2002, p. 58). Hughes sees a quasi-automatic psychological 
mechanism at work: Even those doing the least rewarding work are bound to 
develop collective pretensions about their given work tasks (Hughes 1994, p. 59; 
see also Pavalko 1971, pp. 193-194). Sennett specifies Hughes’s claim, adding 
that all forms of work provide people with identity as long as the tasks are 
challenging or difficult (Sennett 1998, p. 72). It should therefore “come as no 
surprise that detailed occupations continue to be one of the main social identities 
for contemporary workers” (Grusky and Weeden 2001, p. 204; see also: Krause 
1971, p. 87; Kohn and Schooler 1978; Mortimer and Simmons 1978, pp. 440-
443; Mortimer and Lorence 1979; VanMaanen and Barley 1984, pp. 298-303; 
Grusky and Sørensen 1998, pp. 1192-1196; Kohn 2001, pp. 539-540). 
Accordingly, the term occupation does not describe a fixed destination but a 
continuum that spans the ideal-type extremes of “job” versus “professional 
occupations.” Depending on the historical point in time at which specific patterns 
of manpower are considered, they can tend more towards one pole or the other. 
Yet this limitation is in keeping with the definition of occupations as collective 
enterprises that were, are, or may become sociologically meaningful or 
institutionalized (Freidson 1994, p. 76-78). 
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central for the purpose of my research: the tasks, the provision of 
occupation-specific skills in occupational education and training 
programs, and the social dimension of occupations. 
1) While there is little argument about seeing occupations as task 
bundles, there is a lot of disagreement on whether these are a mere product 
of an efficient and rational (technical) division of labor, or whether the 
division of labor is socially created (see for example Freidson 1994, pp. 
49-54, Grusky and Sørensen 1998, pp. 1192-1196). I follow Freidson 
(1994) and Grusky and Sørensen (1998), who argue that occupation-
specific work roles are the result of occupational attempts to establish 
measures of collective control (Freidson 1994, p. 58)
17
. Occupations are 
collective enterprises that compete over their specific tasks and actively 
defend or extend their claims on these tasks (Brint 1994, pp. 30-31; 
Grusky and Sørensen 1998, pp. 1192-1196). Occupations that successfully 
claim and secure task niches in the social division of labor improve the 
labor market chances of their incumbents (at the expense of related 
occupations) (Kerr 1954; Hall 1975, p. 70; Beck and Brater 1978, pp. 249-
252; Beck et al. 1980, pp. 38-44;Murphy 1988; Weeden 2002, pp. 59-60). 
2) Occupations are rarely defined by tasks alone. Most researchers also 
emphasize the relevance of education and training programs that provide 
occupation-specific skills
18
. The relevance of education and training 
____________________ 
17  “Indeed, insofar as the division of labor is represented as the outcome of 
interoccupational conflict and competition, the resulting occupations must 
perforce be taken as sociologically meaningful rather than nominal” (Grusky and 
Sørensen 1998, p. 1195; see also: Simpson et al. 1982; Freidson 1994, pp. 64-66). 
18  There are some researchers that define occupations solely through their education 
and training programs (e.g., Dunkmann 1922; Baethge and Baethge-Kinsky 
1998; Baethge 2004). They usually emphasize the mismatch between 
occupational education and training programs and the tasks and skills employers’ 
actually need. They claim this mismatch is constantly growing because of the 
increasing speed of technological and social change and that it erodes the basis of 
traditional (industrial) occupations, which are the tasks and skills education and 
training programs provide. However, this perspective ignores the simultaneous 
emergence of new occupations (Beck et al. 1980, p. 19; Mayer and Blossfeld 
1990; Müller and Shavit 1998, p. 185; Fuchs 1999; Kupka 2005, p. 30; Brückner 
and Mayer 2005; Erlinghagen 2005; Kurz et al. 2005; Mayer et al. 2010). 
 This strand of thought first came up during the Industrial Revolution in Germany, 
where the traditional crafts and professions were displaced by new industrial 
occupations (see Fischer 1918; Dunkmann 1922; Scharmann 1956; Schelsky 
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programs for the conception of occupations relies strongly on classical 
sociological authors like Max Weber. Weber defines occupations as 
follows:  
“The term ‘occupation’ (Beruf) will be applied to the mode of specialization, 
specification, and combination of the functions of an individual so far as it 
constitutes for him the basis of a continuous opportunity for income and earnings” 
(Weber 1978, p. 140).  
The degree of access to valued resources within a society depends on the 
individuals’ combination of functions or tasks. Yet in Weber’s view, 
occupations only constitute continuous opportunities for income and 
earnings if they are based on formal education and training programs.  
“It is only functions which require a certain minimum of training and for which 
opportunity of continuous remuneration is available which become the objects of 
independent and stable occupations” (Weber 1978, pp. 141-142)19.  
Occupational education and training programs are crucial to enable 
occupational incumbents to perform a complex of occupation-specific 
tasks, which creates a fragmentation of the labor supply and labor demand. 
As a consequence, boundaries between occupations emerge (Kerr 1954; 
Stolzenberg 1975). Employers rely on occupations as a source of 
information about the suitability of employees for vacant positions that 
____________________ 
1965, Beck et al. 1980, pp. 15-19). Given this (repeating) history, it is ironic that 
the current post-occupational discussion sees the industrial occupations as the 
ideal type of occupations. This ideal type of industrial occupation is considered to 
be under constant threat because of the shift from an industrial to a service 
economy (again without considering the emergence of new service occupations) 
(Baethge and Baethge-Kinsky 1998; Baethge 2001; Berger et al. 2001; Daheim 
2001; Baethge 2004; a similar line of post-occupational discussions is presented 
by Rifkin 1995, Casey 1995, Sennett 1998, Doherty 2009). 
19  Because of Weber’s notions about continuity and stability, short term and 
discontinuous employment relations are often seen as contradicting his definition 
of occupations. But Weber explains further that “occupational specialization does 
not necessarily imply continuous rendering of services […]. Other forms are not 
only possible but common: (1) Propertyless occupationally specialized workers 
may be employed on an occasional basis as needed in the service of either 
consumers in household units or employers in profit-making enterprises” (Weber 
1978, p. 142). Continuous employment is not an essential element of 
occupations. Essential elements of occupations are the specialization, 
specification, and combination of tasks or functions that are attained through 
education. 
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demand certain combinations of tasks and skills. They also provide 
individuals with information about what work conditions and earnings 
they can expect. 
3) Occupational education and training also has an important impact on 
the formation of occupational identities (Durkheim 1988, 1991; Hughes 
and Coser 1994)
20
 and the employability of the occupational incumbents. 
Only occupations whose members share the same values and a sense of 
identity can become collective enterprises (see: Caplow 1954; Braude 
1975, pp. 83-87; Collins 1979, p. 59; Van Maanen and Barley 1984, p. 
291; Corsten 1995, pp. 41-42; Rothmann 1998, pp. 5-6; Grusky and 
Sørensen 1998, pp. 1196-1198; Kupka 2005, p. 24). 
2.4 No Trespassing—The Mechanisms and Sources of Occupational 
Closure 
The existence of occupation-specific sets of tasks and skills results in an 
occupational fragmentation of the labor market, which may be reinforced 
by institutionalized barriers (Kerr 1954, Stolzenberg 1975, Beck et al. 
1980; Sengenberger 1987, Grusky and Sørensen 1998, pp. 1210-1212). 
These barriers are created by legal and normative provisions that limit 
access to occupations to a small circle of qualified individuals (Parkin 
1979, p. 3). Max Weber (1978) refers to this process as social closure. 
“Social closure, according to Weber (1978, pp. 43-46, 339-48, 926-55), 
occurs wherever the competition for a livelihood creates groups interested 
____________________ 
20  For some authors, occupational identity is a key element that defines occupations. 
For example, Van Maanen and Barley describe an occupation as a group of 
individuals “who consider themselves to be engaged in the same sort of work 
[…]” (Van Maanen and Barley 1984, p. 295; see also: Hall 1975, p. 3-5; 
Mortimer and Lorence 1979; Statistisches Bundesamt 1992, p. 15; Freidson 
1994, p. 86; Hughes 1994, pp. 59-63; Biersack and Parmentier 2002, pp. 480-
481; Standing 2009, p. 11). The minimum requirement for a shared identity (or 
character as Sennett puts it) is a shared narrative of difficulties (Sennett 1998, p. 
147). 
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in reducing that competition” (Weeden 2002, p. 58). It is an important 
basis for unequal labor market opportunities
21
. 
Analogous to Weber’s (1978) concept of social closure, occupational 
closure refers to mechanisms that continuously establish, contest, or 
reinforce institutional boundaries around occupations (e.g., Kerr 1954; 
Hall 1975, p. 70; Parkin 1979, p. 48; Beck et al. 1980, pp. 38-44; Van 
Maanen and Barley 1984, p. 290; Murphy 1988; Hughes 1994; Weber 
1978, 2001, pp. 83-87; Brint 1994, p. 23; Freidson 1994; Tolbert 1996; 
Weeden 2002;). These boundaries affect employees’ negotiating power, 
their labor market opportunities, and thus, their labor market related risks, 
like the employee’s risk of holding a temporary employment contract 
(Freedman 1976; Beck et al. 1980, pp. 77-78; Weeden 2002; Haupt 
2012)
22
. Kim Weeden (2002) identifies four different mechanisms of 
occupational closure that create and reinforce these boundaries: restricting 
the occupation-specific labor supply, increasing the diffuse demand, 
channeling the demand for tasks and services to an occupation, and 
signaling of quality (Weeden 2002, p. 60). 
The restriction of the occupation-specific labor supply (hereinafter 
referred to as the “restricting supply mechanism”) is the primary closure 
mechanism researchers usually consider, if they account for occupational 
closure at all. They take this mechanism into consideration to analyze 
inequalities in the distribution of earnings (e.g., Weeden 2002; Kleiner 
2006; Weeden et al. 2007; Kleiner and Krüger 2010; Abraham et al. 2011; 
Groß 2012; Haupt 2012; Bol and Weeden 2014). These studies use the 
concept of rents to explain the impact of this closure mechanism on 
inequalities in earnings. Rents exist where demand for an asset exceeds 
the supply and where the supply is fixed, for example, through political 
barriers that artificially restrict supply (e.g., Sørensen 1996; 2000; 
____________________ 
21  “Usually one group of competitors takes some externally identifiable 
characteristic of another group of (actual or potential) competitors – race, 
language, local or social origin, descent, residence, etc. – as a pretext for 
attempting their exclusion“(Weber 1978, p. 342). 
22  This does not mean that all members of an occupation benefit equally from 
closure. However, the overall labor market chances that are provided by 
occupations will benefit or harm all its members, but not all to the same degree 
(Weeden 2002, p. 59). 
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Congleton et al. 2008, 2010; Weeden and Grusky 2014)
23
. The artificially 
restricted supply of the asset prevents the adjustment of demand and 
supply that would occur in a free market and thus guarantees higher 
earnings (Berlant 1975, p. 54). Even if rents explicitly refer to wages, the 
underlying logic is also applicable to temporary employment. Barriers to 
entering the labor market create a disjuncture between the labor supply 
and employer demand for a particular type of labor. This improves 
working conditions within the occupations—whether in the form of higher 
pay or in the form of greater job stability through permanent employment 
contracts.  
An increase in diffuse demand (hereinafter referred to as the “increasing 
diffuse demand mechanism”) ensures that the benefits produced by the 
restrictions in the labor supply can be obtained. A constant demand for 
occupation-specific tasks and skills is necessary or the restriction of the 
labor supply will have no effect (e.g., Brint 1994, pp. 76-77). Maintaining 
constant demand for occupation-specific work or services is thereby 
essential for occupations that want to avoid ending up in the “dustbin of 
history with railroad dispatchers, dancing masters, and psychological 
mediums (Abbott 1988, pp. 29-30)” (Weeden 2002, p. 65).  
The channeling of demand to occupations (hereinafter referred to as the 
“channeling demand mechanism”) reduces the competition with other 
occupations over their profitable task niches (Beck and Brater 1976, p. 
246; Abbott 1988). The beneficiaries need to have tools at their disposal 
that allow them to restrict competition with other occupations. If they do 
not restrict the competition with other occupations, employers will 
alternatively choose employees from related occupations with similar sets 
of tasks and skills. Consequently, the demand for specific tasks and skills 
has to be channeled to the specific occupation to prevent other occupations 
from cashing in and thereby driving the closure rent down (Berlant 1975, 
p. 48; Weeden and Grusky 2014, pp. 482-483). 
Signals of quality indicate the appropriateness of individuals for 
positions that demand certain tasks and skills. They are based on 
occupations as labels, which instantly invoke stereotypes about the set of 
____________________ 
23  Weeden and Grusky define rent “as returns on an asset (e.g., labor) in excess of 
what is necessary to keep that asset in production in a fully competitive market” 
(2014, p. 474) 
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skills the occupational members are known to have or believed to have. 
Employers can rely on these stereotypical templates to assess which 
individuals are (believed to be) best trained to perform a vacant position 
effectively, efficiently, and at a particular level of quality (e.g., Hall 1975, 
p. 71; Stolzenberg 1975; Abbott 1988; Tolbert 1996, p. 338; Weeden 
2002, pp. 66-67). 
According to Weeden (2002, p. 67), successful signaling of quality has 
the effect that consumers are willing to pay more for occupational 
services. However, this mechanism of occupational closure works 
differently when applied to temporary employment. Successful signaling 
increases the employer’s general willingness to choose members of one 
occupation above members of other occupations. This is because the 
signal of quality promises a guaranteed minimum level of quality (skills 
and knowledge) and thereby a minimum level of productivity. Members of 
other occupations may have signals that also promise a certain level of 
productivity, but the signal quality may be lower or there may be no 
signals at all. In the latter case, employers would have to rely on 
ineffective and costly trial and error procedures to determine the 
suitability and productivity of these individuals for vacant positions 
(Arrow 1972; Spence 1973; Thurow 1975; Solga and Konietzka 1999; 
Haupt 2012; Stuth and Hennig 2014).  
If successful signaling increases employers’ willingness to choose 
members of one occupation rather than members of other occupations, 
then signaling does not constitute a closure mechanism on its own. The 
true mechanism underlying signaling is the channeling mechanism—
signaling channels demand to occupations. In contrast to Weeden (2002), I 
will therefore subsume the signaling of quality mechanism into the 
channeling demand mechanism. 
Weeden (2002) introduces institutionalized sources of closure as 
proxies for closure mechanisms because closure mechanisms (e.g., supply 
side restrictions) are not directly measurable. Yet it is possible to measure 
the strength of institutions through closure sources that create, for 
example, supply-side restrictions. Closure sources are institutionalized 
occupational practices that trigger one or more closure mechanisms and 
thereby help to create or ensure occupations remain labor market shelters 
(Freidson 1994, pp. 83-84; see also Parkin 1979; Weeden 2002). 
However, closure sources differ in their social and economic payoff 
because each institutionalized closure source triggers different closure 
mechanisms. The more closure mechanisms are triggered by an 
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occupation, the lower the risk that its incumbents will hold temporary 
employment contracts should be. 
At this point, it is worth noting why the term “source” is used here and 
not “strategy”. In fact, Weeden (2002) originally used the term “closure 
strategies” instead of “closure sources”. However, the term “strategy” 
implies some degree of intentional occupation-based collective action. To 
account for the fact that occupational closure may exist without 
occupations actively pursuing closure strategies, Weeden suggested using 
the term “closure source” instead. 
In the following sections I introduce five closure sources 
(credentialism, licensing, preserving occupational specificity, 
representation by occupational associations, and unionization) and 
elucidate their impact on the individual’s risk of holding a temporary 
employment contract. 
2.4.1 Credentialism 
Social closure can be based on virtually any group attribute, like race, 
religion, regional origin, or social origin etc. (Weber 1978, p. 342), but 
credentials are the main sources of social closure in modern societies 
because they make it possible “to control and monitor entry to key 
positions in the division of labor” (Parkin 1979, p. 48). Credentials 
provide a signal that certain characteristics have been acquired in formal 
training or education programs. Credentials persist for a number of 
reasons—for one, they are important for guaranteeing efficient 
performance—but the primary interest of credential providing bodies is in 
limiting the supply of candidates for the benefit of a given occupation 
(Weber 1978, p. 344)
24
.  
“If we hear from all sides demands for introduction of regulated curricula  
culminating in specialized examinations, the reason behind this is, of course, not a 
suddenly awakened ‘thirst for education,’ but rather the desire to limit the supply 
of candidates for these positions and monopolize them for the holders of 
____________________ 
24  “The smaller and the more exclusive such a circle is, the higher will be both the 
economic value and the social prestige of membership” (Weber 1978, p. 347). 
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educational patents” (Weber 1978, p. 1000; also see: Larson 1977; Collins 
1979)25.  
The supply of candidates can be formally controlled by recruiting people 
into education and training tracks, training them, and requiring them to sit 
examinations. The examination and training processes that candidates 
must complete are often challenging, and thus, they give the occupations 
direct control over the supply of (successful) candidates (Weber 1978, pp. 
999-1000; 2001, p. 87; also see: Berlant 1975, p. 182; Larson 1977, p. 55; 
Parkin 1979, p. 60-64; Beck et al. 1980, pp. 43-48; Murphy 1988, p. 9; 
Sørensen 1996, pp. 1346-1347; Weeden 2002, p. 62). The occupations 
may also exert indirect control by defining necessary preconditions for 
entering the education and training programs (Caplow 1954, p. 105; 
Parkin 1971, p. 21). If the number of potential candidates increases, 
training or examination standards may be raised to ensure or maintain the 
scarcity of the credentials (Caplow 1954, p. 105; Larson 1977, p. 52; 
Freidson 1994, p. 83-84;), because “[…] it is the degree of scarcity 
relative to demand which largely determines occupational reward” (Parkin 
1971, p. 21, also see: Larson 1977, p. 48; Collins 1979, p. 27; Beck et al. 
1980, p. 79; Müller and Shavit 1998). 
Weber argues that examinations are a means of selection by 
qualification. He also notes that formal training dispenses with the need 
for talent (charisma) and replaces it with the need for economic capital 
because formal training and education requires considerable investments 
of time and capital. Occupational candidates also have to comply with 
cultural requirements. Occupations may have minimum prerequisites that 
are necessary to get access to their education and training programs; they 
demand prestigious school-leaving certificates.  The problem is that the 
educational system that grants the school leaving certificates is biased in 
favor of the culture of the middle class and discriminates “against those 
who do not use its vocabulary and do not refer to the same literary classics 
____________________ 
25  “Even in so modest a form as a letter of reference, credentialism is intrinsically 
exclusionary, for if one person has a letter and the other has not, the other may 
not be able to gain the opportunity to work” (Freidson 1994, p. 160; see also 
Parkin 1979, p. 58). 
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or technicist ideals” (Collins 1975, p. 87; also see: Bourdieu and Passeron 
1970; Collins 1971, 1979; Bourdieu 1987, Murphy 1988)
26
. 
Raising the entry requirements by requiring school-leaving certificates 
has a selective effect on the composition of potential candidates. However, 
this kind of social closure does not reduce the absolute number of 
candidates but ensures that their habitus matches the habitus of the 
occupational group members (Collins 1971, 1975, p. 87, 1979; Beck et al. 
1980)
27
. Any occupation seeking to control or reduce the number of their 
credentialed members would instead restrict the supply of education and 
training opportunities or make it more difficult to successfully complete 
the education and examination processes (e.g., Larson 1977, p. 52). 
Hypothesis 1: A worker’s risk of holding a temporary employment 
contract is not only based on his/her individual skills, but on the 
competitive supply of their credentialed occupation-specific skills
28
. 
Occupations with a low supply of individuals with occupation-specific 
credentials reduce competition between their members and simultaneously 
increase competition between employers, who have to rely on the reduced 
occupation-specific workforce. Employers may now decide to use 
permanent employment contracts more often to secure the scarce 
occupation-specific skills. In contrast, incumbents of occupations with a 
____________________ 
26  The argument Weber makes regarding the need for economic capital also holds 
true for cultural capital. Setting minimum schooling requirements to enter an 
occupational training track replaces the individual’s talent with the cultural 
and/or economic capital of his/her parents (Weber 1978, p. 999-1000; 2001, p. 
87). However, Murphy stresses the point that these exclusionary rules are set up 
for protective purposes and that inter-generational (im)mobility is not a foregone 
conclusion (1988, p. 12; also see Parkin 1979, pp. 60-64). “In other words, 
although the typical bourgeois family will certainly be better equipped than most 
to cope with the closure system on its children’s behalf, it must still approach the 
task more in the manner of a challenge with serious risks attached than as a 
foregone conclusion” (Parkin 1979, p. 63). 
27  “A large and widely dispersed supply of cultural currency makes resources 
available to many groups in the population for organizing themselves in this 
struggle, which may then result in the proliferation of monopolized occupational 
enclaves” (Collins 1979, p. 65). 
28  “[…] the worker gets his security not from the individual employer but from his 
skill, the competitive supply of which is controlled by the occupational group” 
(Kalleberg and Sørensen 1979, p. 359). 
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high supply of occupation-specific credentials should face a high risk of 
holding temporary employment contracts.  
 
Credentials also have to represent a common standard regarding the 
commodity occupational incumbents provide to employers. Employers 
will always choose individuals who have credentials of known value 
above individuals with credentials of unknown value. Therefore, it is not 
enough for the various training and education tracks to provide 
occupational incumbents with adequate training and socialization. These 
skills have “to be standardized in order to clearly differentiate their 
identity and connect them, in the minds of consumers, with stable criteria 
of evaluation” (Larson 1977, p. 14). In order to create a common standard 
on what the occupation’s commodity is, occupational education and 
training programs have to follow standardized curricula and examinations 
(e.g., Larson 1977, pp. 9-18; Allmendinger 1989; Müller and Shavit 1998, 
p. 6; Brzsinky-Fay 2012; Ebner 2013). Occupational incumbents’ 
intangible skills and knowledge become more tangible the more 
standardized formal education and training is. Standardized credentials 
represent recognizable and distinguishable occupation-specific skills and 
signal a well-defined use value
29
. They provide employers with 
information they can utilize to determine the potential productivity of 
future employees (Spence 1973; Thurow 1975; Barley and Tolbert 1991; 
Tolbert 1996, pp. 338-339; Solga and Konietzka 1999; Vicari 2014, p. 5). 
Standardized occupational credentials are thus unambiguous signals of 
craftsmanship and provide holders with an advantage over individuals 
whose credentials are unstandardized.  
Hypothesis 2: Incumbents from occupations whose credentials are 
standardized should face a low risk of holding temporary employment 
contracts because the demand for their tasks and skills is more likely to be 
channeled to their occupation. Incumbents from occupations without 
standardized credentials should not benefit from the channeling demand 
mechanism and face a higher risk of holding temporary employment 
contracts. 
____________________ 
29  Occupations establish social credit for their sets of tasks and skills through the 
claim that their members are subject to rigorous evaluations and their credentials 
thereby life-long guarantors of competence (Murphy 1988, pp. 155-158). 
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2.4.2 Licensing 
Whereas credentialism is often considered to be the most important source 
of control of the supply of occupational candidates, licensure is viewed as 
the most significant closure source. It channels the demand to an 
occupation by restricting employers in their hiring decisions. Legal 
regulations on occupation-specific tasks require employers to hire only 
licensed workers for these tasks. Licensing is therefore, theoretically, 
much more powerful than credentialism because employers are usually not 
restricted to only recruiting, for example, credentialed carpenters for 
vacant carpenter positions
30—they are free to fill positions with anyone 
they deem fit. Yet if state agencies grant licenses for occupation-specific 
tasks, true monopolizing power is established
31
. Licensing provides 
occupational incumbents with an exclusive patent on specific tasks and 
forbids members of other occupations from fulfilling these tasks under 
threat of legal prosecution (Braude 1975, p. 15; Larson 1977, pp. 14-18; 
Parkin 1979, pp. 54-60; Beck et al. 1980; Brater and Beck 1982, p. 113f.; 
Freidson 1994, pp. 80-84; Hughes and Coser 1994, p. 25; Weeden 2002, 
p. 62)
 32
. Licensing in the form of protected titles rather than tasks should 
signal quality and hence channeling the demand to the occupations in 
question (Weeden 2002, p. 66). 
Hypothesis 3: Licensing should reduce the risk of employees holding 
temporary employment contracts because it channels the demand to 
licensed occupations. 
____________________ 
30  For an extensive list of benefits or risks related to licensing of occupations see 
Bryson and Kleiner (2010, pp. 670-671) or Haupt (2014, pp. 106-107). 
31  This monopolizing effect of licensing has been extensively analyzed with regard 
to occupation’s earnings (e.g., Weeden 2002; Kleiner and Morris 2002; Bryson 
and Kleiner 2010; Kleiner and Krueger 2010; Haupt 2012a; Bol and Weeden 
2014; Bol 2014). 
32  “The possession of the license implies propriety in activity associated with the 
work specialty” (Braude 1975, p. 15). 
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2.4.3 Occupational Specificity 
The composition of occupation-specific tasks and skills may be wide or 
narrow. This determines the marketability of these tasks and skills (Beck 
et al. 1980, pp. 75-90; Rotolo and McPherson 2001). Occupations that 
have managed to occupy task niches that are highly marketable trigger the 
“increasing diffuse demand” closure mechanism. Beck et al. (1980, p. 90) 
argue that the marketability of an occupation’s tasks and skills is best 
described using an ideal-typical continuum that ranges from a very narrow 
set of tasks and skills to a very wide set of tasks and skills. Occupations 
with a wide range of tasks and skills can grant access to a multitude of 
different positions. They guarantee basic employability (Beck et al. 1980, 
p. 82; Witte and Kalleberg 1995; Hoffmann et al. 2011; Streeck 2011, pp. 
4-5) and provide a constant demand for occupation-specific services. 
Occupational incumbents with narrow sets of tasks and skills are not as 
mobile as occupational incumbents with a wide range of tasks and skills 
(Iversen and Soskice 2001, p. 875). If the position of an individual with 
narrow tasks and skills is no longer required, employers will have very 
limited options to reassign these employees to jobs within the organization 
where they would be equally productive. Hence, according to this logic, 
belonging to an occupation with a narrow set of tasks increases the 
probability of temporary employment for these individuals. 
However, proponents of the signaling theory would argue that the 
opposite is the case. An occupation is highly marketable when its range of 
tasks and skills is narrow and less marketable when this range is wide. The 
reasons for this are as follows: Signaling theory (Arrow 1972; Spence 
1973; Thurow 1979; Williamson 1981) argues that employers need 
information about the suitability of applicants for available positions, their 
potential productivity, and the induction costs to decide with whom to fill 
vacant positions. It is not possible for employers to estimate with certainty 
how potential employees will perform. To fill positions with suitable 
employees despite this uncertainty while also minimizing recruitment and 
headhunting costs, employers use a variety of information sources—
signals—to evaluate the potential suitability of applicants. The occupation 
of a potential employee provides employers with information, but the 
value of the information varies across occupations (Haupt 2012; Stuth and 
Hennig 2014). The signaling value of an occupation depends on the 
narrowness or wideness of the occupation in question. Narrow 
occupational task profiles send strong and clear signals to potential 
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employers as to whether and how well applicants are suited for available 
positions (Hall 1975, pp. 71; Stolzenberg 1975; Larson 1977, pp. 9-18, 40-
48; Mortimer and Lorence 1979, Allmendinger 1989; Tolbert 1996, p. 
338; Müller and Shavit 1998, p. 6). Employers will therefore prefer 
incumbents of occupations with narrow task profiles to fill vacant 
positions (channeling demand). Occupations with wide task profiles can 
be widely deployed (Beck et al. 1980, p. 90; Abraham et al. 2011, pp. 8-
9.), but they only have a limited signaling function for employers as it 
remains unclear whether wide task profiles match specific job 
requirements.  
According to the mobility perspective of Iversen and Soskice (2001), 
occupations with a wide range of tasks should trigger the “increasing 
diffuse demand” mechanism, whereas the signaling perspective assumes 
that incumbents of occupations with a narrow range of tasks should trigger 
the “channeling demand” mechanism. Both theoretical approaches have 
valid arguments. I will therefore assume that there is an association 
between narrow and wide sets of tasks and temporary employment. 
However, because it is not possible to theoretically determine the direction 
of this association, I propose a bidirectional hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: The lower mobility of employees with a narrow range of 
tasks should increase their risk of temporary employment because 
employers will be reluctant to grant permanent employment contracts to 
individuals who cannot be efficiently reassigned within their organization. 
Hypothesis 5: Employers will use temporary employment contracts 
more often when the fit between job requirements and the individuals’ 
task profiles is uncertain, which is the case for occupations with a wide 
range of tasks and skills. 
 
The tasks and skills that occupations provide also differ in their degree 
of uniqueness. Occupations that provide employers with unique tasks and 
skills guarantee their members exclusivity (Beck et al. 1980, p. 872; Van 
Maanen and Barley 1984). Occupations with exclusive sets of tasks and 
skills trigger the channeling demand closure mechanism. The intersection 
between occupations’ relatively unique task niches and the task niches of 
other occupations is small. Hence, there is little competition between 
occupational incumbents with incumbents of other occupations for vacant 
positions that require these unique tasks and skills. Employers have to rely 
on the occupational workforce if they require their specific skills. 
Members of occupations with common sets of tasks and skills share a lot 
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of their tasks and skills with other occupations and thus face an increased 
level of competition (e.g., Rotolo and McPherson 2001; Abraham et al. 
2011, p. 9; Streeck 2011, pp. 22-23). The segmentation of the labor 
markets for these occupations is imperfect, and the barriers between the 
occupation-specific labor markets are low. However, unique tasks and 
skills should be a relatively rare phenomenon because other occupations 
will encroach on exclusive tasks and skills and try to integrate them into 
their inventories of tasks and skills so that they can cash in on and profit 
from their exclusivity (Freidson 1994, p. 85). 
Hypothesis 6: Temporary employment contracts will be rare in 
occupations with unique tasks because employers strongly rely on the 
workforce of these occupations and do not have the possibility to 
substitute these individuals with incumbents from other occupations. 
2.4.4 Occupational Associations 
There is little empirical evidence on whether occupational associations are 
an important source of occupational closure or not
33
, but there are ample 
theoretical arguments proposing that occupational associations are 
important organizational actors that represent occupations in their upward 
mobility project (Pavalko 1971; Braude 1975; Larson 1977; Van Maanen 
and Barley 1984; Abbott 1988; Weeden 2002). I will consider two 
features of occupational associations that allow associations to further the 
interests of the occupations they represent: First, occupational associations 
act as lobby groups, and second, they attempt to establish or maintain 
social credit and professional ethics
34
. 
____________________ 
33  Weeden, for example, found no association between occupational associations on 
wages, net of other sources of occupational closure (Weeden 2002), while a study 
on closure in Germany found an association between occupational associations 
and occupational mobility, also net of other sources of occupational closure 
(Hoffmann et al. 2011). 
34  I present only a very narrow set of functions occupational associations perform 
because my theoretical approach focuses on occupational closure. For a more 
comprehensive review of functions occupational associations may perform, see 
Caplow (1954), Millerson (1964), and Daheim (1967). 
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The baseline function of each occupational association is to lobby on 
behalf of the occupations they represent by engaging in PR campaigns on 
behalf of their occupational incumbents (Weeden 2002, p. 65). Lobbying 
is an attempt to trigger the “increasing diffuse demand” closure 
mechanism. Occupational associations address the general public through 
advertisements, or lobby the government on the federal or state level for 
regulations to maintain or increase demand for occupation-specific goods 
or services (see Weeden 2002, pp. 65-66). Lobbying attempts on the part 
of occupational associations may aim to increase state or federal 
expenditure on public services (e.g., increased education spending affects 
all education related occupations) or introduce laws that oblige the public 
to make use of certain occupational services (for example: In Germany, 
house owners have to hire a chimney sweeper at legally defined intervals). 
They may also aim to increase the demand for occupational services or 
products using advertisements to address the general public. For example, 
in 2010, the chambers of crafts in Germany decided to spend 50 million 
euros over five years on an advertising campaign to emphasize the 
importance of the crafts. They tried to increase the willingness of 
consumers to rely on their services and goods because of their tradition of 
providing skilled services and high quality goods
35
.  
Hypothesis 7: The lobbying activities of occupational associations may 
trigger the “increasing diffuse demand” mechanism, which in turn may 
change the equilibrium between occupation-specific labor demand and 
supply to the benefit of the occupational incumbents, who should thus face 
a low risk of holding temporary employment contracts.  
 
Occupational associations also attempt to establish/maintain social 
credit and to promote the public’s belief in the professional and ethical 
conduct of their members (e.g., Plant 2000; Haynes and Gazley 2011, pp. 
60-61). For occupations that wish to improve their public standing, it is 
important to improve and maintain occupational ethics and standards 
because it enhances the marketability of their incumbents’ tasks and skills. 
I have already pointed out that occupational training and education 
establishes standards that render occupation-specific sets of tasks and 
____________________ 
35  See, for example, this advertisement, which emphasizes the civilizing function of 
the crafts: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1TwIUgd7eb0. 
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skills distinctive, recognizable, and, in other words, marketable (Larson 
1977, p. 14). Occupation-specific standards may be violated by individual 
members that wish to maximize their individual chances and profit, and 
who thereby threaten the social credit and ethics of their occupation. Yet it 
will only be possible for occupations to ensure their tasks and skills are 
very marketable if their individual members obey the occupational 
standards (Larson 1977, p. 63)
36
. Hence, occupations have to ensure that 
occupation-specific standards are upheld. Individuals with their own 
inclinations and ambitions must be subjected to the rule of the 
occupation’s ethics and standards (Larson 1977, p. 58).  Occupational 
associations provide the necessary organizational means to establish a 
sense of occupational consciousness. They develop social networks that 
become a means of informal control between the members of occupations 
and reinforce occupational standards and ethics (Lipset et al. 1956, pp. 
106-139; Pavalko 1971, pp. 103-107; Braude 1975, pp. 83-87; Van 
Maanen and Barley 1984, pp. 331-333; Tolbert 1996, p. 339).  
“Thus, persons who may in their normal work activities be in competition with 
one another (businessmen), or physically and spatially separated (physicians, 
academicians in different universities, bricklayers working on different 
construction sites) are brought together under the aegis of the occupational 
association in such a way as to minimize their differences and maximize their 
sense of common interest, concern, and destiny” (Pavalko 1971, p. 106).  
Occupational associations also establish formal sets of sanctions and rules 
that are used to reinforce occupational identity and standards on formal 
occasions like conferences or rallies (Pavalko 1971, pp. 105-107)
37
. 
Standards of performance and conduct are reviewed, the catalogue of 
relevant work activities and techniques revised, and behavior that 
contravenes the occupational paradigm is formally or informally 
____________________ 
36  Occupational associations ideally transform loosely connected occupational 
incumbents into a Weberian-style status group. Status groups make effective 
claims on social esteem and social honor, and are often able to translate these 
claims into the monopolization of ideal and material goods and opportunities 
(Murphy 1988, p. 8). 
37  “Here the formality and dignity of ceremony can be combined with the repetition, 
rhythm, and emotional contagion of ritual to make of any occasion for interaction 
a situation in which loyalty to occupational norms and views may be further 
inculcated.“ (Braude 1975, p. 85). 
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sanctioned, including by expelling members (Braude 1975; Van Maanen 
and Barley 1984; Abbott 1988). Hence, occupational associations use 
social control to reinforce occupational standards and ethics. Social 
control is a prerequisite to establishing social credit and furthering the 
public’s belief in the professional ethics of the occupations’ incumbents.  
Hypothesis 8: Occupations’ social credit and professional ethics may 
trigger the “channeling demand” closure mechanism and thereby reduce 
the risk of their members holding temporary employment contracts. 
2.4.5 Unionization 
Unions are sometimes conceptualized as a source of occupational closure 
because unions may affect the supply of labor and thereby generate rents 
(Weeden 2002; Bol and Weeden 2014). The most direct way unions might 
affect the supply of labor is through closed-shop agreements, wherein 
employers are only allowed to hire union members. Unions can also limit 
the supply of labor through union-run apprenticeship programs, which 
limit access to training, or through collective bargaining and the threat of 
strikes (Weeden 2002, pp. 63-64; Bol and Weeden 2014). The ability of 
unions to collectively bargain may allow occupations to negotiate a 
greater share of firm profits or improved working conditions like 
permanent employment contracts (e.g., Morgan and Tang 2007, p. 276; 
Eichhorst and Marx 2012, p. 85; Weeden and Grusky 2014, p. 482).  
Hypothesis 9: Unions may trigger the restricting supply mechanism and 
thereby decrease their clients’ risk of temporary employment. 
 
There is also the theoretical possibility that unions might contribute to 
the dualization of the workforce (Polavieja 2006; Hipp et al. 2015). 
Unions may indirectly support a flexibilization at the margins if they 
concentrate on their traditional core workforce, which would put labor 
market entrants or low skilled workers at a disadvantage (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1988; Rubery 1989; Kahn 2007; Baranowska and Gebel 2010; 
Hevenstone 2010; Palier and Thelen 2010). 
Hypothesis 10: Based on the aforementioned theories, I expect that non-
core workforce populations (youths or low skilled workers) are at a higher 
risk of temporary employment within unionized occupations than within 
non-unionized occupations. 
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2.4.6 Human Capital, Internal Labor Markets, and Occupational Closure 
Human capital theory stresses the fact that employees differ in their 
productivity due to training and education (Becker 1962, 1964, Mincer 
1974). I expand the standard predictions of human capital and internal 
labor market theories by incorporating closure theory arguments. Shifting 
the analytical focus to occupational closure does not mean that I will 
abandon well-established knowledge regarding human capital and internal 
labor markets. In the following paragraphs, I will address human capital 
theory and the internal labor market approach and formulate hypotheses 
about how they theoretically interrelate with the credentialism and 
specificity closure sources with regard to temporary employment
38
. 
My exploration in this regard will not just be theoretical. In the 
empirical section, I will also check for possible interactions between the 
complexity of work tasks (monitoring costs) and the occupational closure, 
and whether occupational closure works differently within occupations 
with regard to two socio-demographic groups that almost always have the 
highest risk of temporary employment: poorly qualified individuals and 
young adults (e.g., Giesecke and Groß 2003; Mertens and McGinnity 
2004; McGinnity et al. 2005; DiPrete et al. 2006; Gundert 2007, pp. 276-
278). These analyses, however, will be exploratory in nature
39
. 
Werfhorst (2011, pp. 526-528) describes how the theoretical 
relationship between skills, human capital, firm-internal labor markets, 
and temporary/permanent employment might relate to additional 
education and training. He points out that employers might offer 
additional training for employees whose productive value is uncertain in 
____________________ 
38  The other sources of occupational closure, licensing, associations, and trade 
unions do not theoretically intersect with human capital theory, and licensing and 
associations do not theoretically intersect with the internal labor market  
approach. 
39  It is not possible to align the ample knowledge on task complexity with my skill 
complexity measure. Conventional skill measures normally use one measure for 
each skill, whereas I have to use several measures to capture the skill-level of 
tasks (see section 5.3.6). 
 Because no analysis has been done on the determinants of temporary 
employment that also includes detailed occupations and various sources of 
occupational closure, it is not possible to deduce hypotheses for both of these 
high-risk groups that are based on known facts or theories. 
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order to improve their initial qualifications and to increase their 
productivity. For employers, the uncertainty associated with occupational 
incumbents’ productive value may be indicated by the standardization of 
their credentials. If employers require instant productivity, they rely on 
individuals with highly standardized credentials. Additional education and 
training of individuals with highly standardized credentials might not 
increase their productivity much further and should have little effect on 
their risk of temporary employment. However, with regard to members of 
unstandardized occupations, additional training might substantially 
increase their productivity (Werfhorst 2011, p. 526). 
Hypothesis 11: The standardization of occupational credentials is 
theoretically interconnected with additional education and training. The 
higher initial risk of temporary employment for occupational incumbents 
with unstandardized credentials (as proposed in hypothesis 2) might be 
offset by additional education and training courses. Both the investment in 
further education and the resulting increase in productivity should 
decrease the risk of temporary employment. This offsetting feature of 
further education should be much weaker for occupations with highly 
standardized credentials, as these occupations already have a high level of 
productivity. 
 
Regarding the skill composition of occupations (narrow or wide sets of 
skills), additional education and training should positively impact both 
occupations with narrow and occupations with wide ranges of skills. 
However, when we take the role of additional education and training into 
consideration, this makes it necessary to modify the argument that narrow 
skill sets might more easily become redundant with changing technologies 
or markets (and therefore should be more often affected by temporary 
employment contracts). Allowing for an effect of education and training 
on the relationship between narrow sets of skills and temporary 
employment might seriously change this predicted outcome because these 
skill sets would change in line with the changing circumstances. In this 
context, the initial argument (hypothesis 4 – Iversen and Soskice’s (2001) 
mobility perspective) that employers will reluctantly grant permanent 
employment contracts to individuals who cannot be efficiently reassigned 
within their organization, would become obsolete. 
Hypothesis 12: Additional education and training may offset the low 
flexibility employers experience when reassigning occupational 
incumbents with narrow skill sets. Given this possibility, the incumbents’ 
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risk of temporary employment should converge between occupations with 
wide and narrow sets of skills as their participation in additional education 
and training courses increases, if hypothesis 5 (signaling perspective) is 
false.  
Hypothesis 13: Alternatively, the risk of temporary employment may 
diverge even more for incumbents of occupations with wide and narrow 
skill sets as their participation in additional education and training courses 
increases. That would be the case if both hypotheses, hypothesis 4 
(mobility) and hypothesis 5 (signaling), are true. In this particular setting, 
the mobility argument would predict a strong decrease in the risk of 
temporary employment mainly for incumbents of occupations with narrow 
sets of skills who participate in additional education and training courses. 
 
Occupational incumbents with relatively unique skills might not benefit 
at all from the uniqueness of their skills if employers can provide these 
unique skills through additional education and training courses. The 
positive aspects of an occupation inhabiting a specific task niche (low 
competition) would cease to exist, but the negative aspects would remain. 
Incumbents of occupations with relatively unique skills are restricted to a 
relatively fixed sample of possible jobs. Hence, they cannot easily avoid 
increasing competition within their niche by choosing other types of jobs. 
Hypothesis 14: If additional education and training courses grant access 
to relatively unique occupational niches, the advantage held by individuals 
in these niches would deteriorate, while at the same time, the unique 
character of their skills would tie the incumbents to their niche. The risk of 
temporary employment should increase steeply for incumbents of these 
occupations.  
A similar argument can be made for the credential inflation index. 
However, only the first half of the argument (increasing competition) also 
applies to CIX. If employers have the option to provide scarce skills 
through additional education and training courses, incumbents of 
occupations whose credentials are scarce might not benefit from the 
scarcity of their credentials and the occupation-specific skills they signify.  
Hypothesis 15: Further education might neutralize the benefits of scarce 
credentials.  
 
Organizations with internal labor markets are usually also large 
organizations, which incur lower marginal costs for additional training of 
employees than small organizations (Knoke and Kalleberg 1994, p. 538; 
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Werfhorst 2011). As a result, the use of temporary employees is more cost 
effective for large organizations than for small organizations (see Uzzi and 
Barsness 1998, p. 973). Assuming that hypothesis 15 is not true and, on 
the contrary, employers try to secure scarce occupation-specific skills 
(hypothesis 1), they might alternatively use the more cost-efficient 
temporary employment contracts for incumbents of occupations whose 
credentials are awarded in an inflationary manner. The ample supply of 
individuals with such credentials on the labor market means organizations 
do not have to rely on long-term employment contracts to secure their 
occupation-specific skills.  
Hypothesis 16: Incumbents of occupations with credentials awarded in 
an inflationary manner may face an increased risk of temporary 
employment in large organizations. 
 
Temporary employment contracts may be used by the management of 
large organizations as a critical resource to assert dominance over 
organizational labor practices. Occupational incumbents who are 
represented by occupation-specific trade unions might thus be temporarily 
employed more often in order to weaken the union’s power because 
temporary employees are harder to unionize and remind permanent 
employees of their substitutability (e.g., Pfeffer and Baron 1988; Uzzi and 
Barsness 1998). 
Hypothesis 17: Incumbents of occupations that are represented by trade 
unions might face an increased risk of temporary employment in large 
organizations. 
 
2.5 Summary on Occupational Closure and Temporary Employment 
I defined occupations by addressing three major occupational features: 
their sets of tasks and skills, which are based on occupational education 
and training programs, and their social dimension. Vocational education 
and training tracks establish occupation-specific sets of tasks, which differ 
in their scarcity or abundance. Furthermore, occupations are social groups, 
which may (un)intentionally improve the labor market chances of their 
incumbents. I introduced three different closure mechanisms that serve 
this purpose and thereby might reduce employees’ risk of holding 
temporary employment contracts: restricting labor supply, increasing 
diffuse demand, and channeling demand to occupations. Since it is not 
possible to observe these mechanisms directly, I adopt Kim Weeden’s 
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(2002) analytical approach and introduce observable closure sources that 
trigger these closure mechanisms: credentialism, licensing, occupational 
specificity, and occupational associations. 
Credentials may trigger the restricting supply  mechanism insofar as the 
credentialing institutions limit the supply of occupation-specific 
credentials. Credentials may additionally trigger the channeling demand 
mechanism, depending on their degree of standardization. Some tasks are 
legally protected by licenses, which triggers the channeling demand 
mechanism. The tasks of occupations are structured in very different ways 
and thereby might trigger the increasing diffuse demand mechanism 
and/or the channeling demand mechanism, depending on their degree of 
task specialization or the unique nature of their tasks. Occupations that 
organize themselves in associations might also trigger the increasing 
diffuse demand mechanism and the channeling demand mechanism. 
Unionization also possibly triggers the restricting supply mechanism.  
Human capital theory, the internal labor market approach, and task 
complexity may be interrelated with the previously mentioned closure 
sources. Additionally, there might be intra-occupational differences in the 
effects of the various closure sources on an individual’s risk of temporary 
employment. 
  
3 Case Selection 
There are various reasons why Germany is an ideal-typical case for 
studying the interrelationship between occupational closure and temporary 
employment. First, Germany is renowned for its occupational labor market 
and the associated upper-secondary apprenticeship training system. 
Second, in Germany, the normative framework for employment relations 
is firmly based on standard work arrangements: almost no employees want 
to have temporary employment contracts. Third, the institutional setting in 
Germany is characterized by relatively strict employment protection 
legislation, which incentivizes employers to use temporary employment 
contracts to increase their external, numerical flexibility. 
Germany therefore represents an ideal setting for the analysis of the 
association between occupational closure and temporary employment. 
Occupations are a fixed part of the labor market and the education system. 
Employers have a constant demand for external and numerical flexibility 
due to the institutional setting. Since there is almost no voluntary 
temporary employment in Germany, it is correct to assume that employees 
would always choose permanent contracts over temporary employment 
contracts. If the various sources of occupational closure improve the 
bargaining position of employees, then their risk of temporary 
employment should be systematically associated with their respective 
occupations. 
3.1 Germany as a Textbook Example of an Occupational Labor Market 
In the German labor market, occupations have an important influence on 
employees’ labor market chances in terms of (un-)employment, income, 
and promotions (e.g., Blossfeld 1985, 1990; Krüger et al. 1989; 
Büchtemann et al. 1994; Corsten 1995; Witte and Kalleberg 1995; Dostal 
et al. 1998; Berger et al. 2001; DiPrete 2002; Mayer et al. 2010; Hoffmann 
et al. 2011; Haupt 2014; Stuth and Hennig 2014). Occupations relate to 
specific fields of activity, regulate the social allocation of recognition and 
prestige, and integrate individuals into the labor market and the society 
(e.g., Dunkmann 1922; Beck et.al. 1976; Stooß 1982; Voß 1994; Kurtz 
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2001). An important characteristic of the German labor market is that 
occupations structure both the education/training system and the labor 
market: Occupational credentials are the key to accessing vacant positions 
(e.g., Marsden 1992, p. 415; Müller et al. 1998; Solga and Konietzka 
1999; Kurtz 2001; Ebner 2013; Heisig and Solga 2014). These credentials 
are characterized by more vocational than general skills and are 
constitutive of the German occupational labor market (Marsden 1992; Hall 
and Soskice 2001). Additionally, Germany is renowned for its highly 
effective apprenticeship training as part of the upper-secondary education 
and training system. It provides apprentices with standardized, high-level 
qualifications that are specialized but not narrow. Employers benefit from 
the apprenticeship system because it provides relatively large numbers of 
highly skilled workers (Facharbeiter) that are easy to retrain and to 
redeploy in firm-internal labor markets. Facharbeiter are also highly 
mobile in external labor markets due to their standardized vocational 
credentials (Marsden 1992; Müller and Shavit 1998; Streeck 2011, pp. 4-
5). In sum, Facharbeiter with upper-secondary educational credentials are 
the backbone of the German occupational labor market.  
It is important not to confuse the craft workers of Anglophone societies 
with Facharbeiter in Germany. Especially the German apprenticeship 
system is organized around sets of tasks and skills that are continuously 
broadened and updated
40
 to increase employees’ professionalism, 
versatility, and mobility (Streeck 2011, p. 24). Craft work regimes, on the 
other hand, are organized around union-imposed job territories that are 
defined by narrow task specializations, which are also necessary 
requirements for employment. Although craft occupations (Handwerk) 
may be held in low regard in Anglophone societies, this is not the case in 
Germany.  
“In this context it is interesting to remember that in the 1980s, an English 
industrial sociologist, who had studied the small-firm Handwerk sector in 
Germany, expressed his admiration for the high levels of competence he had seen 
____________________ 
40  This process of constructing and updating training occupations is a joint process 
because of the wide range of actors involved in Germany: the federal 
government, the governments of the Länder (states), the employers’ associations, 
the unions and the Institute for Occupational Research (Bundesinst itut für 
Berufsbildung (BIBB)). 
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by referring to German Handwerksberufe as `professions for the people´”(Streeck 
2011, p. 25).  
Unlike the English language, the German language does not distinguish 
between professions and craft occupations. The German word Beruf 
covers carpenters, automobile repairmen, and hairdressers as well as 
physicians, lawyers, or teachers. Therefore, when I use the term 
occupation, I refer to the whole spectrum of vocations, crafts, and 
professions that are practiced in Germany.  
3.2 The Norm of Standard Work Arrangements and the Deregulation of 
Employment Protection Legislation in Germany 
In Germany, temporary employment is involuntary. Census data show that 
nearly 99 percent of all workers with temporary employment contracts in 
Germany would rather have permanent employment contracts (German 
Microcensus 2008: own calculations; Bellmann et al. 2009, p. 379). This 
very high percentage confirms that employment relations are firmly based 
on the normative framework of standard work arrangements. This is an 
important precondition for the analyses, which are based on the 
assumption that employees will always choose permanent employment 
contracts over temporary employment contracts. 
Despite the established norm of standard work arrangements, temporary 
employment is moderately increasing (see figure 1). The share of 
employees with temporary employment contracts (in comparison to all 
employees between 15-64 years) increased from 6 percent in 1993 to 10 
percent in 2008
41
. 
____________________ 
41  See Allmendinger et al. (2013) for a comprehensive description of the trends in 
temporary employment (and various other kinds of non-standard work 
arrangements) in Germany and another 20 European countries over a period of 
16 years. 
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Figure 1: Temporary employment in Germany, 1993 to 2008 
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These changes are due to the relaxation of the legislation on temporary 
employment, which has allowed employers to circumvent the relatively 
strict employment-protection legislation. German employment-protection 
legislation presents employers with three principal challenges when they 
start dismissal processes: procedural inconveniences, notice periods, and 
severance payments
42
. The law also restricts the reasons for which 
employees can get dismissed to reasons of conduct (e.g., absenteeism) or 
____________________ 
42  For the impact of legislation on the individual’s risk of holding a temporary 
employment contract see Goux et al. (2001), Blanchard and Landier (2002), 
Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), Kahn (2007, 2010), Gebel and Giesecke (2011). 
For information on how the deregulation of employment protection for 
permanent and temporary employees ambiguously affect the individuals labor 
market chances and risks, see Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992), Bentolila and 
Dolado (1994), Cabrales and Hopenhayn (1997), Smith (1997, p. 327), Boeri 
(1999), Goux and Maurin (2000), Güell (2000a,b), Korpi and Levin (2001), 
Blanchard and Landier (2002), Cahuc and Postel-Vinay (2002), Polavieja (2003), 
Boockmann and Hagen (2005a,b), Kurz et al. (2005), Boockmann and Hagen 
(2006), Giesecke (2009), Hohendanner and Gerner (2010), Kahn (2010). 
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capacity (e.g., illness)
43
. Insufficient business is also valid grounds for 
laying employees off, but additional restrictions apply
44
. However, 
employment protection is not relevant for all employees. There are three 
categories of employees that are not eligible for employment protection: 
(1) newly hired employees (for the first six months of employment), (2) 
employees in organizations with less than ten full-time equivalent 
employees
45
, and (3) employees with temporary employment contracts. 
Even if temporary employment contracts present employers with a legal 
opportunity to circumvent the employment protection legislation, labor 
courts require companies to have “objective reasons” (sachliche Gründe) 
for using temporary employment contracts (§§ 620-628 BGB). Until the 
introduction of the Employment Promotion Act in 1985 
(Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz), it was illegal to employ workers 
without “objective reasons” on a temporary basis. Legally valid “objective 
reasons” were, for example, the need for substitutes for unavailable 
employees, or extra workers for seasonal or (scientific) project work, 
etc.
46
. Chains of temporary employment contracts were possible. The 
Employment Promotion Act from 1985 deregulated the use of temporary 
employment contracts by removing the requirement to provide “objective 
reasons” for new employees or apprentices who just finished training 
within their organization
47
. The act did not replace the old regulations, 
____________________ 
43  In situations of gross misconduct (e.g., persistent disobedience, theft), permanent 
illness and misuse of confidential information, employers are allowed to dismiss 
employees without notice (extraordinary dismissal) (Schömann et al. 1998, pp. 
38-40). 
44  Layoffs of this nature are not permitted if alternative and equivalent positions are 
available, and layoffs have to follow social criteria (seniority, age, disability, 
support of dependent relatives). There are also groups of persons to whom special 
protection applies (for example: it is not permitted to dismiss mothers-to-be until 
the fourth month after birth or members of the works council (see Zimmermann 
1997, p. 65)). 
45  This special regulation for small organizations has changed repeatedly in the last 
20 years between thresholds of five or ten full-time equivalent employees. 
46  For an extended list of valid reasons see Schömann et al. (1998, p.41), Schaub 
(1992, pp. 196-202); Rudolph (1987, p. 290) or Walwei (1990, p. 52). 
47  The Employment Promotion Act only applies if there was no previous fixed-term 
contract between the parties in the preceding four months (Schömann et al. 1998, 
p. 42). It also restricts the duration of temporary employment contracts without 
“objective reasons” to a maximum of 18 months. Newly founded organizations 
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which allowed temporary employment for “objective reasons,” but 
complemented the regulations by providing the possibility of time-
restricted temporary employment without reason. 
The Employment Promotion Act, whose validity was originally limited 
to five years, was renewed twice (1989 and 1994). It was modified in 1996 
and was valid until 2000. The amendment in 1996 made it possible to use 
temporary employment without objective reasons for all employees; it was 
no longer restricted to new employees or apprentices who finished their 
training. Additionally, the maximum duration of temporary employment 
contracts was increased to two years and employers no longer faced any 
duration-restrictions if they wanted to employ older workers (those aged 
60 years or older) on a temporary basis.   
As a result of an EU directive
48
, in the year 2000, the previous 
legislation on temporary employment was replaced with a new act on part-
time work and temporary employment contracts (TzBfG). There are still 
no time restrictions on temporary employment with valid reasons. The 
duration of these contracts is determined by the reason itself (e.g., 
substitution of employees on sick leave is for the time the sick leave 
actually takes). There are three exceptions regarding the use of temporary 
employment without valid reasons (Schaub et al. 2009, pp. 300-350): 
(1) For new employees
49
, temporary employment contracts may be 
renewed three times in a row but with an overall maximum duration of 
two years. (2) New corporations that are not older than four years are 
allowed to use temporary employment contracts for up to four years
50
. (3) 
Employers do not face any restrictions in using temporary employment 
____________________ 
that were not older than six months were allowed a maximum duration of these 
kinds of temporary employment contracts of 24 months. 
48  Council Directive 1999/70/EC of 28 June 1999 concerning the framework 
agreement on fixed-term work concluded by ETUC, UNICE and CEEP (OJ 1999 
L 175, p. 43) 
49  New employees are defined as employees that were never previously employed 
(permanently or temporarily) by the employer. 
50  This passage was not part of the original act on part-time work and temporary 
employment contracts and was added in 2003 (BGBl part 1, year 2003 nr. 67).  
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contracts without valid reasons when the employees are 52 years old or 
older
51
. 
There is an additional regulation that applies only for small 
subpopulations of the workforce—academic and artistic staff as well as 
doctors. Introduced in the year 1985, it enables universities and (partially) 
publically financed research facilities to use temporary employment 
contracts almost without restrictions
52
. Only administrative staff, junior 
professors, and professors are exempted. Since the introduction of the 
regulations, there have been changes that have led to more rigidly defined 
thresholds of the maximum duration of temporary employment contracts 
(six years for PhD students, six additional years for postdocs and nine 
years for doctors). 
 
____________________ 
51  The original law included an age threshold of 58 years of age. After two years it 
was changed to 52 years of age (BGBl part 1, year 2002 nr. 87). However, after 
this legislation was introduced, the European Court of Justice interpreted this 
procedure as age discrimination. As a result, the act on part-time work and 
temporary employment contracts was changed. Since 2007, temporary 
employment without valid reasons has been possible up to a maximum duration 
of five years for individuals aged 52 or older, if they have been unemployed for 
at least four months or are part of a publically financed employability measure 
(BGBl part 1, year 2007 nr. 15). The motivation behind these changes was to 
improve the employability of older workers. 
52  HRG §§57a-57f, ÄArbVtrG (BGBl part 1, year 1986 nr. 21), WissZeitVG (BGBl 
part 1, year 2007 no. 13), see also Giesecke (2006, p. 124) or Schaub et al. (2009, 
pp. 326-330). 
  
4 The Theoretical and Methodological Challenges of              
Operationalizing Closure Measures for Germany 
This chapter will critically discuss established measures of occupational 
closure and explain why some of them are not a good fit for the German 
labor market. Research about occupational closure in Germany usually 
draws on Weeden’s (2002) seminal work on occupational closure in the 
US, without considering national differences between the institutions of 
Germany and the US (Giesecke and Verwiebe 2009, p. 537; Groß 2009, p. 
508; Abraham et al. 2011; Hofmann et al. 2011; Groß 2012, p. 466; Bol 
and Weeden 2014; Stuth and Hennig 2014). However, these institutional 
differences between Germany and the USA make it necessary to modify 
Weeden’s (2002) operationalization of occupational closure to fit the 
German labor market. I will also discuss theoretical as well as 
methodological issues associated with measures that have not been used in 
the context of occupational closure. 
4.1 Credentialism—An Unbalanced Concept 
Research on credentialism as a closure source in Germany typically leans 
on Weeden’s (2002) operationalization of credentialism: the proportion of 
occupational incumbents with tertiary degrees (e.g., Giesecke and 
Verwiebe 2009, p. 537; Groß 2009, p. 508; Groß 2012, p. 466)
53
. Weeden 
(2002, p. 79) argues that occupations successfully establish occupational 
closure based on credentials if they require their incumbents to hold 
tertiary degrees. However, there are several reasons why the proportion of 
occupational incumbents with tertiary degrees may not be the best proxy 
for the credentialism closure source, which theoretically should trigger the 
restricting supply mechanism as well as the channeling demand 
mechanism. 
____________________ 
53  Abraham et al. (2011) base their credentialism measure on the percentage of 
occupational incumbents who only completed their basic schooling. 
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Weeden’s (2002, p. 79) argument—that any link between an occupation 
and academic knowledge is sufficient to activate the mechanisms of 
occupational closure—is not true with regard to the restricting supply 
mechanism. There are a number of occupations that require tertiary 
degrees. However, the degrees required for these occupations are not 
specified, which has substantial consequences for the degree of closure of 
these occupations. For example, executive consultants and management 
consultants have often studied subjects with very different sets of skills 
and knowledge (e.g., philosophy, history, literature, linguistics, 
economics, journalism, psychology, social science, industrial engineering, 
general physics, etc.). The approach to occupational closure through 
academic credentials proposed by Weeden (2002) would indicate that the 
consultant occupation is closed because of the high proportion of 
employees with tertiary degrees. However, an approach that does not rely 
on coarse qualification levels but on subject-of-study-specific credentials 
would show that the executive and management consultant occupation is 
not closed at all. Employers do not require candidates to have studied a 
particular academic subject to fill vacant consultant positions. The 
executive consultants and management consultants therefore fail to 
establish an occupation-specific credential on which employers mainly or 
at least partially rely. Hence, given that employers do not require subject-
specific credentials to fill vacant consultant positions, we cannot say that 
credentialism triggers the restricting labor supply mechanism—after all, 
individuals with tertiary degrees are hardly scarce in most modern 
industrialized societies
54
. Hence, in terms of their credentials, executive 
consultants and management consultants are easily exchangeable owing to 
the fact that employers have access to a large pool of employees with 
tertiary degrees
55
. The fact that some occupations require tertiary degrees 
should nevertheless be interpreted as a process of closure in the sense of 
restricted intergenerational mobility (see Hauser and Warren 1997). 
____________________ 
54  In the US, 42 percent of the population between 25 and 64 years of age has a 
tertiary degree, whereas in Germany, 27 percent of this population has a tertiary 
education degree (OECD 2012a, p. 1; Allmendinger and Driesch 2014, p. 9).  
55  The critique also applies to attempts to measure closure through apprenticeship 
training programs by using the percentage of employees within occupations 
holding vocational qualifications (Stuth et al. 2009, p. 21; Bol and Weeden 2014; 
Stuth and Hennig 2014). 
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The question remains of how one might alternatively capture the link 
between the credentialism closure source and the restricting labor supply 
mechanism. I propose to utilize the German education and training 
system, which awards occupational credentials to the majority of the 
German population. I will determine whether the supply of occupation-
specific credentials is restricted or not by analyzing the supply of newly 
credentialed incumbents for each occupation per year. Relating the 
number of newly credentialed occupational incumbents to the number of 
employed incumbents should provide a clear picture: If we see a low ratio, 
it would indicate that an occupation’s workforce is modestly reproducing 
itself and is thereby relatively small, and if we see a high ratio, it would 
indicate an occupation that awards its credentials in an inflationary 
manner and the supply of the occupation’s workforce is therefore not 
restricted at all. 
The link between credentialism and the channeling supply mechanism 
is based on the assumption that tertiary degrees are superior to other 
credentials and thereby signal quality. However, this assumption does not 
apply in the German labor market (Streeck 2011, pp. 22-26). In Germany, 
closure is also—and even to a greater extent—established at the level of 
upper-secondary (apprenticeship) qualifications (see also Bol and Weeden 
2014
56
). Although there are some recent publications that seek to avoid 
such an unbalanced approach by addressing various levels of 
qualifications on which occupational closure might be established 
(Konietzka 1999; Solga and Konietzka 1999; Stuth et al. 2009, p. 21; 
Haupt 2012; Bol and Weeden 2014; DiPrete et al. 2014; Stuth and Hennig 
2014)
57
, it is nevertheless important to bear this feature of the German 
____________________ 
56  Bol and Weeden (2014) point out that apprenticeship training in Germany is 
special and stands out from other forms of credentials. Therefore they raise 
apprenticeship training credentials to the status of a source of occupational 
closure on their own. However, they do fail to establish why apprenticeships 
constitute a closure source that is distinct from the credentialism closure source, 
since underlying functions of both closure sources are similar (Bol and Weeden 
2014, pp. 2-4). 
57  Haupt (2012b) and Bol and Weeden (2014) use a “subjective” variable where the 
individuals were asked what kind of credential their position usually requires. 
The other researchers (Konietzka 1999; Solga and Konietzka 1999; Stuth et al. 
2009, p. 21; Stuth and Hennig 2014; DiPrete et al. 2014) use “objective” 
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labor market in mind. Additionally, there are vast differences between 
tertiary level degrees (but also between upper-secondary level 
qualifications, etc.) with respect to the contents of their curricula, quality 
of education, and the skills obtained, etc. (Streeck 2011, p. 23; 
Allmendinger and Driesch 2014, p. 14). Therefore, it remains unclear how 
such a heterogeneous population of credentialed individuals might signal 
distinctiveness or quality and thereby trigger the channeling demand 
closure mechanism. 
In this respect, there is another plausible mechanism. In the theory 
section, I introduced an additional dimension of credentialism that should 
trigger the channeling demand mechanism: standardization. 
Standardization is most commonly defined as “the degree to which the 
quality of education meets the same standards nationwide” (Allmendinger 
1989, p. 233). This concept is usually used in international comparisons 
(e.g., Allmendinger 1989; Shavit and Müller 1998; Breen 2005; Ebner 
2013). Scholars of occupational closure use the same concept to measure 
the varying signals of quality given by different credentials in Germany   
(Hoffmann et al. 2011; Vicari 2014). Hoffmann et al. (2011) and Vicari  
(2014) conceptualize standardization in terms of the regulation of 
examinations. I follow Gamoran (1996), who argues that standardized 
examinations may guarantee a minimum level of skills and knowledge. 
However, standardized curricula provide even stronger signals for 
employers because the whole process of training and education (and not 
only the final examinations) is standardized. Put another way, school 
pupils, students, and apprentices all receive the same education and 
training independent of their school, university, or training organization if 
the curricula are standardized (Horn 2009, p. 346). This differentiation 
may seem unimportant and superficial, yet for many credentials, a 
different degree of standardization applies for the examinations and the 
curriculum. 
I will link credentialism to the channeling demand closure mechanism 
by assessing the degree of standardization of the curricula studied by 
individual credential holders—these curricula might be standardized on 
____________________ 
variables that capture the empirical heterogeneity of different levels of education 
and training within the occupations. 
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the federal level, the Länder (state) level, and the school/university level 
(Abraham et al. 2011, p. 11)
58
. 
4.2 Licensing—Two Definitions, Two Worlds of Licensed Occupations 
In Germany, the term licensure is used to refer to the protection of 
occupational tasks and to describe the protection of occupational titles. 
Licensing in the form of protected occupational titles might have an 
impact on employers’ hiring decisions by signaling quality and hence 
channeling demand to the occupations in question (Weeden 2002). 
Licensing as the protection of specific tasks exclusively channels demand 
to licensed occupations. In Germany, only a small number of occupations 
are licensed this way. The reason for the low number of licensed tasks lies 
in the German constitution (Art. 12), which grants every citizen the right 
to practice an occupation of his or her choosing. The licensing of tasks 
therefore represents a massive violation of this constitutional right and is 
only granted if basic necessities (Grundgüter) (e.g., health and education) 
are at stake (see Haupt 2014, pp. 106-116). 
Both forms of licensing are fundamentally different. The licensing of 
occupational titles works on the individual level – i.e., employers might 
prefer to hire individuals with protected titles. Yet employers might also 
decide to hire individuals without licensed titles. Hence, the proportion of 
employees with licensed and non-licensed titles may vary greatly from 
occupation to occupation. The second form of licensing, the protection of 
tasks, is located on the occupational level. All incumbents have to have 
licenses to be allowed to work in an occupation with legally protected 
tasks. There is no variation – all incumbents of a task-protected 
occupation have licenses
59
. 
Despite these differences, most researchers combine both types of 
licenses into one measure, even if the theoretical argument that a license is 
a legal patent on practice does not apply to licensed occupational titles 
____________________ 
58  However, Hoffmann et al. (2011) and Vicari (2014) oversimplify their 
measurement of standardization by mixing credentials that are standardized on 
the Länder level with credentials that are standardized on the federal level. 
59  Illegal deviations from the law are nevertheless possible. 
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(Hoffmann 2011; Bol and Weeden 2014; Stuth and Hennig 2014; Vicari 
2014). Additionally, these authors use incomplete data. Due to omissions 
in the data provided by the Federal Labor Office (Bundesagentur für 
Arbeit) they do not include the majority of protected occupational titles 
that are awarded through the apprenticeship training system and by 
universities60. However, occupational titles that are awarded by 
apprenticeship training and by universities are protected by law, as are all 
master craftsman titles, all public service job titles and grades (Beamte), 
all military ranks used in the armed forces and police, and all occupations 
with licensed tasks
61
. 
Both forms of licensure theoretically constitute occupational closure, 
and both trigger the channeling demand closure mechanism. However, 
they differ in power and reach: There are very few occupations with the 
more powerful form of licensure, the licensure of tasks, whereas the 
licensure of titles is less powerful but covers a wide range of occupations. 
I will therefore test whether licensed titles and licensed tasks are both 
empirically linked to the occupation members’ risk of holding temporary 
employment contracts. 
4.3 Specificity—An Underexplored Niche 
Empirical research on occupational specificity, in the sense of uniqueness, 
is very rare. Rotolo and McPherson (2001) use an ecological concept of 
____________________ 
60  The data provided by the Federal Labor Office (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) on 
licensed occupations in Germany is inconsistent. The data include occupations 
with protected tasks and occupations with protected titles. The data on protected 
tasks is complete while the data on protected titles is fragmentary. The list does 
not include occupations that are part of the apprenticeship training system and 
only a selection of protected academic titles. 
61  The protection of occupational titles that are part of the apprenticeship system is 
based on the Vocational Training Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz (BBiG)) and the 
Crafts Code (Handwerksordnung (HwO)). The protection of tertiary degrees, all 
public service job titles and grades, and military ranks in armed forces and police 
forces are regulated in § 132a Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). The protection of 
master-craftsman occupations is based on § 51 of the Crafts Code (HwO). Haupt 
(2012a, pp. 330-332) gives a comprehensive overview over the legislation aimed 
on single occupations and the protection of their tasks or titles. 
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competitors within their niche. Hoffmann et al. (2011) address the 
uniqueness of occupational tasks using an occupational task-similarity 
matrix that is based on an unpublished database from the Federal Labor 
Office of Germany. Since the data Hoffmann et al. (2011) draw on are not 
available, I will use Rotolo and McPherson’s (2001, p. 1101) innovative 
concept of occupational niches instead. It allows me to distinguish 
between occupations that share their tasks with a lot of other 
occupations—these occupations will not trigger the channeling demand 
mechanism—and occupations that share their tasks with only a few other 
occupations and thereby trigger the channeling demand mechanism. 
Occupational specificity in the sense of narrowness is not a new 
concept in the research on labor market inequalities. However, the 
established measures of this kind of occupational specificity are not 
appropriate for analyzing occupational closure. Two major concepts 
address occupational specificity in the sense of narrowness and its 
potential consequences for the mobility of employees: asset theory and 
human capital theory (Iversen and Soskice 2001, p. 875; Becker 1964). 
Becker (1964) defines narrow/specific skills by the structure of the 
(monopsonistic) demand for given skills, whereas Iversen and Soskice 
(2001) focus on the content of the skills, which might be broad in the case 
of unspecialized skills or narrow in the case of specialized skills (Streeck 
2011, p. 15). 
The human capital approach cannot easily be used because it is not 
possible to determine the (monopsonistic) demand for skills directly. 
Iversen and Soskice (2001) develop their own measure of skill specificity, 
but it has a number of serious methodological problems. First, they 
operationalize skill specificity as a function of the size of occupations 
(Kitschelt and Rehm 2006). It follows that incumbents of small 
occupations tend to have highly specialized/narrow sets of skills, whereas 
incumbents of large occupations tend to have very general/broad sets of 
skills. Second, they base their measurement of occupational specificity on 
the artificial structure of the ISCO88 classification and count the number 
of minor occupational groupings within each major occupational grouping 
(Kitschelt/Rehm 2006). However, the ISCO88 classification does not 
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represent a real-time map of occupations but a skewed reflection that 
depicts industrial occupations in great detail and service occupations very 
crudely
62
. Hence, the degree of specificity might be completely 
determined by the artificially structured ISCO classification. 
I will adopt an alternative approach, which was proposed by Stuth and 
Hennig (2014). This allows me to model Iversen’s and Soskice’s (2001) 
differentiation of specialized/narrow skills and unspecialized/broad skills. 
Stuth and Hennig (2014, p. 16) measure the dispersion of the main tasks 
performed in occupations, which allows them to determine whether an 
occupation does not focus on specific tasks (if so, the occupation is broad) 
or whether the occupation concentrates on few tasks (and is thus narrow). 
4.4 Associations—Two Different Measurement Strategies 
In Germany, research on associations as a closure source is based on the 
presence or absence of occupational associations (Hoffmann et al. 2011, p. 
31). Weeden (2002, p. 78) measures associations differently, using the 
proportion of occupational members who belonged to an occupational 
association instead. Both measures have their merits. Weeden’s (2002) 
approach allows for various degrees of association-based closure. Yet this 
approach comes with a weakness. The number of occupational members 
an association represents is a kind of currency that associations use to try 
to achieve their lobbying goals. Hence, there is a strong possibility that the 
reported membership numbers are not necessarily correct. Additionally, 
the power of an association does not so much rely on a simple 
membership count but on the effective organization of their members’ 
interests, which is a function of the diversity of interests within the 
association (Schroeder et al. 2011, p. 30). By contrast, Hoffmann et al. 
(2011) propose a simple dichotomous measurement to determine whether 
an occupation is represented by an association or not. This is a robust 
measure, and does not have the problems associated with Weeden’s 
____________________ 
62  For example, the major ISCO group “craft and related trade workers” is divided 
into 70 minor groups whereas the major ISCO group “clerks and service 
workers” is only divided into 23 minor groups. 
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(2002) continuous measure. However, it turns a blind eye to the 
heterogeneity of association-based closure. 
I will adopt the simplistic but robust approach proposed by Hoffman et 
al. (2011), but will try to improve it to capture some of the various degrees 
of association-based closure. I differentiate associations by their diversity 
of interests and identify two different kinds of occupational associations: 
associations that only represent one occupation or associations that 
represent incumbents from more than one occupation. Associations that 
represent only one occupation may have a stronger power base. They 
should be more able to organize the interests of their members effectively 
because their members will be relatively homogenous. The relatively 
homogenous interests of the associations’ members should also allow a 
higher degree of social cohesion, which might result in the successful 
establishment and maintenance of professional ethics. 
4.5 Unionization—Industry-Level versus Occupational-Level Unions 
In Germany, there is nearly no research on occupational closure that takes 
unionization into consideration. The only exception is an article by Bol 
and Weeden (2014) that measures unionization by taking the proportion of 
union members per occupation
63
. One reason for this reluctance to 
measure unionization might be that unions mainly operate at industry level 
in Germany (e.g., Ebbinghaus 2000, p. 286; Hipp et al. 2015)
64
. The 
outcome of collective bargaining negotiations is applied to entire 
industries. Whether individuals benefit from collective bargaining 
agreements or not is thus dependent on the industry they are employed in 
____________________ 
63  This measure was originally proposed by Weeden (2002) to analyze the US labor 
market. 
64  Another reason is that unions in Germany were never allowed to use closed-shop 
agreements. Additionally, apprenticeship programs are not run by unions and 
thus cannot be utilized to restrict the labor supply. However, they have their say 
about the design of the apprenticeship programs and use this influence to 
continuously push for a broadened and updated tasks and skills base for the 
apprenticeship programs (Streeck 2011). 
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and not their occupation
65
. These industries may perfectly overlap with 
some occupations, but the majority of occupations are distributed across a 
variety of industries. Thus, the link between the proportion of 
occupational incumbents who are union members and the unionization 
closure source is weak at best. However, there are some exceptions: Even 
if the majority of unions do not operate on the occupational level, there are 
some unions that do (e.g., Greef and Speth 2013, pp. 13-14). Germany has 
occupation-specific trade unions that bargain only for the occupations they 
represent (e.g., aircraft pilots, medical doctors). Hence, I will measure 
unionization-based closure by assessing whether occupations are 
represented by occupation-specific trade unions or not. Additionally, I will 
account for the possible impact of collective bargaining agreements on 
employees’ risk of temporary employment by controlling industries. 
____________________ 
65  The trade union ver.di (United Service Union), for example, represents 
employees from the whole service sector and claims to represent employees from 
over 1000 different occupations. 
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4.6 Additional Distinctive Features of the German Labor Market 
As previously noted, the institutional differences between the German and 
the US labor markets make it necessary to carefully adapt the established 
occupational closure measures to the German labor market. We should 
also test whether they are interrelated with two distinctive characteristics 
of the German labor market.  
First: The gender composition of occupations is a frequently discussed 
and well-known precursor of inequalities in pay, working conditions, etc. 
(e.g., England 1992; Kilbourne et al. 1994; Weeden 1998; England und 
Folbre 2005; Gartner and Hinz 2009; Haupt 2012). In Germany, the 
gender composition of the occupations has its structural roots in the 
occupational education and training system, which is closely linked to the 
labor market (e.g., Willms-Herget 1985; Krüger 1996, 2003; Solga and 
Konietzka 2000; Achatz 2005). For example, men dominate the highly 
standardized apprenticeship training track, whereas women dominate the 
less standardized vocational full-time schooling track. Additionally, 
women are concentrated in a few detailed occupations, whereas men are 
broadly distributed over a very wide range of occupations, which might 
affect how vigorous the competition for vacant positions is. Because the 
link between the education and training system and the labor market is not 
gender neutral, it may affect the credentialism closure source. Hence, I 
will test for gender differences in the impact of the closure sources on 
temporary employment.  
Second: The general economic conditions are very different between 
the old and new German Länder
66
. These great differences have their roots 
in the reunification of the formerly socialist German Democratic Republic 
with the Federal Republic of Germany. Within months of reunification in 
1990, the unprepared planned economy of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) was integrated into the West German economy and hence 
into the world market. As a result, the majority of factories were shut 
down (the employment volume in the industrial sector decreased by 70 
percent) and unemployment skyrocketed (from 1989 to 1992, 3.5 million 
____________________ 
66  While the socialist German Democratic Republic was a planned economy, it 
nevertheless continued the long-standing pre-war tradition of the occupational 
education and training system.  
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jobs out of previous 9.7 million jobs were lost) (Lutz et al. 2007, p. 1077). 
In contrast to the situation in the “old” (western) Länder, in the new 
Länder, the industrial sector is now of minor importance in overall 
employment and most employees are employed in the service sector. 
Gross wages, collective bargaining coverage, and pensions are 
considerably lower in the new Länder and the competition for vacant 
positions is very high because of the consistently high level of 
unemployment. In sum, there are great differences between the two parts 
of Germany in terms of their economic situation, and hence, there might 
also be differences in the association between occupational closure and 
temporary employment. I will therefore check whether occupational 
closure differs between the old and new Länder with regard to temporary 
employment or not. 
  
5 Data, Methods, Sample Selection, and Variables 
In this study, I will rely on a repeated cross-sectional survey that combines 
a large sample with information on detailed occupations: the German 
Microcensus. The German Microcensus meets two essential requirements 
that allow me to analyze the risk of employees of holding temporary 
employment contracts and the association of this risk with occupational 
closure. 1) The first of these requirements is the requirement for 
information on detailed occupations. Many surveys only provide 
aggregated information on employees’ occupational fields, which are 
defined by a range of related detailed occupations. Related occupations are 
grouped according to the degree of similarity of the tasks usually done in 
the occupations. However, mechanisms of occupational closure operate on 
the level of detailed occupations. The Microcensus provides information 
on detailed occupations, and thus fulfills this requirement. 2) The second 
requirement is that the data set be sufficiently large to generate reliable 
estimates for each detailed occupation. Many surveys that include 
information on detailed occupations, for example the German socio 
economic panel (Gsoep) or BIBB/BAuA, are too small to estimate reliable 
occupation-level parameters for several hundreds of detailed occupations 
or even general occupational fields
67
. However, the Microcensus is 
sufficiently large to generate reliable estimates for detailed occupations. 
Although ideally one might also want a longitudinal survey that allows for 
within-person comparisons, longitudinal surveys of this sort do not meet 
these two essential requirements. 
The German Microcensus is a nationally representative, annual survey 
that provides official statistics on the population and the labor market in 
Germany. The Microcensus samples 1 percent of the residential 
____________________ 
67  This might not be such a problem if these parameters are used as dependent 
variables in multi-level models because these correct unreliable measures using 
partial-pooling (Bayes) estimates (e.g., Gelman and Hill 2007, p. 276; Rabe-
Hesketh and Skrondal 2012, p. 213). However, if these parameters are used as 
independent variables no such correction applies and these potentially unreliable 
estimates will introduce a lot of noise into the models. 
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population in Germany and includes all persons with the right to reside in 
Germany living in private or collective households
68
. The primary 
sampling units are delimited areas consisting of residential buildings or, in 
the case of large buildings, of subsets of units within these buildings. The 
secondary sampling units are persons, households, and dwellings within 
the sampling areas. The sampling method used is single-stage stratified 
cluster sampling with a systematic random selection sampling technique. 
The Microcensus provides information about detailed occupations
69
, 
temporary employment, and the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
employed working population. The Microcensus also includes some 
information on the individual level, which can be aggregated on the 
occupational level. It provides, for example, the information that I need to 
operationalize occupational specificity. Still, much data that are necessary 
to measure occupational closure thoroughly are not provided by the 
Microcensus. Therefore, I have gathered additional data and matched this 
information with the Microcensus data using the German Dictionary of 
Occupational Titles (Klassifikation der Berufe (KldB 1992))
70
. 
____________________ 
68  Homeless persons are therefore excluded from the Microcensus. 
69  Due to confidentiality and privacy legislation, the Federal Statistical Office of 
Germany provides scientific-use files of the Microcensus with a reduced sample 
size (a 70 percent sub-sample) and coarsened information on occupations. These 
scientific-use data files do not provide information on detailed occupations but on 
general occupational fields. To nevertheless be able to work with the full 1 
percent population sample and with detailed occupations, I had to analyze the 
Microcensus in the Federal Statistical Office’s research data centers and in the 
statistical offices of the Länder. The research data centers (RDC) provide access 
to special versions of micro data of official statistics in a secure working 
environment to comply with confidentiality and privacy legislation. 
70  The dictionary of occupational titles identifies 2,287 detailed occupations 
(Berufsklassen), which are identified by a four-digit number. The digits do not 
provide additional information on, for example, required skills or physical 
demands. However, the last digit has some informative value. For example, a 
seven as the last digit describes laborer occupations (Helferberufe) with simple 
occupation-specific assistant/helping tasks. 
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5.1 Methods 
To distinguish between individual-level effects and occupational-level 
effects, I will use a two-step multilevel strategy
71
 because for my 
purposes, it provides several advantages over the one-step (partial-
pooling) multilevel strategy: First, a two-step multilevel approach is based 
on less demanding assumptions than partial-pooling multi-level 
approaches, which assume a multivariate normal distribution of the error 
terms (Gebel and Giesecke 2011, p. 27). Second, one-step strategies 
become progressively more complicated with stochastic model 
specifications that differ across levels, which is true for binary outcomes 
like temporary employment (Franzese 2005, pp. 431-432). The third 
advantage is also linked to the binary nature of the dependent variable: 
The analysis of binary outcome variables requires a minimum number of 
events because conventional logistic regression models rely on asymptotic 
methods, and asymptotic methods suffer from small-sample bias (e.g., 
Mehta and Pathel 1995; King and Zeng 2001; Kin and Ryan 2002; Agresti 
2007, pp. 152-160; Hosmer et al. 2013, pp. 387-395)
72
.   
In this context, it is important to note that the “performance of model-
based estimates may be determined more by the number of events rather 
than the total sample size” (Hosmer et al. 2013, p. 408). This is a serious 
issue even for large occupations with a low number of temporarily 
employed incumbents. In order to avoid specification errors and biased, 
unreliable estimation results (Peduzzi et al. 1996; Vittinghof and 
McCulloch 2006), I might have to drop such occupations and would 
thereby compromise the aim of the analyses. However, relying on a two-
step approach allows me to use exact logistic regressions for occupations 
where conventional logistic regression models would produce small-n-
biased estimates, and to use conventional regression models for 
____________________ 
71  Irrespective of the differences between both analytical strategies, a two-step (no-
pooling) multilevel approach is basically the same as a partial-pooling multilevel 
model, but with group-level variance parameters set to infinity (Gelman 2005, p. 
459). Both estimation procedures produce similar results (Achen 2005, pp. 450-
451) but have different advantages, which are dependent on the data structure 
(Franzese 2005). 
72  The degree of this bias depends on the number of observations in the less 
frequent of the two categories of the dependent variable. 
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occupations with a sufficiently high cell count on temporary 
employment
73
. (See appendix
74
 for a comparison between exact and 
conventional logistic regressions for a sample occupation.) Exact logistic 
regression derives its regression parameters by relying on conditional 
maximum likelihood estimates and uses test statistics that are based on 
permutational distributions of sufficient statistics
75
 (Hirji et al. 1987; Hirji 
et al. 1989; Mehta and Pahtel 1995, p. 2143; King and Zeng 2001; Agresti 
2007, p. 158). The exact inference of parameters makes it possible to 
analyze small samples (few occupational incumbents), samples with very 
few events (few temporary employees), and even models with empty cells 
(sparse or unbalanced data)
76
.  
The fourth advantage also relates to a shortcoming of one-step 
multilevel models with binary dependent variables. These models would 
drop all occupations where the incumbents have no temporary 
employment contracts at all because on the micro level they do not vary 
across the dependent variable. Yet these occupations might be especially 
important to determine the association between occupational closure and 
temporary employment. The complete absence of temporary employees 
might be an outcome of occupational closure. A two-step approach also 
drops these occupations in the first stage of the analysis but allows them to 
be reintroduced into the analyses on the second stage. 
The general form of the two-step multilevel model is given in the 
following two equations: 
____________________ 
73  Exact logistic regression requires extensive, time consuming computations, 
which easily become too complex to be solved, even with fast computers. Hence, 
I restrict the use of the exact method to these settings where sample sizes are 
small enough to call into question the use of the large sample assumption 
(Hosmer et al. 2013, p. 393). Where large sample assumptions apply, I use the 
conventional logistic regression technique.  
74  Find appendix at the end of the pdf. 
75  “The central idea behind the theory of exact methods for logistic regression  is to 
construct a statistical distribution that can, with efficient algorithms, be 
completely enumerated” (Hosmer et al. 2013, p. 388). 
76  The last problem is especially prevalent if occupations are the objects of interest 
because occupations often have incumbents with relatively homogeneous 
characteristics. For example, in many occupations all the incumbents have the 
same qualification level, so the other qualification levels are either not populated 
or sparsely populated. 
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Equation 1: The general form of the first step of the two-step 
multilevel model 
 
𝑌𝑚𝑜𝑡 = 𝛽0𝑜𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑡 + 𝑣𝑚𝑜𝑡  
 
The first step consists of a series of separate regression analyses, where 
𝑌𝑚𝑜𝑡  is the permanent or temporary employment contract of each member 
m of occupation o in the year t. 𝛽‘ is the vector of coefficients that 
estimates the association between individual level characteristics, 𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑡 , 
and permanent or temporary employment
77
. 𝑉𝑚𝑜𝑡  is an individual-level 
disturbance term. To avoid small-sample bias, I use conventional logistic 
regression for occupations with at least 50 incumbents with temporary 
contracts
78
 and exact logistic regression for occupations with fewer 
temporarily employed incumbents. The asymptotic methods of 
conventional logistic regression are based on the assumption of a random 
sample. Hence, I had to adjust the conventional logistic regression 
analyses to account for the fact that the German Microcensus is not a 
random sample of individuals but a random sample of areas with 100 
percent of all individuals within this area being sampled
79
. To account for 
the survey design, I use clustered standard errors, with the clusters being 
defined by the random sample of areas (e.g., Deaton 1997, pp. 74-78; 
Schimpl-Neimanns 2009, pp. 51-54). 
 
Equation 2: The general form of the second step of the two-step 
multilevel model 
 
____________________ 
77  As a byproduct of two-step multilevel analyses, the intercepts and the slopes of 
individual level coefficients are allowed to vary across occupations. 
78  I determined this threshold by comparing the results of exact and conventional 
logistic regressions for occupations that had between 30 and 80 temporary 
employees. The differences between both logistic methods converged for 
occupations with 50 or more temporarily employed incumbents. 
79  The individuals within each area are thereby not independent from each other.  
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√𝑌𝑜?̂? = 𝛾00 + 𝛾
′(𝑍𝑜𝑡 − 𝑍..) + 𝜀𝑜𝑡 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑌𝑜?̂? =
1
𝑛
∙ ∑ 𝑌𝑚𝑜?̂?
𝑛
𝑚 =1
 
 
I calculate the mean of the predicted probabilities of the occupational 
members 𝑌𝑚𝑜?̂?  for each occupation o and year t and thereby transform 
𝑌𝑚𝑜𝑡  into the continuous occupational-level variable 𝑌𝑜?̂? , which I use as 
the dependent variable in the second step (means as outcomes). I also 
include occupations without any temporary employees on this level of the 
analyses by replacing their missing value on 𝑌𝑜?̂?  with a zero
80
. The second 
step consists of linear regression analyses, where the coefficients 
𝛾′estimate the linear association between the grand-mean centered 
occupational characteristics, (𝑍𝑜𝑡 − 𝑍..), and the mean (square rooted) 
predicted probability (√𝑌𝑜?̂?) of temporary employment in occupation o in 
the year t. 𝜀𝑜𝑡  is an occupational-level disturbance term. The square root 
of 𝑌𝑜?̂?  ensures an approximate normal distribution of the variable. All 
second stage analyses use heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors (see Wooldridge 2002, pp. 55-58)
81
. These analyses also 
____________________ 
80  It does not seem to be too bold to assume that in occupations without any 
temporary employment, all incumbents enjoy a zero probability of temporary 
employment. 
81  Using estimated parameters as dependent variables might induce 
heteroscedasticity because the uncertainty of these parameters may vary across 
occupations (Lewis and Linzer 2005). Lewis and Linzer (2005) propose the use 
of two different methods to estimate heteroscedastic consistent standard errors: 
the Huber-White standard errors (see Wooldridge 2002, pp. 55-58 for a 
comprehensive overview) and the feasible generalized least squares estimator 
(Lewis and Linzer 2005). Both methods perform equally well. The Huber-White 
standard error is more reliable than the feasible generalized least squares 
estimator (FGLS), whereas the FGLS is more efficient than Huber-White 
standard error “if a sufficiently high fraction of the total regression error variance 
is due to sampling error” (Lewis and Linzer 2005, p. 363). 
 Lewis and Linzer originally introduced a third heteroscedastic consistent standard 
error (Efron or HC3 standard errors (Efron 1982)), but I will not refer to this 
measure because it is only an alternative to the Huber-White standard error when 
the sample size is small (<=250) (Long and Ervin 2000). However, my analyses 
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consist of pooled time-series cross-sectional data. However, I cannot 
model time, given that I have only three cross sections available (see next 
section). Instead, I apply a complete pooling strategy for the second stage, 
control for time on the occupational level, and assume that the association 
between temporary employment and occupational closure is 
approximately identical for each cross section (Gelman and Hill 2007, p. 
251; Firebaugh 1997, p. 4). 
I will also use the coefficients 𝛽‘𝑋𝑚𝑜𝑡  (from equation 1) as a dependent 
variable for the second-step analyses (slopes as outcomes). This allows me 
to check whether the relationship between individual-level characteristics 
and temporary employment changes as a function of the occupational-
level closure sources. This is equal to cross-level interactions in standard 
multilevel models. 
5.2 Sample selection 
As with any repeated cross-sectional design, the challenge of the 
Microcensus is that not all the variables are available in all years, and that 
their wording, response categories, or coding schemes change. The 
availability of comparable variables, which are required for 
operationalizing the various closure sources, restricts the number of 
repeated cross sections to the years 2000, 2004, and 2007
82
. 
The sample of individual-level cases will be limited to individuals 
between 15 und 64 years
83
. I exclude individuals who were questioned at 
their second home, who are in compulsory military service or compulsory 
civil service, and individuals who are apprentices. Because the primary 
____________________ 
are based on a large sample, where the Huber-White standard error outperforms 
the Efron standard error (Lewis and Linzer 2005, p. 356). 
82  In order to operationalize the credentialism closure sources I need detailed 
information about the individuals’ qualifications. This information is available on 
the necessary level of detail only from the year 2000 onwards (with regard to the 
level of qualification) and only for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 (with regard 
to the field of study of individuals with tertiary degrees). 
83  The lowest boundary of 15 years and the highest boundary of 64 years are based 
on standard age thresholds used for labor market analyses by the Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany (e.g., Eisenmenger et al. 2014, p. 546). 
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sampling units of the German Microcensus are housing units in artificially 
delimited areas and not individuals, it is possible that a small fraction of 
individuals with a second home could be interviewed twice in the same 
year. According to their legal status, it is not possible for apprentices and 
individuals in military or civil service to have permanent employment 
contracts. I also omit unpaid family workers, unemployed and 
economically inactive individuals, and self-employed individuals because 
they are not at risk of holding temporary employment contracts. 
Individuals who live in collective housing units, such as asylums or 
monasteries, are also excluded. 
Some individuals did not state their current occupations as specifically 
as necessary to map them properly into their detailed occupations. Those 
individuals were assigned to generalized occupational categories, which 
serve as catch-all categories. For example, the general occupational 
category engineer replaces 59 detailed engineer occupations. Therefore, I 
had to exclude those general occupations from my sample of detailed 
occupations
84
. Very few occupations primarily consist of unqualified 
individuals. For these occupations, the credentialism closure source cannot 
be meaningfully operationalized
85
. Hence, I dropped those few 
occupations from my sample
86
. 
In light of Hosmer’s et al. (2013) cautionary tale that the performance 
of model-based estimates may be determined more by the number of 
events rather than the sample size, I use a two-step approach, which 
allows me to address the number-of-events problem. However, as a result 
of this decision, I will not benefit from the borrowing strength effect and 
the shrinkage effect of a one-step (partial-pooling) multilevel approach, 
which would have allowed me to address the sample size problem
87
. The 
____________________ 
84  I also had to exclude the occupation “soldier” because it is so general that it 
allows neither the differentiation between army, navy and air force, nor the 
differentiation between the various military ranks. 
85  I tested various specifications that included unqualified occupations, but, not 
surprisingly, they all played havoc with the credentialism measures. 
86  The number of unqualified occupations is very small. In the pooled three years, I 
classified only 24 occupations as unqualified occupations. 
87  Using a one-stage (partial-pooling) multilevel model would allow me to include 
occupations into the analysis that only consist of very few incumbents or even 
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absence of this advantage means that the standard requirements for the 
number of observations per occupation apply
88
. Hence, I need to ensure I 
have enough observations to run a separate regression analysis for each 
detailed occupation and year
89
. The Federal Statistical Office of Germany 
provides a binding guideline for the minimum number of observations for 
researchers using their data. To guarantee stable and reliable estimates, the 
Federal Statistical Office of Germany requires researchers to only report 
estimates of units of interest, like occupations, that have at least 50 
observations each (Mikrozensus-Referenten/-innen des Bundes und der 
Länder 2013, p. 1)
90
. The authors of the guideline specify that units with 
fewer observations have relative sampling errors above 15 percent and are 
thereby not representative for the populations of these units. Therefore, I 
defined a minimum threshold of 50 or more occupational incumbents per 
occupation. I drop occupations below that threshold from the sample. 
Starting from a full sample of 2364 detailed occupations
91
 with 702,002 
incumbents, my final sample consists of 1,118 occupations with 677,080 
incumbents after applying the threshold of 50 incumbents per occupation 
(see table 1). My analytical sample still represents more than 96 percent of 
the employed individual-level population. The considerable reduction of 
the number of occupations is mainly due to the large number of 
occupations that have zero temporary employment and that also have less 
than 50 incumbents. 
____________________ 
one incumbent (e.g., Gelman and Hill 2007, p. 276; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 
2012, p. 213). 
88  These conventional requirements are necessary because potentially unreliable 
measures through low case numbers will not be replaced by more plausible 
partial-pooling (Bayes) estimates. 
89  Haupt (2014) tries to avoid the small-N problem by merging similar occupations 
until they are sufficiently large. However, a new problem emerges: In order to 
aggregate occupations, assumptions have to be made about the identifiers of 
similarity. These assumptions are always arbitrary to a certain degree and have to 
be uncorrelated with the dependent and independent variables. 
90  The contractual obligations of the researcher are also stated under the following 
link under bullet point seven:  
 http://www.gesis.org/missy/en/studie/erhebung/rechtliche-und-allgemeine-
informationen/leitfaden-zur-faktischen-anonymisierung/.(Date of last access: 
January 2014) 
91  The full sample does not contain generalized catch-all occupations; however it 
does contain some unqualified occupations. 
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Table 1: Description of individual-level and occupational-level sample 
sizes of the full sample and the final sample (pooled for the years 2000, 
2004, and 2007) 
  
Full 
sample 
Final 
sample 
Number of occupations 2.364 1.118 
Number of individuals 702.002 677.080 
Number of occupations with more than 0 and 
less than 50 events 
1242 818 
Number of members of occupations with more 
than 0 and less than 50 events 
248.019 229.017 
Number of occupations with zero temporary 
employment 
880 58 
Number of members of occupations with zero 
temporary employment 
11.735 5.815 
 
Although the sample represents nearly all employed individuals and the 
majority of occupations that have temporarily employed incumbents, the 
threshold of 50 employees per occupation may introduce a bias against 
very small occupations. This bias would occur if the incumbents of small 
occupations are temporarily employed more often than employees in 
larger occupations. To test for this possible bias, I correlated the size of 
the occupations with their proportion of temporarily employed incumbents 
and did not find a statistically significant correlation
92
. 
____________________ 
92  Based on the full sample, the correlation is -0.06. 
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5.3 Variables 
The dependent variable—temporary employment—is based on a binary 
variable in the Microcensus
93
. I will measure occupational closure, 
addressing five different closure sources—credentialism, licensing, 
occupational specificity, occupational associations, and unionization. The 
operationalization of these closure sources will be described in the 
following sections. I first discuss my measures of occupational 
credentialism at some length, then licensure, followed by the relatively 
unknown concept of occupational specificity, and finally address 
occupational associations and unionization. The discussion of the 
measures of credentialism will necessarily be somewhat lengthy because 
these measures are deeply rooted in the German education and training 
system. 
5.3.1 The Credential Inflation Index—A New Approach to Capture the 
Supply of Occupation Specific Credentials 
To capture the credentialism closure source, I follow Müller and Shavit 
(1998), who argued that the value of credentials for individuals derives not 
only from the specific skills these credentials represent, but also from their 
scarcity, i.e. the number of individuals who hold the same credential (also 
see: Parkin 1971, p. 21, Larson 1977, p. 48; Collins 1979, p. 27; Beck et 
al. 1980, p. 79). To capture the scarcity of occupation-specific credentials, 
I have developed the credential inflation index. Occupational credentials 
are highly institutionalized in Germany. As scholars of comparative 
inequality have long noted, the German labor market and the education 
and training system are closely linked (e.g., Allmendinger 1989; Shavit 
and Müller 1998; Konietzka 1999; Solga and Konietzka 1999; Kurtz 
2005; Brzinsky-Fay 2007; Brzinsky-Fay 2011, pp. 26-27; Bol and 
Weeden 2014; Bol 2014). This linkage is reflected in the German 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles, which is not only used to classify 
occupations, but also the corresponding credentials. Utilizing this 
____________________ 
93  The variable is based on the question: “Is your employment contract permanent 
or temporary?” 
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number of all freshly awarded occupation-specific credentials, divided by 
the number of employees in the respective occupation in a given year. 
The task of developing the measure is complicated by a specific feature 
of the German education and training system: It is possible for individuals 
to acquire credentials for one occupation in different institutionalized 
education and training tracks
94
. There are six different education and 
training tracks that provide occupational credentials: Apprenticeship 
training combines work-based training in private businesses with 
education in vocational schools
95
; hence, it is described as the dual 
system
96
. The second track is the vocational full-time schooling track with 
recognized credentials—the credentials here are similar to the credentials 
awarded through apprenticeship training
97
. This schooling track awards 
very few credentials in comparison to the other five education and training 
tracks and is a rarely used alternative for young adults who did not find an 
apprentice position in the apprenticeship system. The third education and 
training track is the vocational full-time schooling track with non-
recognized credentials
98
. It covers a very wide range of credentials that 
correspond with current demand for qualifications that are not covered by 
the apprenticeship training system. This track awards credentials for 
occupations that operate, for example, in the social service, foreign 
language, health care, or information technology sectors. The fourth 
education and training track consists of schools of the healthcare sector. 
This type of vocational school trains its students for various healthcare 
____________________ 
94  A count of the various education and training tracks that award credentials for the 
same occupation is shown in appendix. 
95  Because the training is conducted in two different places (in private businesses 
and vocational schools) the apprenticeship training system is called the dual 
system (duales System). 
96  For a more exhaustive description of the vocational education and training 
system in Germany in general, see Ebner (2013) or Hippach-Schneider et al. 
(2011). For a detailed description of the organization of a training program that 
awards bricklayer credentials, see Clarke et al. (2013, pp. 941-945). 
97  They are also recognized by the Vocational Training Act (BBiG) and the Crafts 
Code (HwO).  
98  These credentials are called non-recognized because they are not regulated by the 
Vocational Training Act (BBiG) and the Crafts Code (HwO) (In German: 
berufliche Abschlüsse in Berufen die keine Ausbildungsberufe sind). 
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occupations (for example nurses, midwifes or physiotherapists) and 
cooperates closely with hospitals, where practical training usually occurs. 
The fifth education and training track consist of trade, technical, and 
master’s schools, which provide credentials at a tertiary education level99. 
These schools prepare the occupational incumbents for executive tasks 
and self-employment and award, for example, master-craftsman 
credentials (Meister)
100
. The sixth education and training track is publicly 
financed
101
 higher education at universities
102
, which allows students to 
acquire credentials in a wide range of academic subjects. 
I count all occupation-specific credentials that are awarded by the 
different education and training tracks by combining various data 
sources
103
. Based on these combined data sources, I derive a total count of 
____________________ 
99  The International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) classifies trade, 
technical, and master’s-school based credentials as ISCED 5B. 
100  The trade, technical, and master’s schools  do not provide initial occupational 
training but provide further intermediate training and hence require their pupils to 
have relevant occupational credentials and work experience to gain access to 
their training programs. 
101  There are also private but state recognized universities run by the Catholic or 
Lutheran churches or private institutions. 
102  There are three types of higher education institutions in Germany: the universities 
of applied sciences, which place a strong emphasis on practical work and 
application, the universities, which are research oriented, and the Colleges of Art 
and Colleges of Music, which are of equivalent status to universities. 
103  The Federal Statistical Office of Germany provides data on the yearly number of 
successfully acquired occupation-specific credentials of the university students, 
school pupils, and apprentices in the various education and training tracks. Data 
for the apprenticeship system are to be found in Fachserie 11, Reihe 3 (vocational 
training). Data are available as Excel files for the years 1999-2008, except 2002. 
I had to rely on the printed edition for the year 2002, which I scanned and edited 
with special software to avoid and check for errors due to the scanning process 
(For example the number 7 is often misread as 1, lines shifts, etc.). Due to 
changes in the survey methodology, no data on graduates are available for the 
year 2007.  
Data for vocational full-time schools (recognized), vocational full-time schools 
(not recognized), schools of the healthcare sector, and trade, technical and 
master’s schools are to be found in Fachserie 11, Reihe 2 (Vocational schools). 
Data are available as Excel files for the years 2000 to 2009. Due to a time lag in 
the official publications, data on graduates are released with a delay of one year. 
For example: The number of graduates in the year 2000 is to be found in the 
release of 2001.  
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occupation-specific credentials
104
 awarded annually, which I relate to the 
Microcensus-based number of employees in the respective occupation (see 
equation 3). 
 
Equation 3: The credential inflation index 
 
𝐶𝐼𝑋(𝑜𝑡) =
∑ 𝐶(𝑜𝑖𝑡)
6
𝑖=1
𝑁 (𝑜𝑡)
 
 
𝐶𝐼𝑋(𝑜𝑡): Credential inflation index of the occupation o in the year t 
𝑁 (𝑜𝑡): Number of the occupational incumbents of the occupation o in the 
year t 
∑ C(oit)
6
i=1 : Count of all newly awarded credentials through the six 
education and training tracks i for the occupation o in the year t 
 
The occupation-specific credential count and the number of occupational 
incumbents are matched using the German Dictionary of Occupational 
Titles (KldB 1992). However, the continuous upgrading and broadening of 
the apprenticeship training system
105
 and its corresponding credentials 
creates a mismatch because new credentials that combine formerly distinct 
credentials are introduced
106
. For example: In the year 2004, a new 
____________________ 
Data for tertiary education at universities are to be found in Fachserie 11, Reihe 
4.2. (Examinations at universities) and were made available by the Federal 
Statistical Office of Germany in a special edited Excel file that contained all 
years from 1999 to 2008. 
104  To smooth out short-term fluctuations and to emphasize longer-term trends, I use 
a central moving average of three years to calculate the total count of yearly 
issued occupation-specific credentials. This procedure also allows me to impute 
the missing data for the apprenticeship system in the year 2007. 
105  This process dates back to the 1960s and has resulted in a continuously falling 
number of apprenticeship-training-based credentials and a simultaneously 
broadened skills base for the remaining credentials (Busemeyer 2009). 
106  There were more changes in the apprenticeship training system, but these 
changes do not negatively affect the matching of the credential count with the 
number of employees. These changes consisted of the modernization of the 
curricula, the discontinuation of old training programs, or the establishment of 
new ones. Curriculum changes have no impact on the data structure at all. The 
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credential was introduced—the construction mechanic credential—which 
replaced four credentials that were no longer awarded: the construction 
mechanic (equipment engineering) credential, the construction mechanic 
(sheet-metal construction technology) credential, the construction 
mechanic (metal construction and ship-building technology) credential, 
and the construction mechanic (welding technology) credential. I adapt the 
raw data on the credentials to take account of the fact that, for example, 
each of the four construction mechanic occupations still exists, but they 
now share the same credential
107
. 
 
There is an important difference between the tertiary education track 
and the other five education and training tracks: Many degrees do not 
obviously track into a particular occupation—for example, German studies 
(Germanistik). Instead, tertiary education at universities provides 
generalist training (see, e.g., Abraham et al. 2011; Bol and Weeden 2014), 
which results in an imperfect match between field-of-study-specific 
credentials and occupations
108
. The problem is easily solved by calculating 
____________________ 
decision to discontinue old or establish new training programs causes marked 
changes in the number of credentials (the number of credentials rises from zero 
or falls to zero), but the organizing principle of the data remains the same. 
107  Starting with the year 2004, I assigned the new credential to the four detailed 
occupations. However, a simple reassignment would bias the number of awarded 
credentials by multiplying the number of credentials with the number of 
occupations they are assigned to. Therefore, I divided the absolute number of 
awarded credentials by the number of occupations this credential was assigned 
to. 
108  The data on tertiary-level credentials are available at a detailed level of 
aggregation that differentiates between approximately 300 different subjects of 
study (Studienfach). This detailed level allows for the matching of the number of 
awarded degrees to the Microcensus’s 74 fields of study (Studienbereich). I 
matched the 300 subjects of study to the 74 fields of study using a coding system 
provided by GESIS. GESIS is an organization that provides advisory services for 
social scientists in Germany  
(http://www.gesis.org/missy/fileadmin/missy/klassifikationen/Amtliche_Klassifi
kationen/Hfr/hfr00.pdf (Date of last access: January 2014)).  
There is one Microcensus field of study that cannot be matched with specific 
subjects of study—teacher. It is not possible because the term teacher does not 
refer to a subject of study but a special kind of degree like bachelor’s or master’s 
degrees—the Lehramt. However, the Federal Statistical Office also provides 
overall statistics for Lehramt, which are used instead. There are two exceptions: 
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the weighted sum of the awarded fields-of-study-specific degrees that 
grant access to the same occupation. The weight allows me to account for 
the fact that most field-of-study-specific credentials correspond to more 
than one occupation (see equation 4). 
Equation 4: The computation of the number of occupation-specific 
credentials that are awarded by the tertiary education track 
 
𝐶(𝑜𝑡) = ∑ 𝐶(𝑜𝑗𝑡) ∙ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑜𝑖𝑗)
74
𝑗=1
 , 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑜𝑗𝑡) =
𝑁 (𝑜𝑗𝑡)
∑ 𝑁 (𝑜𝑗𝑡)
𝑂
𝑜=1
  
 
𝐶(𝑜𝑡): Number of new credentials for the occupation o awarded by the 
tertiary education track in the year t 
𝐶(𝑜𝑗𝑡): The number of new credentials for the occupation o corresponding 
to the 74 fields of study j of the tertiary education track
109
 in the year t 
Weight(𝑜𝑗𝑡): The relative weight or importance of the field of study j in 
occupation o in the year t 
𝑁 (𝑜𝑗𝑡): Number of the incumbents of the occupation o with credentials 
corresponding to the field of study j in the year t 
∑ N(ojt)
O
o=1 : Count of all employees of all occupations o who have a 
credential corresponding to the field of study j in the year t 
 
Some occupations have no occupation-specific credential, yet employers 
nevertheless require their incumbents to have credentials (e.g., product 
testers, product inspectors). In these cases, employers usually rely on 
established credentials that are relatively similar to the occupation in 
____________________ 
teachers in primary schools and special schools (for pupils with disabilities) have 
specific subjects of study.  
109  I have merged the number of new credentials of the various fields of study j with 
each occupation o and all years t with the Microcensus using the Microcensus 
information about the fields of study j the occupational incumbents’ have 
majored in. 
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question
110
. However, there are no data available on which occupation-
specific credentials employers rely on as an alternative. Instead, I will use 
an approximation of the credential inflation index for these occupations. 
This approximation accounts for the broad variety of credentials 
employers might alternatively rely on and is based on the averaged 
credential inflation index of the education and training track in which 
employees acquired their credentials. For each of these occupations, the 
education-and-training-track-specific credential inflation index is 
weighted by the frequency of the incumbents with credentials from the 
respective education and training tracks
111
. 
Figure 2 illustrates my operationalization strategy for the sample 
occupation designer/graphic designer in the year 2004. The middle 
column displays the different education and training tracks that provide 
credentials for the designer/graphic designer occupation. The majority of 
new credentials (3746) were awarded by the vocational full-time school 
training track (not recognized). The second most important education and 
training track was the tertiary education track (1705 credentials) followed 
by trade, technical, and masters schools (272 credentials) and the dual 
system (31 credentials). 
The credentials awarded through the tertiary education track were 
awarded in various fields of study. The majority of these credentials are 
awarded in design-related fields of study (interior designer and audio-
visual designer)
112
. The other fields of study (home economics, 
economics, and German studies) only contribute small numbers of new 
____________________ 
110  For example: Product testers in a shoe factory might be required to have a 
shoemaker credential. In other cases, employers require the employees to have a 
credential that is relevant for the vacant position, which they complement with 
additional informal training courses (for example, this could apply to branch 
managers, sales managers, etc.). 
111  The German Microcensus provides information for all six vocational training 
tracks. However, it is not possible to differentiate between the recognized and 
non-recognized vocational fulltime schooling tracks and it is also not possible to 
differentiate between the schools of the healthcare sector and the trade, technical, 
and master’s schools. In both cases I use a weighted average of the education-
and-training-track-specific credential inflation index where the weight of each 
track is determined by the number of credentials they award in the respective 
years. 
112  I derived the numbers of credentials of the fields of study using equation 4. 
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credentials. There are an additional 14 fields of study (e.g., textile and 
clothing engineering, biology, computer sciences, etc.) that award even 
fewer credentials—I subsumed these under the miscellaneous fields-of-
study category. 
Figure 2: The designer/graphic designer occupation as an example of 
the operationalization of the credential inflation index, in the year 
2004 
 
Before I apply equation 3 and divide the total number of credentials for 
the designer/graphic designer occupation by the number of actual 
employees within the occupation, I have to make one final adjustment. 
This is necessary because the count of credentials is not comparable to the 
count of employees: The number of 439 employees in the 
designer/graphic designer occupation is based on a 1 percent population 
sample, whereas the number of 5754 credentials is based on a complete 
sample. To account for the different sampling plans, I multiply the overall 
number of employees by the inverted 1 percent selection probability of the 
Microcensus. 
The designer/graphic designer occupation has a credential saturation 
ratio of 0.13. This means that, in the year 2004, for approximately every 
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tenth employee in this occupation, a freshly credentialed designer/graphic 
designer entered the labor market. 
5.3.2 The Standardization Index 
I operationalize the credentials level of standardization by relying on the 
data I described in the last section and by conducting additional research 
to determine the level of standardization of the curricula for each 
credential
113
. Curricula may be standardized on the federal level, the 
Länder (state) level, or the school/university level. All credentials awarded 
by the apprenticeship training track and the vocational full-time schooling 
track (recognized) have federal-level standardized curricula
114
. Most 
training programs of the vocational full-time schooling track (not 
recognized) and the trade, technical, and master’s schools are usually 
standardized on the Länder level
115
. These credentials are comparable 
within the German Länder but not between them. Some credentials 
awarded through the vocational full-time schooling track (not recognized) 
are regulated at the federal level or at the school level. Credentials that are 
awarded by schools of the healthcare sector also vary in their degree of 
standardization. Most of these credentials are standardized on the federal 
level, whereas some are standardized on the Länder level or even both on 
the federal level and the level of the Länder. Most credentials awarded by 
the tertiary education system are standardized at the university level
116
. 
____________________ 
113  I used the internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of Germany 
(http://berufenet.arbeitsagentur.de/berufe/). 
114  Federal legislation regulates the curricula, duration of training, range of learning 
fields, basic sectoral skills, and specific occupational skills. The federal 
legislation consists of the Vocational Training Act (Berufsbildungsgesetz 
(BBiG)) and the Crafts Code (Handwerksordnung (HwO)). 
115  All credentials awarded by trade, technical, and master’s schools, and many 
credentials awarded by the vocational full-time schooling track (not recognized) 
are regulated by the Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and 
Cultural Affairs of the Länder. 
116  Despite the fact that tertiary education is formally regulated by the Länder, the 
constitution (Grundgesetz) of Germany (Art. 5 (3) GG) guarantees the freedom 
of science, research, and teaching, and results in quasi autonomous universities. 
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There are few exceptions: Medicine- and pharmacy-related credentials are 
standardized at the federal level, and law, food chemistry, and teacher 
training credentials have curricula that are standardized on the Länder 
level. 
To create an index of standardization, I assign each credential a value 
between 1 and 3. Value one describes credentials that are standardized on 
the school/university level, value two refers to Länder-level standardized 
credentials, and value three relates to credentials that are standardized on 
the federal level
117
. I have to average the standardization index for 
occupations where credentials are awarded through more than one 
education and training track. To account for differences in the importance 
of the credentials of the various education and training tracks for the same 
occupation, I apply weights (see equation 5). 
 
Equation 5: The standardization index 
 
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑜𝑡) = ∑ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑜𝑖𝑡) ∙ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑜𝑖𝑡)
6
𝑖=1
 ,  
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑜𝑖𝑡) =
𝐶(𝑜𝑖𝑡)
∑ C(o𝑖𝑡)
6
𝑖=1
 
 
Standardization(𝑜𝑡): The average credential standardization of the 
occupation (o) in the year t 
standard(o𝑖𝑡): Value of standardization of the occupation’s (o) credential 
awarded by the education and training track i in the year t. The value is 
one of the following three:   
1 for school/university-level standardized curricula, 
2 for Länder-level standardized curricula,  
3 for federal-level standardized curricula. 
____________________ 
The curriculum taught in one subject of study may not only vary between the 
Länder, but also within the Länder between universities. 
117  For the very few credentials that are standardized both at the federal and the 
Länder level, I assign the lower of the possible two values. The lower value 
reflects the leeway schools have in designing the curricula. 
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weight(o𝑖𝑡): Weight of the credential of the occupation o awarded by the 
education and training track i in the year t 
𝐶(𝑜𝑖𝑡): Number of new credentials for the occupation o awarded by the 
education and training track i in the year t 
∑ C(oit)
6
i=1 : Count of all awarded credentials through the six education 
and training tracks i for the occupation o in the year t 
 
In the section on the credential inflation index, I explained that no specific 
credentials are awarded for some occupations. For the purposes of 
approximating the standardization index, I will use the same 
approximation technique that I used for the credential inflation index. In 
the first step, I estimate the average standardization of each education and 
training track. In the second step, I weight the resulting training-track-
specific standardization by the density of employees with credentials from 
the different training tracks within the occupation in question. 
5.3.3 The Licensure of Tasks and Titles 
I measure the licensure of tasks using a dichotomous variable (licensed 
occupations versus occupations without a license). Haupt (2014, pp. 330-
332) provides a complete list of every occupation for which licensure is 
available in Germany and also provides a timeline of the enactment of the 
licensure legislation. A dichotomous measure differs from the established 
measures, which suffer due to the mismatch between the levels of 
analyses. This mismatch arises because occupations are addressed at an 
aggregated level, whereas occupations are licensed at the detailed 
occupational level. This mismatch causes some slippage and requires 
continuous licensing measures (e.g., Hoffmann 2011; Haupt 2014; Bol 
and Weeden 2014; Vicari 2014). Unlike these conventional approaches, I 
base my analysis on detailed occupations and hence have no slippage. 
Occupations that are subject to task licensure legally require all their 
incumbents to have the license. Hence, an occupation, along with all its 
incumbents, is licensed or not. 
I capture the licensure of occupational titles using a continuous measure 
that reflects the proportion of occupational incumbents with protected 
titles. The Microcensus makes it possible to identify all individuals who 
have protected titles: That includes all individuals with titles that were 
awarded by apprenticeship training tracks or by universities, all 
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individuals with public service job titles and grades (Beamte), and master 
craftsman positions. Additionally, some occupations solely consist of 
incumbents with licensed titles. For example: policemen, industrial master 
craftsmen (Industrie- und Werkmeister), and all occupations with licensed 
tasks. 
5.3.4 The Specificity of Occupational Tasks 
I use data provided by the Microcensus to capture whether occupational 
tasks and skills are common or unique and narrow or wide. Since the 
Microcensus does not directly measure skills, I use the “main task” 
variable as a proxy and assume that the occupational incumbents have the 
skills that would allow them to perform this main task
118
. The respondents 
can choose their main task out of a list of 20 tasks. I use the index of 
qualitative variation (IQV) to determine whether the tasks performed in 
one occupation are relatively common or relatively unique across all 
occupations (see equation 6). That means I compare the broadness of the 
distribution of each task over all occupations with the maximum 
dispersion that is theoretically possible
119
. Tasks that are relatively similar 
to the maximum dispersion are common while tasks that are dissimilar are 
unique. In a second step, I calculated the weighted mean of the IQVs for 
all tasks in an occupation, where the weights are based on the frequency 
with which incumbents report performing each main task in the 
occupation
120
. 
 
____________________ 
118  The Microcensus asks “Which task do you primarily perform?” (Statistisches 
Bundesamt and GESIS 2012: p.92). 
119  The IQV measure is based on the ratio of the total number of differences in a 
distribution to the maximum number of possible differences within the same 
distribution. The specific version of the IQV that I use is based on Klemm (2002, 
pp. 58-59). 
120  The IQV is based on the full sample of occupations and individuals and not the 
final sample as described chapter 5.2 to ensure an unbiased estimate of the 
unique or common sets of tasks. 
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Equation 6: The relative uniqueness of tasks and skills in occupations 
using the index of qualitative variation 
 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑜) = ∑ 𝐼𝑄𝑉𝑥 ∗ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑜𝑥)
20
𝑥=1
 , 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑄𝑉𝑥 =
𝑠 ∙ (𝑛𝑥
2 − ∑ 𝑓(𝑥𝑟)
2𝑠
𝑟=1 )
𝑛𝑥2 ∙ (𝑠 − 1)
 
𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡(𝑜𝑥) =
𝑁 (𝑜𝑥)
∑ 𝑁 (𝑜𝑥)
20
𝑥=1
 
 
Uniqueness(o) = weighted mean of the IQV of all activities mainly 
exercised in occupation o 
 𝐼𝑄𝑉𝑥 = The Index of Qualitative Variation of activity x over all 
occupations 
𝑛𝑥 = Number of individuals of all occupations primarily exercising 
activity x 
s = Number of nominal categories (number of occupations) 
∑ 𝑓(𝑥𝑟)
2𝑠
𝑟=1  = Frequency f of empirical pairs with the same value on 𝑥𝑟 (r 
= 1…s)  
Weight(𝑜𝑥): Intra-occupational weight of the activity x of occupation o 
N(𝑜𝑥): Number of the incumbents of the occupation o who exercise 
activity x  
∑ 𝑁 (𝑜𝑥)
20
𝑥=1 : Count of all employees within occupation o 
 
I measure how narrow or wide the range of tasks performed in an 
occupation is using the skill-specificity measure proposed by Stuth and 
Hennig (2014). In this paper, my coauthor and I also use the index of 
qualitative variation to determine whether all the incumbents of an 
occupation perform the same main task or if they are distributed over a 
wide range of main tasks. For example, occupations are deemed to be very 
narrow when their incumbents all state that they perform the same main 
task. I will again use the IQV, but in this instance, I will evaluate the 
dispersion of activities within each detailed occupation (see equation 7).  
 
Equation 7:The relative variety of tasks and skills within occupations 
using the index of qualitative variation  
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𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦(𝑜) = 𝐼𝑄𝑉𝑜 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝐼𝑄𝑉𝑜 =
𝑠 ∙ (𝑛𝑜
2 − ∑ 𝑓(𝑜𝑟)
2𝑠
𝑟=1 )
𝑛𝑜2 ∙ (𝑠 − 1)
 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑡𝑦𝑜= 𝐼𝑄𝑉𝑜= The Index of Qualitative Variation of all activities 
within the occupations o 
𝑛𝑜 = Number of individuals exercising all activities in occupation o 
s = Number of nominal categories (number of activities) 
∑ 𝑓(𝑜𝑟)
2𝑠
𝑟=1  = Frequency f of empirical pairs with the same value on 𝑜𝑟 (r 
= 1…s)  
 
Equations 4 and 5 are not indexed for time. However, both measures are 
calculated separately for each year. 
5.3.5 Occupational Associations and Occupation-Specific Trade Unions 
Measuring the representation of occupations by associations is difficult 
because no official data on occupational associations exist in Germany. 
However, Schroeder, Kalass, and Greef conducted a survey on 
occupational associations in Germany in 2009 to 2010 (Schroeder et al. 
2008, pp. 34-38)
121
. I assume that occupational associations are a 
relatively stable phenomenon and that the data also apply for my 
occupational sample of the years 2000, 2004, and 2007.  
Because the focus of this survey was on associations and not 
occupations, I had to research what occupation(s) each occupational 
association represented. I then transposed the focus of the data from 
____________________ 
121  Using a combined postal/online survey, they were able to obtain a response rate 
of 84.5 percent of the approximated total number of occupational associations 
(Schroeder et al. 2011:45). To validate and complete the survey, I conducted 
extensive internet-based research for those occupations where the survey 
indicated the non-existence of occupational associations. (The website 
http://berufenet.arbeitsagentur.de/berufe/ of the Federal Labor Office 
(Bundesagentur für Arbeit) provides information for occupations on whether 
there are associations or not.) Due to the high response rate, my research only 
turned up few additional associations. 
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occupational associations to occupations
122
. I matched the modified survey 
to the Microcensus data and was thus able to distinguish occupations that 
are represented by associations from occupations that are not. The survey 
on occupational associations also included data on occupation-specific 
trade unions, which allowed me to code occupations as being represented 
by occupation-specific trade unions in contrast to occupations that were 
not represented by an occupation-specific trade union. 
To determine whether occupational associations might have a strong 
powerbase (homogeneity of interests) or not (heterogeneity of interests), I 
counted the number of occupations each association represented and 
estimated the minimum value of the represented occupations over all 
associations that are assigned to one occupation. Occupations with 
associations that only represent one occupation are coded as having a 
potentially strong powerbase. Occupations with values above 1 are coded 
as being represented by occupational associations with a potentially weak 
powerbase. Occupations without any associations are coded as not being 
represented by an association at all. 
5.3.6 Control Variables 
There are a range of additional variables on the occupational level and the 
individual level that are also associated with temporary employment. I 
integrate these characteristics into my empirical models to control for their 
well-known impact. 
The first of these relates to further education. Further education affects 
an individual’s risk of holding a temporary employment contract because 
it increases the amount of human capital possessed (e.g., Booth et al. 
2002, Giesecke and Groß 2004, pp. 351-352). It also provides individuals 
with additional credentials that might increase their labor market chances 
by signaling high productivity (e.g., Weeden 2002, p. 68; Haupt 2012)
123
. 
____________________ 
122  The resulting data matrix is more complex than the original one because many 
occupations are represented by more than one occupational association and many 
associations represent more than one occupation. 
123  Some occupations mandate their incumbents to engage in further education in 
fixed time-intervals (e.g., commercial and professional drivers, animal keepers, 
physicians or teachers). 
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Therefore, I control for the proportion of individuals per occupation who 
have engaged in work-related further education in the last 12 months. This 
measure is based on Microcensus data. 
Second, research on the impact of occupational characteristics on 
wages, working conditions, and promotion chances usually finds net 
effects for gender composition and racial composition (e.g., England 1992 
; Kilbourne et al. 1994; Weeden 2002; Cohen and Huffman 2003; England 
und Folbre 2005; Gartner and Hinz 2009; Haupt 2012). Using the 
Microcensus, I therefore construct measures of the percentage of women 
within the occupations and the percentage of employees with non-German 
nationality within the occupations. 
Third, small organizations in Germany are not subject to employment 
protection legislation. Because they do not face procedural 
inconveniences, notice periods, and severance payments when they lay off 
employees, small organizations do not need temporary employment 
contracts to maintain external flexibility. Incumbents of occupations that 
are concentrated in small businesses may therefore have a low incidence 
of temporary employment contracts. The law defines organizations as 
small when they have less than ten full-time equivalent employees. This 
definition was true for the years 2004 and onwards. Before 2004, the 
threshold was set at five full-time equivalent employees. To control for 
this possible bias, I use the Microcensus to construct a measure of the 
percentage of occupational incumbents that are employed in organizations 
with up to five or ten employees. 
Fourth, the use of temporary employment contracts might be more cost 
effective for large organizations than for small organizations because large 
organizations incur lower marginal costs for additional training of new 
(temporary) employees than small organizations (e.g., Knoke and 
Kalleberg 1994; Uzzi and Barsness 1998; Werfhorst 2011). To control for 
the fact that large organizations use temporary employment contracts more 
often than small organizations,
124
 I use the Microcensus to construct a 
____________________ 
124  See Fritsch and Schank (2005), Giesecke (2006, pp. 212-213) or Bellmann et al. 
(2009, pp. 383-384). 
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measure of the percentage of occupational incumbents that are employed 
in organizations with 50 or more employees
125
.  
Fifth, the general economic conditions differ greatly between the old 
and new German Länder and this might also have an impact on an 
individual’s risk of holding temporary employment contracts. I therefore 
control for the different economic conditions and construct a Microcensus-
based measure of the percentage of occupational incumbents that are 
employed in the new Länder. 
Sixth, to account for the human capital approach and its emphasis on 
the economic value of skills, I will also control for occupational skills. Bol 
and Weeden (2014) use the BIBB/BAUA data from the year 2006 along 
with the German Microcensus to compute scales for a broad variety of 
occupational skills (see also Haupt 2012, 2014; Bol 2014). However, this 
data source does not have sufficient cases to construct reliable skill 
measures for detailed occupations
126
. As an alternative, I will use less 
detailed but more reliable data that are provided by the Microcensus. The 
Microcensus differentiates between four different skill levels of tasks: 
routine/labor tasks, skilled tasks, skilled tasks with some managerial 
responsibilities, and managerial tasks. I construct a density measure for 
each of the four skill levels of the tasks performed by the incumbents of 
each occupation. I cannot use a composite measure for the skill level of 
tasks because each skill level varies in a non-linear fashion in its 
association with temporary employment. 
Seventh, collective wage bargaining does not only affect wages but also 
employment relations and hence, temporary employment. However, 
German unions mainly operate at a sectoral or industry level (e.g., 
Ebbinghaus 2000, p. 286). To control for their potential association with 
temporary employment, I construct ten density measures for the 
proportion of occupational incumbents within ten industries. 
____________________ 
125  Unfortunately, the Microcensus only makes it possible to identify organizations 
with between one and 50 and more employees. 
126  Bol and Weeden (2014) based their analyses on general occupational fields rather 
than detailed occupations. However, for at least one fifth of their sample of 
general occupational fields, these skill measures are based on less than ten 
incumbents. Because I use detailed occupations, the reliability of such measures 
would be significantly lower. 
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Eighth, nearly all the studies on the individual-level determinants of 
temporary employment in Germany agree in their assessment of the 
importance of the individual-level characteristics qualification, age, public 
service employment, and region (e.g., Rudolph 1987, Hagen 2002; 
Giesecke and Groß 2002, p. 99; Giesecke and Groß 2003, p. 168; Kim and 
Kurz 2003; Giesecke and Groß 2004; Mertens and McGinnity 2004; Kurz 
et al. 2005, pp. 64-65; McGinnity et al. 2005; Boockmann and Hagen 
2006, p. 33; Buchholz and Grunow 2006; Giesecke 2006, pp. 210-213; 
Giesecke and Groß 2007, p. 92; Gundert 2007; Gebel 2009; Gebel and 
Giesecke 2009; Allmendinger et al. 2013, pp. 32-34). Almost all studies 
find no effect of gender on temporary employment. However, because I 
stratify my individual-level analyses using detailed occupations, it is 
highly probable that gender might nevertheless have an impact. 
Therefore I will control for qualifications, age, public service 
employment, region, and gender on the individual level. I differentiate 
qualifications into low, medium, and high education groups 
(Allmendinger et al. 2013, p. 9). This categorization is based on the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The “low” 
education group covers ISCED groups 1, 2, and 3c and captures 
individuals who only completed basic education. The “medium” category 
(ISCED groups 3 and 4) includes all individuals who completed upper 
secondary education (e.g., apprenticeship training or vocational full-time 
schooling) or a program in preparation for tertiary education. The “high” 
education group (ISCED 5 and 6) includes all individuals with a 
completed tertiary education. I differentiated age into three categories: 
“Young” people are those who are between 15 and 29 years old. The 
“middle” age category contains all people between 30 and 49 years, and 
the “older” category includes all people between the ages of 50 and 64. 
Public service employment contains all individuals who are employed in 
the public sector as opposed to private sector employment. Region 
differentiates between the old and new Länder. 
  
6 Descriptive Statistics 
In the following sections, I first present the trends in temporary 
employment on the individual level, differentiated by the individual 
characteristics I used in the first step of my two-step multilevel regression 
analysis. The descriptive trends are based on data from the full 1 percent 
population sample of the German Microcensus for the years 1993 to 2008. 
Second, I show descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables on the occupational level. Finally, I present an overview of the 
means and standard deviations of the occupational-level variables and of 
the bivariate occupational-level correlations between the various closure 
source variables. I also provide an overview on how the various closure 
sources are distributed over major occupational groupings. 
6.1 The Trends in Temporary Employment in Germany 
Figure 3 presents the differences between the old and new German Länder 
(former West and East Germany respectively) as the percentage of 
employees in temporary employment, in order to give a first impression of 
the rate of temporary employment and its association with the different 
regions of Germany. The relative prevalence of temporary employment 
contracts is measured in comparison to the individuals in employment 
who are at risk of holding temporary employment contracts (see chapter 
5). Temporary employment was of relatively low importance for the West 
German labor market, at least in the 90s. However, the share of temporary 
employment contracts rose slowly but continuously in the old Länder 
from 4.8 percent (1993) to 7 percent (1999). Between 1999 and 2004, the 
share stagnated but it again rose steeply to 9.5 percent in the years 2005 to 
2008. In the new East German Länder, temporary employment contracts 
were much more important than in the old West German Länder. In the 
early 90s, every tenth employee in the new Länder had a temporary 
employment contract. This high initial percentage remained relatively 
stable till 2004. In 2006, temporary employment peaked (14.3 percent) 
and then declined to its 2008 value of 13.2 percent. 
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Figure 3: Temporary employment in the old and new German Länder, 
1993-2008 
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 1993-2008, own calculations 
 
The sharp increase in both parts of Germany from 2005 onwards is due to 
profound changes in the unemployment insurance system—the Hartz 
reforms. The Hartz reforms constituted the most radical change in the 
welfare tradition of post-war Germany and transformed the unemployment 
benefit system from an insurance-based system that aimed to preserve 
status to a system providing flat-rate assistance at a subsistence level (for a 
short literature overview see Bernhardt 2015). Before 2005, the 
unemployment insurance system aimed to preserve the newly unemployed 
person’s status. The new flat-rate assistance established as part of the 
Hartz reforms provides basic, status-independent income support that is 
only granted if savings are used up beforehand. Long-term unemployment 
(unemployment that lasts longer than one year) now entails the real threat 
of downward social mobility particularly for the middle class (Bernhardt 
forthcoming, p. 7). While the old regulation granted the unemployed the 
necessary time and money to find a new status-equivalent job, the revised 
regulation incorporates strong incentives to take jobs that are not status 
equivalent to avoid long-term unemployment. This pressure may have 
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caused the increase in temporary employment, since more unemployed 
people may have tried to get back into employment regardless of the status 
or employment conditions of the new job
127
. 
Figure 3 shows the share of temporary employment contracts for three 
age groups
128
 and shows a strong association between age and temporary 
employment. The share of temporary employment contracts increased 
strongly and continuously for the young age group. In the early 90s, every 
tenth employee aged below 30 held a temporary employment contract. By 
2008 this ratio had increased steeply: One out of four employees held 
temporary employment contracts. Although older employees have the 
lowest share of temporary employment contracts, the differences between 
the 30-49 year olds and the older employees are minimal. 
 
____________________ 
127  There was also an important change in the sampling technique of the 
Microcensus. Before 2005 all respondents were surveyed in one week of the 
second quarter of the year. The survey was changed to a continuous survey in 
2005 and the respondents were equally distributed through the year. To avoid 
measuring errors through design effects I restricted the sample for the 
Microcensus years 2005-2008 to the second quarter. This reduces the number of 
observations for these years by three quarters. 
128  The differentiation of the age categories into three groups (15-29 years, 30-49 
years, 50-64 years) is based on Allmendinger et al. (2013, p. 9). The main idea 
behind this coding is to emphasize the prime working age and contrast it with 
those age groups that are usually more at risk of being unemployed, economically 
inactive, or in non-standard employment. 
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Figure 4: Temporary employment differentiated by age, 1993-2008
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 1993-2008, own calculations 
 
In general, an individual’s qualification level is an important influence on 
the risk of holding a temporary employment contract (see figure 4). Most 
notably, the absence of formal qualifications (no additional formal 
education beyond basic schooling) is most strongly associated with 
temporary employment. People without formal qualifications had 
temporary employment levels that ranged between 8 percent and 19. 
However, until the middle of the 90s, the proportions of temporary 
employment among those who have high levels of vocational 
qualifications (individuals with master-craftsmen credentials or tertiary 
degrees) were similar. While the difference in the share of temporary 
employment for individuals with medium- and high-level qualifications 
converged, individuals with high-level qualifications were more often 
temporarily employed than individuals with medium-level qualifications 
(completed vocational training and education below the tertiary level).  
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Figure 5: Temporary employment differentiated by qualification, 1993-
2008
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 1993-2008, own calculations 
 
The use of temporary employment contracts in the public sector differs 
from its use in the private sector. Individuals in the public sector were 
more often temporarily employed than employees in the private sector, but 
the gap between both sectors was closing. The share of temporary 
employment was higher in the public sector than in the private sector. 
There were no appreciable differences in temporary employment 
between women and men (see figure 6). In the 90s, women were 
temporarily employed slightly more often than men. In the 2000s, the 
picture changed and even this small difference in men’s and women’s 
temporary employment rates vanished almost completely. However, the 
maximum difference between men’s and women’s temporary employment 
rates was very small in any case (1.3 percent in 1994 and 1995). 
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Figure 6: Temporary employment differentiated by public and private 
sector, 1993-2008 
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 1993-2008, own calculations 
 
Figure 7: Temporary employment differentiated by sex, 1993-2008 
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Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 1993-2008, own calculations 
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6.2 Closure Sources and Their Bivariate Association with Temporary 
Employment 
For the following descriptions of the occupational-level variables, I will 
use descriptive statistics that are based on deciles. These deciles divide the 
ordered sample of the occupations into ten essentially equal subsets of 
occupations. The variable I use for the ordering of the occupations is the 
variable of interest of the respective section (e.g., standardization). First, I 
use these deciles to describe the distribution of the variable of interest 
(e.g., the mean standardization value of each decile). Second I use the 
same deciles to assess the potential association between the variable of 
interest and temporary employment (e.g., the mean proportion of 
temporary employment for each decile). The style of the descriptions will 
be necessarily different for categorical/binary variables like associations, 
unionization, and task-licensure. The descriptive statistics for the 
credential inflation index will include an additional figure that shows the 
association between the conventional credentialism measure (proportion 
of occupational incumbents with tertiary degrees) and the credential 
inflation index measure. The focus of the descriptive analyses is the 
pooled total sample (N = 1,118 occupations), but I will also show the 
distribution of the average values for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007, to 
check the stability of the closure measures over time. 
6.2.1 The Credential Inflation Index 
The lower the value of the credential inflation index (CIX), the fewer the 
numbers of freshly credentialed individuals entering the occupational 
labor market in comparison to the employees who are already employed in 
the occupation in question. Lower credential inflation index values 
thereby indicate more closed occupations. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the CIX values across the occupations, 
which were assigned to ten deciles according to their credential inflation 
index values. The majority of occupations in Germany have low CIX 
values. Only occupations in the eighth decile exceed the mean CIX value 
of 0.05. For most of the occupations in the ninth and tenth decile 
credentials are awarded in an inflationary manner. Some sample 
occupations with values around the median of the credential inflation 
index are bakers (CIX=0.038), HR administrators (CIX=0.04), and field 
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representatives and traveling salesman (CIX=0.044). Occupations with 
very high values on the credential inflation index include application 
software developers (CIX=0.29), industrial clerks and business managers  
(CIX=0.4), and car electricians (CIX=0.69). Examples of occupations  
Figure 8: The distribution of the mean credential inflation index values 
over the deciles of the occupations for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany. 
 
with very low credential inflation index values include shoemakers 
(CIX=0.007), goods decorators and goods painters (CIX=0.005), and 
miners (CIX=0.003). 
Figure 9 shows the average rate of temporary employment for each 
decile of occupation-specific values of the credential inflation index. The 
association between CIX and temporary employment appears to be 
relatively weak. Occupations within the first two deciles had the lowest 
shares of temporary employment. Occupations within the third to eigth 
decile had slightly higher shares of incumbents who are in temporary 
employment. Occupations within the last two deciles had the highest share 
of their incumbents in temporary employment. This pattern mirrors the 
pattern depicted in Figure 8, which shows that credentials were only 
awarded in an inflationary manner in the occupations in the last two 
deciles. Even though the mean credential inflation values of occupations 
within the last decile is very high, the share of temporary employees 
increases only slightly from the ninth to the tenth decile. The reason for 
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this small increase is that the last decile also contains relatively “new” 
occupations (e.g. software developers). The number of new employees 
within these new occupations is still relatively small, but the numbers of 
freshly credentialed individuals is high.
129
  
 
Figure 9: The mean rate of temporary employment differentiated by 
the deciles of CIX for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
129  “Old” and “dying” occupations are most often to be found in the first deciles. 
Even if only few incumbents are left who work in their occupation, even fewer 
freshly credentialed individuals enter these occupational labor markets. 
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Figure 10: The mean rate of occupational incumbents with tertiary 
degrees differentiated by the deciles of CIX for the years 2000, 2004, 
and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany. 
 
Figure 10 shows how the credential inflation index is associated with the 
measure most commonly used to capture the credentialism closure source  
(see chapter 4.1)—the proportion of occupational incumbents with tertiary 
degrees. For occupations with low values on the credential inflation index, 
the proportion of occupational incumbents with tertiary degrees is also 
low. Starting with the fourth decile up to the ninth decile, this proportion 
steadily increases as the credential inflation index increases.  
6.2.2 The Standardization of Occupational Credentials 
The standardization of the curricula of occupational credentials varies 
between 1 and 3 with a median standardization value of 2.61. The high 
median value reflects the importance of apprenticeship credentials for the 
German labor market. The apprenticeship training track only awards 
credentials that are standardized at the federal level.  
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Figure 11: The distribution of the mean standardization index values 
over the deciles of the occupations for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany. 
 
Figure 11 shows the distribution of the standardization values across the 
occupations, which were assigned to ten deciles according to their 
standardization index values. The curricula of the occupations within the 
first two deciles are mainly regulated on the school/university level and 
thus had the lowest standardization values. The occupations within the 
fourth, fifth, and sixth deciles are mainly standardized on the Länder level. 
Most of these occupations also have incumbents with credentials that are 
standardized on the federal level. Nearly all incumbents of the occupations 
within the seventh up to the tenth decile have credentials that are 
standardized on the federal level. Sample occupations with values around 
the median of the standardization variable include HR administrators 
(standardization=2.47), product testers, product inspectors 
(standardization=2.59), and assistant desk officers (standardization=2.63). 
Occupations with a very high degree of standardization include plate glass 
mechanics (standardization=3), tile and mosaic layers 
(standardization=2.99), and management assistants in data processing 
(standardization=2.98). Examples of occupations with a very low degree 
of standardization include all engineering occupations 
(standardization=1), IT consultants (standardization=1), and singers, 
actors, and performers (standardization=1). 
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Figure 12 shows an unambiguous association between temporary 
employment and the standardization of credentials. Occupations had the 
lowest share of temporarily employed incumbents when the majority of 
their incumbents held highly standardized credentials, whereas 
occupations had the highest shares of temporary employment when the 
majority of their members held credentials that were not very 
standardized. However, the occupations with the highest level of 
standardized credentials, i.e., those in the tenth decile, deviate from the 
overall pattern. They have a similar share of temporary employment as the 
occupations in the fourth to the sixth decile. 
 
Figure 12: The mean rate of temporary employment differentiated by 
the standardization of vocational credentials in the years 2000, 2004, 
and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany. 
6.2.3 Occupational Specificity 
Occupational specificity measures the composition of tasks within 
occupations and across occupations. Both measures of occupational 
specificity range between values of zero and one. Low values on the 
measures of occupational specificity indicate occupations with relatively 
unique or narrow combinations of tasks, whereas high values indicate 
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occupations with tasks that are common or occupations that have a broad 
set of tasks and skills.  
 
Figure 13: The distribution of unique and common sets of tasks over 
the deciles of the occupations for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
M
e
an
 v
al
u
e
 o
f 
sp
e
ci
fi
ci
ty
Deciles of occupations ordered by their specificity (unique or common sets of 
tasks)
2000
2004
2007
Total
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations 
 
In the theory section I have already argued that occupations with unique 
tasks should be a relatively rare phenomenon. This assumption is 
evidently true because most occupations had sets of tasks that were 
relatively common (see figure 13). The median value of the 
uniqueness/commonness variable of 0.94 indicates that most occupations 
share the same tasks
130
. Sample occupations with values around the 
median of the uniqueness variable include dental laboratory assistants and 
dental technicians (uniqueness = 0.93), administrative professionals 
(higher service) (uniqueness = 0.94), and scientific librarians (uniqueness 
= 0.95). Occupations with very common tasks include milling machine 
operators (uniqueness = 0.98), screed layers (uniqueness = 0.98), and 
machine setters and setter operators (uniqueness = 0.98). Examples for 
occupations with relatively unique tasks are industrial cleaners 
____________________ 
130  The range of the variable is 0.26. 
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(uniqueness = 0.73), cooks (uniqueness = 0.8), and animal keepers 
(uniqueness = 0.83). 
 
Figure 14: The mean rate of temporary employment differentiated by 
the deciles of occupational specificity (unique or common sets of 
tasks) for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations 
 
Figure 14 shows the average rate of temporary employment for each 
decile of the occupations. The association between occupational 
specificity and temporary employment is ambiguous. Occupations with 
very unique sets of tasks (those in the first and second decile) had the 
highest share of incumbents with temporary employment contracts. 
Occupations in the fourth and fifth decile had similarly low rates of 
temporary employment as occupations in the eighth, ninth, and tenth 
decile. This similarity might be caused by the very low variance of this 
variable, that is, most occupations have relatively common sets of tasks. 
As figure 13 shows, the differentiation of the occupations into deciles 
signifies that the differences in the occupational specificity of the 
occupations are only small after the second decile. 
 
The specificity measure for occupations with narrow or broad sets of 
tasks is evenly distributed (see figure 15). The median value of this 
specificity measure is 0.42. Sample occupations with values around the 
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median of the specificity measure include pastry cooks (narrowness = 
0.59), gas and water fitters (narrowness = 0.61), and surveying technicians 
(narrowness = 0.64). Occupations with very broad sets of tasks include 
communications electronics technicians (narrowness = 0.88), hydraulic 
technicians (narrowness = 0.9), and social scientists (narrowness = 0.92). 
Examples of occupations with narrow sets of tasks include lower 
secondary school teachers (narrowness = 0.01), judges, attorneys, and 
public prosecutors (narrowness = 0.1), and food sellers (narrowness = 
0.14). 
 
Figure 15: The distribution of narrow and wide sets of tasks over the 
deciles of the occupations for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations 
 
Figure 16 shows the average rate of temporary employment for each 
decile of the occupations. The association between this measure of 
occupational specificity and temporary employment was weak. 
Occupations with a focus on a few skills and tasks had higher levels of 
temporary employment. The highest shares of temporary employees were 
found in occupations in the first decile up to occupations in the fourth 
decile. The share of temporary employment was relatively stable and low 
for occupations in the fifth up to occupations in the tenth decile. There 
seems to be an association between occupations with narrow sets of tasks 
and skills and temporary employment. However, after the range of tasks of 
occupations becomes relatively wide, further increases in the wideness of 
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the tasks and skills had a visible association with their incumbents’ risks 
of temporary employment. 
 
Figure 16: The mean rate of temporary employment differentiated by 
the deciles of occupational specificity (narrow or wide range of tasks) 
for years 2000, 2004, and, 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations 
6.2.4 The Licensing of Occupations 
My first licensing measure is based on the federal-level legislation 
regarding the licensure of occupation-specific tasks. I am able to identify 
37 licensed occupations. Two occupations were not licensed in the year 
2000. The number of licensed occupations is therefore 35 in 2000. As a 
result, approximately 10 percent of the occupations in my sample were 
licensed. Sample occupations that are licensed include: nurses, medical 
doctors, and teachers. 
Figure 17 presents the share of temporarily employed incumbents in 
licensed and non-licensed occupations, which are differentiated by time. 
Employees in licensed occupations had a higher rate of temporary 
employment than occupations that were not licensed. The small increase 
from 35 licensed occupations in 2000 to 37 licensed occupations in 2004 
and 2007 had no visible impact on the mean share of temporary 
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employment of licensed occupations. The differences in temporary 
employment between licensed and non-licensed occupations were smallest 
in 2007 because temporary employment strongly increased in the non-
licensed occupations.  
 
Figure 17: The mean rate of temporary employment differentiated by 
licensed and non-licensed occupations in the years 2000, 2004, and 
2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of 
the Federal Labor Office of Germany; Haupt (2012a). 
 
My second licensing measure is based on the federal-level legislation 
regarding the licensure of occupation-specific titles. It measures the 
proportion of occupational members with protected titles. Hence, the 
licensing of titles varies between 0 and 100.  
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Figure 18: The distribution of the mean licensure (titles) over the 
deciles of the occupations for the years 2000, 2004, and 2007
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations. 
 
Figure 18 shows the distribution of protected titles across the occupations, 
which were assigned to nine deciles. The ninth and tenth decile could not 
be meaningfully distinguished from each other because the majority of 
occupations within these two deciles had incumbents who all had 
protected titles. Even the occupations in the first decile had a relatively 
high density of incumbents with protected titles (50 percent). Sample 
occupations with a median density of incumbents with protected titles 
include forestry workers (licensure (titles) = 78%), software developers 
(licensure (titles) = 76%), and freight forwarding and logistics services 
clerks (licensure (titles) = 80%). Occupations with a very high density of 
incumbents with protected titles include industrial master craftsmen 
(licensure (titles = 100%), professional fire fighters (licensure (titles = 
100%), and chaplains (licensure (titles = 100%). Examples for 
occupations with a very low density of incumbents with protected titles 
are therapists (licensure (titles) = 48%), publishing house workers 
(licensure (titles) = 54%) and waiters and waitresses (licensure (titles) = 
51%). 
Figure 19 shows the average rate of temporary employment for each 
decile of the occupations. The association between this measure of 
licensure and the proportion of temporarily employed individuals is strong 
for occupations within the first up to the fifth deciles: A higher density of 
occupational members with protected titles is strongly associated with a 
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decrease in the proportion of occupational incumbents who have 
temporary employment contracts. A further increase in the density of 
occupational members with protected titles did not 
Figure 19: The mean rate of temporary employment differentiated by 
the deciles of title licensure for years 2000, 2004, and, 2007
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations. 
 
correspond to a further decrease in their risk of holding temporary 
employment contracts. The share of incumbents with temporary contracts 
remains stable for occupations within the fifth up to the eighth decile. 
However, for occupations where nearly all incumbents have protected 
titles, the share of temporary employment goes back up. 
6.2.5 Occupational Associations 
One third of all occupations in my sample were represented by 
associations. I use the degree of exclusivity to differentiate between 
occupational associations that represent more than one occupation and 
occupational associations that represent only one occupation. 17 percent 
of the occupations were represented by an association that only 
represented that occupation and no other occupations. I will refer to them 
as specific associations. 16 percent of the occupations were represented by 
associations that represented other occupations, too. I will refer to these 
associations as general associations. The majority of occupations, two 
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thirds, were not represented by any associations. Examples of occupations 
without representation are butchers, interior decorators, and earth moving 
machine drivers. Various engineer, technician, and management 
occupations are represented by general associations, while commercial 
and professional drivers, executive consultants and management 
consultants, and hair stylists are represented by specific occupational 
associations. 
Figure 20 presents the level of temporary employment for occupations 
without occupational associations, for occupations with general 
associations, and for occupations with specific associations. Temporary 
employment was highest for employees in occupations with associations, 
irrespective of their general or specific character, and was lowest in 
occupations without associations. 
 
Figure 20: Occupational incumbents’ mean rate of temporary 
employment differentiated by their representation by occupational 
associations in the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Survey of the total population of 
occupational associations conducted by Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations 
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6.2.6 Occupation-Specific Trade Unions 
Thirteen percent of all occupations were represented by trade unions, 
which were legally permitted to collectively bargain for the interests of the 
occupational incumbents. Examples of occupations with trade unions 
include train drivers/rail vehicle operators, medical doctors, and road 
maintenance workers. Figure 21 presents the level of temporary 
employment for occupations with and without occupation-specific trade 
unions. Temporary employment was high for employees in occupations 
with occupation-specific trade unions and was low in occupations without 
trade union representation. 
 
Figure 21: Occupational incumbents’ mean rate of temporary 
employment differentiated by their representation by trade unions in 
the years 2000, 2004, and 2007 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Survey of the total population of 
occupational associations conducted by Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations 
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6.3 Summary of the Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the occupational-level variables’ means and standard 
deviations. The descriptive statistics show that nearly all closure sources 
were stable over time. There was only one exception: the licensure of 
occupational titles. In 2007, the mean level of title licensure increased 
considerably. The association between the credential inflation index and 
the proportion of occupational incumbents with tertiary degrees seems to 
support my theoretical concerns: For Germany, the established measure of 
credentialism does not seem to capture the restricting-supply closure 
mechanism: Occupations for which credentials are awarded in an 
inflationary manner have the highest proportions of members with tertiary 
degrees. However, Bol and Weeden (2014), Giesecke and Verwiebe 
(2009), and Groß (2009, 2012) found a positive association between 
occupational closure and tertiary degrees for Germany. I will therefore 
return to this conundrum in the next chapter. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of occupational-level measures 
Variable Mean SD 
Closure Sources (omitted categories: no occupational      
association, no task licensure, no trade union):     
  Credential inflation index …………………… 0,06 0,07 
  Standardization ……………………………… 2,33 0,71 
  Narrow or wide range of tasks ………………. 0,57 0,23 
  Unique of common sets tasks ……………….. 0,93 0,04 
  Specific occupational association …………… 0,17 - 
  General occupational association …………… 0,16 - 
  Task licensure ……………………………….. 0,10 - 
  Title licensure ……………………………….. 0,78 0,15 
  Occupation-specific trade union …………….. 0,13 - 
Skill level of tasks  (omitted category      
= skilled functions):     
  Routine/labor functions ………………...….... 0,20 0,22 
  Managerial and skilled functions ……………. 0,25 0,20 
  Managerial functions ………………………... 0,23 0,25 
Establishment size:     
  Small organizations …………………………. 0,11 0,13 
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  Large organizations …………………………. 0,36 0,22 
Region (omitted category = old Länder):     
  New Länder …………………………………. 0,21 0,10 
Human Capital:     
  Further education ……………………………. 0,10 0,12 
Gender Composition:     
  % female …………………………………….. 0,38 0,30 
Time  (omitted category = 2004):     
  Year 2000 …………………………………… 0,33 - 
  Year 2007 …………………………………… 0,33 - 
 
Nationality:     
  % non-German citizenship ………………….. 0,06 0,07 
 
Industry (omitted category = manufacturing):     
  Agriculture …………………………………... 0,02 0,11 
  Mining, electricity, gas ……………………… 0,02 0,07 
  Construction ………………………………… 0,08 0,22 
  Distributive trades and repair services ……… 0,10 0,20 
  Transportation and information services ……. 0,05 0,16 
  Financial and insurance services ………….… 0,03 0,13 
  Business services ………………………….… 0,09 0,16 
  Miscellaneous services ……………………… 0,07 0,18 
  Non-profit organizations ……………………. 0,16 0,30 
  Public service ……………………………….. 0,09 0,20 
Dependent variable     
  Square root (predicted probability of tempo-  
    rary employment) …………………………… 0,29 0,12 
  
Predicted probability of temporary 
employment…………………………………. 0,10 0,08 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; standard deviations are not shown for binary 
or categorical variables 
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Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Bivariate correlations between the independent occupational-level 
variables are presented in table 3
131
. The strongest associations are found 
between task licensure and title licensure (0.48) and between task 
licensure and occupation-specific trade unions (0.43). The correlation 
between task licensure and title licensure comes as no surprise: All 
occupations with licensed tasks have protected titles. Because of this 
conceptual intersection between both licensure variables, I will use them 
separately in the coming multivariate models, even if the statistical 
relationship between the two measures is not very high. There might be 
reason to be concerned about multicollinearity between both measures of 
occupational specificity, given that they use the same basic information 
but process it in different ways. However, there is only a weak 
mathematical relationship (r=0.32) between them. 
 
Table 3: Bivariate correlations of the occupational-level closure 
variables 
  Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 Credential   
1 
                
  inflation index                 
2 Standardization -0,01 1               
3 Narrow or wide  
-0,07 -0,19 1 
            
  range of tasks             
4 Unique or common 
-0,07 0,00 0,32 1 
          
  sets of tasks           
5 Specific occup. 
0,02 -0,24 -0,08 -0,19 1 
        
  association         
____________________ 
131  A full correlation matrix that also includes the occupational-level control 
variables and the proportion of incumbents with academic degrees is available in 
the appendix. 
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6 General occup. 
0,09 -0,38 -0,10 -0,07 -0,19 1 
      
  association       
7 Task licensure 0,19 -0,16 -0,35 -0,18 0,22 0,23 1     
8 Title licensure 0,11 -0,24 -0,03 0,16 0,14 0,15 0,48 1   
9 Occupation-specific 
0,14 -0,12 -0,20 -0,25 0,18 0,27 0,43 0,24 1   trade union 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Correlations in italic are not significant at 
the p<0.05 level 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
To give a more tangible impression of how the closure sources vary in 
their distribution over the occupations, I aggregated the detailed 
occupations into major occupational groups. Table 4 shows the mean 
value of the closure sources for each major occupational group. The 
credential inflation index does not vary greatly. Service occupations and 
operative/labor occupations have the highest mean credential inflation 
index values. The standardization of credentials is lowest in technical and 
managerial occupations and highest in craft occupations. The sets of tasks 
are relatively narrow in service occupations and relatively wide in 
technical and managerial occupations. Agricultural occupations have 
relatively unique sets of tasks, whereas craft, technical, and managerial 
occupations have relatively common sets of tasks. Service occupations 
and managerial occupations are most often represented by specific 
associations and technical and managerial occupations by general 
associations. 
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Table 4: Mean of the various closure sources by major occupation 
group 
Closure sources 
Opera- Agri- Sales/ Ser- 
Crafts 
Tech- Mana- 
tive/labor culature clerical vice nical gerial 
Credential inflation 
0,07 0,05 0,05 0,07 0,05 0,04 0,05 
index 
Standardization 2,53 2,40 2,33 2,02 2,88 1,54 1,45 
Width of the sets  
0,50 0,53 0,58 0,47 0,58 0,75 0,71 
of tasks 
Commonness of 
0,92 0,87 0,93 0,90 0,96 0,96 0,95 
the tasks 
Specific association 0,04 0,00 0,13 0,40 0,01 0,21 0,31 
General association 0,00 0,11 0,14 0,28 0,01 0,38 0,38 
Task licensure 0,03 0,00 0,00 0,35 0,00 0,03 0,06 
Title licensure 0,63 0,78 0,78 0,84 0,74 0,81 0,81 
Trade union 0,00 0,22 0,06 0,32 0,03 0,00 0,44 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Correlations in italic are not significant at 
the p<0.05 level 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Task licensure is strongly concentrated in service occupations. More than 
a third of service occupations have licensed tasks. Title licensure is also 
most common in service occupations and relatively rare in operative/labor 
occupations. Nearly half of all managerial occupations, a third of service 
occupations, and a fifth of agricultural occupations are represented by 
occupation-specific trade unions. 
The descriptive analyses show that the bivariate associations between 
most closure sources and temporary employment are relatively weak. 
Most of the relationships may be as theoretically predicted, but they are 
obscured by compositional effects. In the next chapter, I will therefore 
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present multivariate analyses to assess the association between the various 
closure sources and temporary employment. 
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Closure and Temporary Employment 
Table 5 displays the distributional characteristics of the estimated logit 
coefficients resulting from 1,118 stage-one regressions (one regression for 
each occupation). These coefficients express the occupational incumbents’ 
relative risk of holding temporary employment contracts. Coefficients 
smaller than zero indicate a lower risk in comparison with the reference 
group, whereas coefficients greater than zero indicate a higher risk. The 
table includes the mean of the coefficients over all occupations and years, 
as well as the standard deviation of these coefficients and their distribution 
over 5 percentiles of the occupations (the 10 percent percentile (p10), the 
25 percent percentile (p25), the median (p50), the 75 percent percentile 
(p75), and the 90 percent percentile (p90)). Interpreting the distributional 
characteristics of the individual-level occupation-specific logit coefficients 
is relatively simple. For example: Each occupation provides one logit 
coefficient for the relative risk held by women in comparison to men. The 
overall mean of 0.26 indicates that women have a slightly higher risk of 
temporary employment than men, when all occupations are considered. To 
create the percentile measures, the logit coefficients are ordered according 
to their size. The 10 percent percentile indicates the mean risk of 
temporary employment for women in the first 10 percent of the 
occupations after the occupations were ordered. The 90 percent percentile 
indicates the mean risk of temporary employment when all occupations, 
except for the last ten percent, were taken into consideration. Positive logit 
coefficient values indicate a higher risk of temporary employment for 
women in comparison to men, whereas negative values indicate a lower 
risk of temporary employment in comparison to the male incumbents of 
the same occupations. 
Table 5 shows that most individual-level variables do not have a fixed 
positive or negative effect for the incumbents of the various occupations. 
For example: The tenth and 25
th
 percentile indicate that women face lower 
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risks of temporary employment than men in 25 percent of all occupations. 
However, the 75
th
 and 90
th
 percentile indicate a reversed and even stronger 
relationship
132
. There is, however, one exception: Occupational 
incumbents aged between 15 and 29 seem to always have a higher risk of 
temporary employment than  
Table 5: A description of the estimated logit coefficients of the 1,118 
separate stage-one regression analyses 
Variable Mean p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 SD 
Demography:               
  15 to 29 years ……. 1,32 0,21 0,82 1,32 1,85 2,40 0,88 
  50 to 64 years ……. -0,27 -1,36 -0,81 -0,28 0,26 0,86 0,92 
  Female …………… 0,26 -0,76 -0,30 0,15 0,67 1,40 0,96 
"Human capital":               
  
Low level of 
qualification……… 0,83 -0,28 0,14 0,70 1,40 2,18 1,02 
  
High level of 
qualification……… 0,81 -0,36 0,00 0,54 1,48 2,55 1,17 
Workplace characteristic               
(ommited variable =                
private sector employment):               
  Public service ……. 0,61 -0,66 -0,02 0,35 1,30 2,34 1,31 
Region:               
  New Länder ………. 0,58 -0,46 0,05 0,56 1,07 1,67 0,83 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations 
Sources: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, 
Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations 
 
incumbents of the same occupation who are between 30 and 49 years old. 
Members of occupations that are between 50 and 64 years old are the only 
subpopulation with a negative mean/median risk of temporary 
employment. Incumbents who have low levels of qualification share a 
similar risk of temporary employment as incumbents with high levels of 
____________________ 
132  Hence, a multilevel model with fixed random slopes would represent a clearly 
mis-specified empirical model. 
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qualification (the reference are incumbents with medium levels of 
qualification). Occupational incumbents that are employed in the new 
Länder or in the public sector also face an increased risk of temporary 
employment compared to their fellow occupational incumbents who are 
employed in the old Länder or the private sector. 
In the next section, I will give a short introduction on how to interpret 
the results of the second-stage regressions and present stepwise models, a 
full model with all closure sources, and a full model with standardized 
coefficients. In section 7.2, I include interaction terms for human capital 
and for internal labor markets. Section 7.3 includes the exploratory 
interaction terms for the monitoring costs (transaction cost approach), and 
section 7.4 includes the exploratory interaction terms that address 
distinctive features of the German labor market—the different economic 
situations in the old and new Länder and the gender composition of 
occupations. Section 7.5 shifts the focus of the analyses from the variation 
between occupations to the variation within occupations, which allows me 
to check whether the relationship between individual-level characteristics 
and temporary employment changes as a function of the occupational-
level closure sources. In section 7.6, I try to determine the relationship 
between the conventional credentialism measure (proportion of the 
incumbents with tertiary degrees) and my closure measures. Section 7.7 
gives a short overview of the sensitivity checks I have done. 
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 7.1 Occupational Closure and Temporary Employment—Results 
To check whether the theoretical arguments I have drawn from closure 
theory are supported by empirical evidence, I present stepwise second 
stage regression results for each closure source and their association with 
the occupation-specific risk of temporary employment (hypotheses 1 to 
hypothesis 9)
133
. The dependent variable on the second stage is based on 
the occupational-level aggregation of the individual-level predicted 
probabilities of temporary employment (see section 5.1, equation 2). It is 
relatively straightforward to interpret the regression coefficients with 
regard to the dependent variable. For example: A mean predicted 
probability value of 0.4 can roughly be interpreted as 40 percent of the 
occupational incumbents having temporary employment contracts. 
Regression coefficients can hence be interpreted as the percentage-point 
change that occurs in the dependent variable if the independent variable 
changes by one unit. To ensure an approximately normal distribution of 
my dependent variable, I take the square root of the occupational mean of 
the predicted probabilities
134
. To be able to interpret these square rooted 
coefficients regardless, I retransform the coefficients using the inverse 
function of the square root. The occupational-level heterogeneity 
(variance) of the square rooted dependent variable is 0.0137 (standard 
deviation is 0.1172 and mean is 0.29) with a minimum value of zero and 
maximum value of 0.801. 
Table 6 summarizes the results for the closure sources and their 
association with the occupation-specific risk of temporary employment. 
The two licensure measures, task licensure and title licensure, are 
introduced in separate models because both measures contain task licensed 
____________________ 
133  Find in the appendix at the end of the pdf. 
134  The mean predicted probabilities of temporary employment have a mean of 
0.098, a median of 0.079, a skewness of 2.67, and a kurtosis of 13.58. Taking the 
square root of the mean predicted probabilities transforms the distributional 
characteristics of the dependent variable as follows: mean: 0.29, median: 0.28, 
skewness: 0.36, kurtosis: 5.59). 
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occupations. The estimates show statistically significant associations for 
three of the five closure sources: credentialism, occupational specificity, 
and occupation-specific trade unions. However, the trade unions do not 
remain significant in the full models (models 6a and 6b).  Model 1 
introduces the credential inflation index, which is positively associated 
with the occupational incumbents’ probability of holding temporary 
employment contracts. Occupations for which credentials are awarded in 
an inflationary manner increase their incumbents’ risk of holding 
temporary employment contracts. An increase of CIX by one unit 
increases the risk of temporary employment by 3.4 percentage points 
(square[0.185] = 0,034)
135
. The results support hypothesis 1 by indicating 
that a low supply of occupation-specific credentials reduces the risk of 
temporary employment. The negative sign of the standardization measure 
corresponds with my argument that standardized occupation-specific 
credentials signal craftsmanship and thereby channel the labor demand to 
the occupation (hypothesis 2). Yet the effect size of standardization is 
quite small: Temporary employment decreases by 0.03 percentage points 
(square[-0.016] = 0.0003) with each increase in the degree of 
standardization
136
. 
Model 2 introduces measures of occupational specificity. It allows me 
to test whether occupational task breadth is associated with a lower risk of 
temporary employment, as implied by the mobility approach, or a higher 
risk of temporary employment, as implied by signaling. According to the 
mobility argument of Iversen and Soskice (2001), occupations with wide 
sets of tasks grant their incumbents access to a multitude of different 
positions. Employers will thus more frequently offer them permanent 
employment contracts because they can be effectively reassigned within 
organizations (hypothesis 4). Proponents of signaling theory argue that 
employers more frequently offer temporary employment contracts to the 
occupational incumbents when the fit between job requirements and the 
individuals’ task profiles is uncertain, which is the case for occupations 
with a wide range of tasks and skills (hypothesis 5). The coefficient of 
model 2 offers support for signaling (hypothesis 5): occupations with 
____________________ 
135  The majority of the occupations, at least eight out of ten, had values between 
0.004 and 0.1 (see figure 8). The range of the CIX variable is 0.86. 
136  The range of the standardization variable is 2. 
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narrow task profiles have a lower probability of temporary employment 
than occupations with a wide range of tasks. The level of temporary 
employment within occupations increases by 0.2 percentage points 
(square[0.041] = 0.002) for each unit increase in the breadth of the task 
range
137
. The second variable for occupational specificity indicates how 
strong the barriers between the occupation-specific labor markets are. 
Employers will not be able to easily replace employees from relatively 
unique occupations with incumbents from other occupations. Hence, the 
risk of temporary employment should be low (hypothesis 6). Indeed, 
incumbents of occupations with common sets of tasks are more at risk of 
holding temporary employment contracts than incumbents of occupations 
with unique sets of tasks. The probability of temporary employment 
increases by 26 percentage points (square[0.508] = 0.258) for each unit 
increase in the commonness measure
138
.  
 
Table 6: Pooled linear regression of temporary employment on the 
different sources of occupational closure, 2000, 2004, and 2007139 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a 
Credential 
inflation index 
0,185 ***           
(0,051)               
Standardization -0,016 *             
  (0,007)               
Width of the 
sets of tasks 
    0,065 **         
    (0,019)           
Commonness of 
the task sets 
    0,504 ***       
    (0,113)           
Associations (omitted category = no association)     
Specific 
association 
        -0,014       
        (0,010)       
General 
association 
        -0,018       
        (0,011)       
____________________ 
137  The range of the variable is 0.92. 
138  The range the commonness variable is 0.25. 
139  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)     
Licensed             -0,030   
              (0,017)   
 Unionization (omitted category = no union)     
Trade union           
      
Constant 0,281 *** 0,272 *** 0,285 *** 0,281 *** 
  (0,009)   (0,009)   (0,009)   (0,009)   
F 14,38 *** 15,65 *** 13,99 *** 14,590 *** 
R squared 0,272   0,286   0,263   0,263   
Root MSE 0,101   0,100   0,102   0,102   
Mean vif 2,94   3,15   2,86   2,96   
 
  Model 4b Model 5 Model 6a Model 6b 
Credential 
inflation index 
        0,172 *** 0,171 *** 
        (0,048)   (0,048)   
Standardization         -0,008   -0,009   
          (0,008)   (0,008)   
Width of the 
sets of tasks 
        0,055 ** 0,052 ** 
        (0,019)   (0,019)   
Commonness of 
the task sets 
        0,437 *** 0,445 *** 
        (0,111)   (0,109)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific 
association 
        -0,002   -0,001   
        (0,010)   (0,010)   
General 
association 
        -0,007   -0,008   
        (0,011)   (0,011)   
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed         -0,002       
          (0,017)       
Title licensure -0,001           0,000   
  (0,000)           (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union     -0,042 ** -0,028   -0,028   
      (0,015)   (0,016)   (0,015)   
Constant 0,278 *** 0,283 *** 0,279 *** 0,278 *** 
  (0,009)   (0,009)   (0,010)   (0,009)   
F 14,62 *** 14,85 *** 13,47 *** 13,59 *** 
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R squared 0,263   0,271   0,300   0,301   
Root MSE 0,102   0,101   0,099   0,099   
Mean vif 3,05   2,92   3,02   3,07   
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Model 3 introduces two binary variables for specific and general 
occupational associations. General associations might trigger the 
“increasing diffuse demand” mechanism via lobbying and PR campaigns 
(hypothesis 7), whereas specific associations might trigger the “channeling 
demand” mechanism by reinforcing occupational standards and ethics, and 
thereby further the public’s belief in the professional ethics of the 
occupations’ incumbents (hypothesis 8). The coefficients for both types of 
associations point in the predicted direction but are not significant. 
Considering their binary nature, the effect size is also very small. 
Temporary employment decreases by 0.02 (0.03) percentage points for 
incumbents in occupations with a specific (general) association in 
comparison to members of occupations without an association. 
Model 4 tests the binary task licensure measure and the continuous title 
licensure measure. Both task licensure and title licensure trigger the 
“channeling demand” mechanism (hypothesis 3), either through a legal 
task monopoly (task licensure), or through the signaling of quality (title 
licensure). Both have coefficients with the predicted negative signs, but 
neither is statistically significant, and both have weak effect sizes 
(hypothesis 3). Incumbents of occupations that are protected by task 
licensure have a risk of temporary employment that is 0.1 percentage point 
lower than incumbents of occupations that are not protected by task 
licensure. The effect of title licensure is also weak: The risk of temporary 
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employment decreases by 0.0001 percentage points for each increase in 
the degree of title licensure
140
.  
Model 5 tests the unionization measure. Unionization triggers the 
“restricting supply” mechanism through collective bargaining and the 
threat of strikes, which might be used by unions to improve working 
conditions by restricting the employers’ use of temporary employment 
contracts (hypothesis 9). Unionization is significant and has the predicted 
negative sign but also has a small effect size. Members of occupations that 
are represented by occupation-specific trade unions have a lower risk of 
temporary employment (0.18 percentage points) than incumbents of 
occupations without trade union representation. 
Models 6a (the full model with task licensure) and 6b (the full model 
with title licensure) show a considerable reduction in the size of the 
coefficients for most closure source variables. As a result, the measures 
for standardization and unionization are no longer statistically significant. 
The width of tasks variable is an exception. Its coefficient increases in 
comparison with model 2. 
I also wanted to test whether licensed titles and licensed tasks are both 
empirically linked to the occupation members’ risk of temporary 
employment. To compare their contribution to the explanation of the 
probability of temporary employment, I used model fit statistics. I fitted a 
full model with all independent and control variables except for the 
licensure measures. Then I introduced both variables separately into the 
models and compared their model fit (Wald) statistics. The addition of the 
binary task licensure measure did not induce any change in R
2
 and had an 
F statistic of 0.01, whereas the addition of the continuous title licensure 
measure induced a change in R
2
 by 0.0012 with an F statistic of 1.89. The 
model fit statistics from the title licensure measure is far from compelling, 
but nevertheless indicates a stronger link with the occupational 
incumbents’ risk of temporary employment than the task licensure 
measure. Hence, I will focus on the title licensure measure in the 
following analytical sections. 
Table 7 again presents the full model with all closure sources. In 
addition, all control variables and standardized regression coefficients are 
shown. The standardized coefficients allow a valid comparison of metric 
____________________ 
140  The range of the title licensure measure is 0.81 
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variables. The interpretation of these standardized “beta” coefficients is 
simple: The increase, for example, of CIX by one standard deviation 
increases the square rooted probability of temporary employment by 0.1 
standard deviations. 
The standardized coefficients indicate that, in comparison to the other 
metric closure sources, the variable measuring the commonness and 
uniqueness of tasks has the biggest impact, followed by the credential 
inflation index and the width of the range of tasks, both of which have a 
similar impact on temporary employment. A variety of control variables 
also have an impact on the probability of temporary employment. Most 
important are the different industries and the task complexity measures. 
Simple routine/labor tasks, as well as complex managerial tasks, increase 
the risk of temporary employment. The probability of temporary 
employment also positively corresponds with the proportion of 
occupational incumbents that were employed in the new Länder and the 
proportion of women within the occupations. The proportions of 
occupational members who have participated in further education, or who 
are employed in very small companies, are inversely associated with the 
probability of temporary employment. 
 
Table 7: Pooled linear regression of temporary employment on the 
different sources of occupational closure—full model with standardized 
coefficients, 2000, 2004, and 2007 
  Model 6b 
Credential inflation index 0,100 (0,048) *** 
Standardization -0,053 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,100 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,166 (0,109) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association - (0,010)   
General association - (0,011)   
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed       
Title licensure -0,059 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union - (0,015)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks 0,279 (0,035) *** 
[126|127] 
7 Closing in on Closure 
 
[127|128] 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,081 (0,032)   
Managerial tasks 0,173 (0,029) ** 
Small organizations -0,081 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,045 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,110 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,180 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,125 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 - (0,008)   
Year 2007 - (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship -0,015 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)        
Agriculture 0,141 (0,000) *** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,077 (0,001) * 
Construction 0,099 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,099 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,074 (0,000) * 
Financial and insurance services -0,013 (0,000)   
Business services 0,153 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,229 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,541 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,127 (0,000) * 
Constant . (0,009) *** 
F 13,59 ***   
R squared 0,301     
Root MSE 0,099     
Mean vif 3,07     
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
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7.2 Occupational Closure, Human Capital, and Internal Labor Markets 
Having established the main effects of occupational closure, I will use this 
section to explore the relationship between the various closure sources, 
specific human capital, and internal labor markets. The aim is to push the 
boundaries of our knowledge of human capital and internal labor markets 
by augmenting their standard predictions based on arguments derived 
from closure theory. In order to do so, I will first address specific human 
capital by taking the proportion of occupational incumbents who have 
participated in work-related further education. Secondly, I will add 
occupational-level interaction terms between the further education density 
measure and all closure sources (see table 8).  
 
Table 8: Pooled linear regression of temporary employment on the 
different sources of occupational closure—with interactions between 
further education and the closure sources, 2000, 2004, and 2007141 
  Model 7 
Credential inflation index 0,152 (0,049) ** 
Standardization -0,014 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,051 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,304 (0,131) * 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,008 (0,010)   
General association -0,014 (0,011)   
Title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,026 (0,016)   
Further edcuation x closure strategies:       
Further education (FE) -0,002 (0,001) * 
FE x CIX 0,007 (0,004)   
FE x standardization 0,001 (0,000) ** 
FE x narrow/wide tasks 0,003 (0,001) * 
FE x unique/common tasks -0,023 (0,011) * 
____________________ 
141  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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FE x title licensure 0,000 (0,000) 
 FE x general association 0,002 (0,001) ** 
FE x specific association 0,002 (0,001) * 
FE x trade union -0,001 (0,001)   
Constant 0,279 (0,010) *** 
F 12,54 ***   
R squared 0,321     
Root MSE 0,098     
Mean vif       
F test statistic
a
 3,27 **   
df 8     
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
a The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Including the interaction terms between further education and the closure 
sources does not substantially change the main effects of the closure 
sources. The effect sizes of CIX and the commonness of the tasks 
decreases, whereas the effect size of the width of task range increases 
slightly. However, five of the eight interaction terms are significant: The 
interaction with standardization both occupational specificity measures, 
and both association measures. 
Because the task of interpreting interaction terms between metric 
variables is very complex, I provide graphs of the association between the 
interacting variables and the dependent variable for three scenarios: for 
occupations that have the minimum, average, and maximum values on the 
closure variable of interest. The x-axis indicates the percentage of 
occupation members who participated in further education, and the y-axis 
refers to the dependent variable (the square root of the mean predicted 
probability of temporary employment). All other covariates in the model 
[128|129] 
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are fixed at their average value and are thus zero (all covariates are grand 
mean centered). 
In hypothesis 11, I argued that the theoretical impact of standardization 
on temporary employment might be offset by additional education and 
training. Occupational incumbents with highly standardized credentials 
should not benefit much from additional training because their 
productivity is already high. The marginal utility of further education and 
training for this group is much lower than for occupational incumbents 
with unstandardized credentials, who should thereby benefit strongly from 
further education and training because their productivity should 
substantially increase. Figure 22 lends support to the assumptions of 
closure theory, as well as to the assumptions of the human capital theory. 
If their occupation has highly standardized credentials, 
Figure 22: The interaction between further education and 
standardization with regard to the probability of temporary 
employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
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Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
occupational incumbents with a below average participation in further 
education are subject to a lower probability of temporary employment 
than incumbents of occupations with unstandardized credentials. 
However, the story changes if we compare occupations that have above 
average further education participation rates, but have minimum 
standardization values or maximum standardization values respectively. 
Occupations with minimum values on standardization benefit strongly 
from further education, and their incumbents face a sharply decreased 
probability of temporary employment. Occupations with highly 
standardized credentials also benefit from further education, but not as 
strongly as occupations with minimally standardized credentials. My 
initial argument (hypothesis 2) regarding standardization as a closure 
source (highly standardized credentials equal a low probability of 
temporary employment and vice versa) is only true for occupations with a 
below average participation in further education. The results confirm 
hypothesis 11: The initially higher risk of temporary employment for 
occupational incumbents with unstandardized credentials is offset by 
further education. 
 
When we consider the potential impact of specific human capital on the 
occupational incumbents’ risk of temporary employment, this changes the 
assumed association between the width of occupation-specific sets of tasks 
and the probability of temporary employment. The initial findings of the 
previous section indicate that narrow task profiles have a signaling value 
for employers because they help employers to evaluate whether and how 
well applicants are suited for available positions. As a consequence, 
employers do not have to rely on temporary employment contracts as 
prolonged probationary periods to assess the fit between job requirements 
and individuals’ task profiles. However, I have also considered the 
possibility that employers might reluctantly grant permanent employment 
contracts to individuals with narrow task profiles because they might not 
be easily reassigned within organizations if their current position should 
become redundant. Yet employees’ mobility within organizations might 
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be improved by further education and training. The initial advantage of 
incumbents of occupations with narrow task profiles (signaling) might be 
additionally increased if further education and training increases their 
potential intra-organizational mobility (hypothesis 13). Figure 23 
substantiates the assumptions of hypothesis 13. Occupations with narrow 
sets of tasks benefit strongly from participation in further education: Their 
probability of temporary employment decreases steeply the more 
incumbents participate in further education. Incumbents in occupations 
with wide sets of tasks always face a higher probability of temporary 
employment and they hardly benefit at all from further education. Thus, 
hypothesis 5 (signaling approach) is confirmed and hypothesis 12 is 
falsified
142
. 
 
____________________ 
142  In hypothesis 12, I based my argument on the assumption that occupations with 
narrow sets of tasks and skills do not have a signaling value for employers. In 
this scenario, occupations with wide sets of tasks should grant their incumbents 
access to a wide range of positions and a multitude of possible employers and 
thereby trigger the “increasing diffuse demand” mechanism, which in turn should 
reduce their risk of temporary employment in comparison to incumbents of 
occupations with narrow sets of tasks. Hypothesis 12 expanded this argument by 
assuming that further education and training may offset the initial low flexibility 
employers experience when reassigning occupational incumbents with narrow 
sets of skills within their organizations. In this case, the difference in the risk of 
temporary employment between incumbents of occupations with narrow and 
wide sets of tasks should converge with increasing further education and training. 
7 Closing in on Closure 
 
Figure 23: The interaction between further education and the width of 
tasks with regard to the probability of temporary employment
 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
In hypothesis 14, I argued that employers may circumvent the problem of 
relatively unique sets of tasks and skills by using additional education and 
training, and thus break down the barriers to relatively unique 
occupational niches. The increasing competition within the niche should 
increase their incumbents’ risk of temporary employment. 
When we consider the empirical association between occupational 
specificity, defined as the relative uniqueness or commonness of the 
occupation-specific sets of tasks, and further education, we find 
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confirmation for the findings of model 6b, but only for occupations with 
average or below average further education participation rates (see figure 
24). For these occupations, the relative uniqueness of their sets of tasks is 
clearly associated with a lower probability of temporary employment in 
comparison to occupations with common sets of tasks. However, this 
relationship is reversed for occupations with above average further 
education participation rates. As greater numbers of incumbents of 
occupations with relatively unique sets of tasks participate in further 
education, their risk of temporary employment becomes higher. This result 
confirms hypothesis 14: Additional education and training may break 
down the barriers around occupational niches and thereby increase their 
incumbents’ risk of temporary employment. However, incumbents of 
occupations with common sets of tasks nevertheless benefit from further 
education. Their risk of temporary employment decreases with increasing 
participation rates. 
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Figure 24: The interaction between further education and the 
commonness of tasks with regard to the probability of temporary 
employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
In hypothesis 15, I argued that additional education and training courses 
might be used to neutralize the scarcity of occupation-specific credentials. 
The prediction shows no such association. The credential inflation index 
remains constant, even if its effect size decreases slightly. This result lends 
further credence to the closure argument, i.e., that a restricted supply of 
credentials increases the bargaining power of the occupational incumbents 
and thereby reduces their risk of temporary employment.  
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I had not argued that an interaction between further education and 
association representation might be possible. Nevertheless, the 
relationship for specific and general associations with regard to further 
education and temporary employment is statistically significant. However, 
differentiating between both types of associations might not seem relevant 
with regard to the interaction with human capital. The slopes for both 
types of associations are the same, and only the intercepts are slightly 
different. Because the graph is essentially the same for general and 
specific associations, figure 25 shows only the graph for specific 
associations. The result, however, is surprising. Occupational incumbents 
who are represented by associations face an increasing probability of 
temporary employment the more they participate in further education. 
Incumbents of occupations without associational representation have a 
lower probability of temporary employment if they participate in further 
education. 
To secure investments in human capital and to exclude outside 
competition, employers rely on firm internal labor markets. I do not have 
the means at hand to identify whether occupational incumbents are part of 
firm-internal or external labor markets. However, most research on 
internal labor markets agrees that large organizations are able to partition 
their labor markets into hierarchical/bureaucratic firm-internal labor 
markets and market mediated firm-external labor markets. I will therefore 
test for additional effects of employment in large organizations on the 
closure sources. To check for additional effects of large organizations and 
internal labor markets, table 9 presents the main model, which is 
supplemented with interaction terms between large organizations and the 
closure sources. However, the inclusion of the interaction terms between 
the proportion of occupational incumbents within large organizations and 
the closure sources does not substantially change the main effects of the 
closure sources. The coefficient of CIX increases, and the coefficients of 
the other closure measures remain constant for the most part. Only one 
interaction term indicates a significant interrelation between closure, 
internal labor markets, and temporary employment: It is the interaction 
term for the credential inflation index. Thus, hypothesis 17, the 
interrelation between trade unions, large organizations, and temporary 
employment, has to be rejected. I had argued that large organizations may 
use temporary employment contracts as a human resource practice to 
weaken the power of occupation-specific trade unions. The lack of 
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Figure 25: The interaction between further education and the specific 
associations with regard to the probability of temporary employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and economic sectors. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
more significant interactions between organization size and closure might 
be due to the relatively low threshold that defines large organizations (50 
employees).   
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Table 9: Pooled linear regression of temporary employment on the 
different sources of occupational closure—with interactions between 
firm internal labor markets (large organizations) and the closure 
sources, 2000, 2004, and 2007143 
  Model 8 
Credential inflation index 0,209 (0,052) *** 
Standardization -0,008 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,054 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,430 (0,106) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,002 (0,010)   
General association -0,007 (0,011)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,029 (0,015)   
Large organizations x closure strategies:       
Large organizations (IL) 0,001 (0,001)   
IL x CIX 0,006 (0,003) * 
IL x standardization 0,000 (0,000)   
IL x narrow/wide tasks 0,000 (0,001)   
IL x unique/common tasks -0,006 (0,004)   
IL x title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
IL x general association 0,001 (0,000)   
IL x specific association 0,000 (0,001)   
IL x trade union -0,001 (0,001)   
Constant 0,284 (0,010) *** 
F 11,90 ***   
R squared 0,310     
Root MSE 0,099     
Mean vif 2,89     
F test statistic
a
 1,52     
df 8     
 
____________________ 
143  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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[137|138] 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
a The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Large organizations incur lower marginal costs for employee training than 
small organizations. Hence, the use of temporary employment is more cost 
effective for large organizations. Given that all organizations try to secure 
scarce occupation-specific skills, I argued that large organizations may use 
temporary employment contracts primarily for occupational incumbents 
whose credentials are in ample supply (hypothesis 16). The empirical 
results indicate that whether or not incumbents of an occupation are 
employed in large organizations is irrelevant for occupations with a 
minimum value or a mean value on the credential inflation index (see 
figure 26). However, occupations whose incumbents are often employed 
in large organizations face a steep increase in their risk of temporary 
employment if the credentials for their occupation are awarded in an 
inflationary manner. This association confirms hypothesis 16. Employers 
especially use temporary employment contracts for incumbents of 
occupations that have a large supply of credential holders. This association 
is most detrimental for occupational incumbents in large organizations 
because large organizations incur lower marginal costs for the repeated 
training of new temporary employees than small organizations. 
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Figure 26: The interaction between large companies and the 
credential inflation index with regard to the probability of temporary 
employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
7.3 Occupational Closure and Monitoring Costs 
According to the transaction cost approach, governance measures used by 
employers, like the provision of job security, may also vary according to 
how difficult it is for the employer to monitor and evaluate the employee’s 
productivity. The relevance of occupational closure might thus differ 
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between occupations that differ in the complexity of their tasks. I use a 
similar approach as in the last section, and separately interact each of the 
four levels of task complexity with the closure measures.  
 
Table 10: Pooled linear regression of temporary employment on the 
different sources of occupational closure—with interactions between 
managerial tasks (model 9), managerial/skilled tasks (model 10), 
skilled tasks (model 11), and routine/labor tasks (model 12) with the 
closure sources, 2000, 2004, and 2007144 
  Model 9  Model 10 
  Managerial Skilled/managerial 
Credential inflation index 0,152 (0,050) ** 0,161 (0,048) ** 
Standardization -0,015 (0,007) * -0,007 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,059 (0,019) ** 0,049 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,160 (0,147)   0,176 (0,150)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association 0,003 (0,010)   -0,018 (0,011)   
General association -0,012 (0,010)   -0,001 (0,012)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000) ** 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,026 (0,016)   -0,036 (0,015) * 
Skill-level of tasks x closure strategies:        
Skill level (Skill) 0,040 (0,038)   -0,029 (0,036)   
Skill x CIX 0,273 (0,361)   -0,157 (0,251)   
Skill x standardization -0,016 (0,028)   -0,013 (0,036)   
Skill x narrow/wide tasks -0,033 (0,074)   0,099 (0,094)   
Skill x unique/common tasks -1,561 (0,607) ** -1,177 (0,640)   
Skill x title licensure 0,005 (0,002) ** -0,007 (0,002) *** 
Skill x general association -0,033 (0,048)   0,137 (0,053) * 
Skill x specific association 0,021 (0,046)   -0,081 (0,056)   
Skill x trade union 0,007 (0,040)   0,126 (0,069)   
 
 
____________________ 
144  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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Constant 0,265 (0,011) *** 0,284 (0,010) *** 
F 12,06 ***   13,34 ***   
R squared 0,324     0,338     
Root MSE 0,098     0,970     
Mean vif 3,24     3,21     
F test statistic
a
 3,23 **   5,56 ***   
df 8     8     
 
  Model 11 Model 12 
  Skilled Routine/labor 
Credential inflation index 0,186 (0,048) *** 0,186 (0,052) *** 
Standardization -0,009 (0,008)   -0,014 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,054 (0,019) ** 0,050 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,422 (0,125) ** 0,444 (0,176) * 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,017 (0,011)   -0,010 (0,010)   
General association -0,013 (0,012)   -0,008 (0,010)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000) ** 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,030 (0,016)   -0,041 (0,017) * 
Skill-level of tasks x closure strategies:        
Skill level (Skill) 0,075 (0,043)   0,247 (0,049) *** 
Skill x CIX -0,189 (0,154)   -0,037 (0,344)   
Skill x standardization 0,018 (0,042)   -0,056 (0,035)   
Skill x narrow/wide tasks 0,041 (0,085)   -0,034 (0,076)   
Skill x unique/common tasks 1,306 (0,570) * -0,212 (0,341)   
Skill x title licensure -0,004 (0,002) * 0,005 (0,001) *** 
Skill x general association -0,121 (0,060) * -0,059 (0,047)   
Skill x specific association -0,072 (0,075)   0,011 (0,054)   
Skill x trade union -0,031 (0,065)   -0,151 (0,098)   
Constant 0,271 (0,011)   0,292 (0,011) *** 
F 11,82 ***   13,75 ***   
R squared 0,324     0,312     
Root MSE 0,098     0,099     
Mean vif 3,35     3,37     
F test statistic
a
 3,38 ***   1,99 *   
df 8     8     
[139|140] 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
a The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
The coefficients of the closure sources remain relatively stable despite the 
addition of the interaction terms (see table 10). There are, however, some 
peculiarities: the title licensure measure becomes significant in the model 
that includes the interaction with managerial tasks and skilled tasks. The 
occupation-specific trade unions become significant in all but the 
managerial tasks interaction models. The commonness of the sets of tasks 
variable drops considerably and becomes insignificant in the managerial 
tasks interaction model and the managerial/skilled tasks interaction model. 
The interactions between title licensure and all four levels of task 
complexity are significant. The majority of occupational incumbents 
perform skilled tasks. For these occupations, the association between the 
two interacting variables and the dependent variable is relatively 
straightforward. Incumbents of occupations with a low level of protected 
titles face a steep increase in the risk of temporary employment with each 
increase in the proportion of skilled incumbents (see figure 27). For 
incumbents with a low level of protected titles the probability also 
decreases, but only minutely. A similar picture emerges for the interaction 
with skilled/managerial tasks. However, the occupational incumbents with 
high levels of protected titles benefit more strongly from the title 
protection and have a lower risk of temporary employment along with a 
higher proportion of skilled/managerial incumbents. 
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Figure 27: The interaction between the four levels of task complexity 
and title licensure with regard to the probability of temporary 
employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Occupations with high proportions of incumbents who perform 
routine/labor tasks do not benefit at all from title protection. Occupations 
with low levels of title protection have a constant probability of temporary 
employment, whereas this probability increases for occupations with mean 
levels of title protection and high levels of title protection. The interaction 
between managerial tasks and title licensure is very heterogeneous. In 
occupations where the incumbents mainly perform managerial tasks, low 
levels of title protection decrease the probability of temporary 
employment, whereas high levels of title protection increase this 
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probability. However, in occupations where the proportion of incumbents 
with managerial tasks is average or below average the association between 
title protection and the probability of temporary employment is reversed. 
The considerable heterogeneity of the interactions between task 
complexity and title licensure is worth exploring further, but for my 
purposes the most important point to note is that title licensure is highly 
relevant with regard to temporary employment. The measure is, however, 
confounded, and thus has a low, non-significant effect size in the main 
model (model 6b). 
 
The interaction between the commonness of the sets of tasks and the 
two levels of task complexity (managerial tasks and skilled tasks) are also 
significant. The interaction for occupations where there are above average 
proportions of incumbents performing managerial tasks is reversed in 
comparison to the main model (model 6b). For those occupations with 
relatively unique tasks, their probability of temporary employment 
increases with each increase in the proportion of incumbents doing 
managerial tasks, whereas the probability of temporary employment 
slightly decreases for occupations with common tasks (see figure 28). For 
occupations whose incumbents mainly perform skilled tasks, the 
established association between the commonness-of-tasks measure and 
temporary employment is strengthened and the slopes become steeper.  
 
Figure 28: The interaction between two levels of task complexity and 
title licensure with regard to the probability of temporary employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
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Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
The specific-occupational-association measure also has significant 
interactions with skilled tasks as well as with skilled/managerial tasks (see 
figure 29). Incumbents of occupations with above average levels of 
skilled/managerial tasks face an increasing risk of temporary employment 
if they are represented by specific associations, whereas incumbents of 
occupations without an association benefit from a decreasing probability 
of temporary employment. This situation is reversed for the interaction 
between skilled tasks and specific occupational associations. However, the 
scale of the y-axis reveals that the effect size of the combined measures of 
task complexity and association representation remains small, even for the 
maximum values of the respective skill-levels of tasks. 
 
Figure 29: The interaction between two levels of task complexity and 
the representation by specific associations with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
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Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
7.4 Occupational Closure and Additional Distinctive Features of the 
German Labor Market – Region and Gender Composition 
General economic conditions differ considerably between the old and the 
new German Länder. The level of unemployment is very high in the new 
Länder and the competition for vacant positions is accordingly high. The 
different economic situation between both parts of Germany might have 
an impact on the measures of occupational closure.  
 
Table 11: Pooled linear regression of temporary employment on the 
different sources of occupational closure—with interactions between 
the new Länder and the closure sources, 2000, 2004, and 2007145 
  Model 13 
Credential inflation index 0,167 (0,050) ** 
Standardization -0,010 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,051 (0,018) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,482 (0,111) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no 
association)       
Specific association -0,001 (0,011)   
General association -0,010 (0,011)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000) * 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,020 (0,015)   
New Länder x closure strategies:       
New Länder (NL) 0,002 (0,001) ** 
NL x CIX 0,005 (0,005)   
NL x standardization -0,002 (0,001)   
NL x narrow/wide tasks 0,001 (0,002)   
NL x unique/common tasks -0,004 (0,008)   
____________________ 
145  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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NL x title licensure 0,000 (0,000) *** 
NL x specific association -0,002 (0,002)   
NL x trade union 0,000 (0,002)   
Constant 0,285 (0,010) *** 
F 13,52 ***   
R squared 0,330     
Root MSE 0,976     
Mean vif 2,88     
F test statistica 4,94 ***   
df 8     
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
a The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associationsconducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Despite the considerable differences between the old and new Länder, the 
main effects remain surprisingly constant, and only one interaction term 
indicates different associations between occupational closure and 
temporary employment in the old and new Länder (see table 11). 
Occupational incumbents with above average employment in the new 
Länder and with low levels of title licensure face a steep increase in the 
probability of temporary employment (see figure 30). This probability 
decreases for occupations with above-average employment in the new 
Länder and high levels of title licensure. The combined effect of region 
and title licensure with regard to the probability of temporary employment 
is very large. 
 
 
7 Closing in on Closure 
 
[146|147] 
Figure 30:The interaction between the proportion of incumbents 
employed in the new Länder and title licensure with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
The gender composition of occupations is another issue frequently 
discussed with regard to occupations and their characteristics. In 
particular, the closure measures for occupation-specific credentials might 
not be gender neutral, because the educational system that awards these 
credentials is not gender neutral. Table 12 introduces interaction terms for 
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gender composition but does not show substantial changes in the closure 
variables. However, both credentialism measures are lower after the 
interaction between the proportion of female incumbents and the closure 
sources is introduced. Additionally, the coefficient of trade unions 
increases slightly. 
Table 12: Pooled linear regression of temporary employment on the 
different sources of occupational closure—with interactions between 
gender type of occupations and the closure sources, 2000, 2004, and 
2007146 
  Model 14 
Credential inflation index 0,135 (0,048) ** 
Standardization -0,001 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,042 (0,019) * 
Commonness of the task sets 0,438 (0,112) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no 
association)       
Specific association -0,005 (0,013)   
General association -0,003 (0,012)   
Title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,037 (0,016) * 
% female x closure strategies:       
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
% female x CIX 0,004 (0,001) ** 
% female x standardization -0,001 (0,000) * 
% female x narrow/wide tasks 0,000 (0,000)   
% female x unique/common tasks 0,001 (0,003)   
% female x title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
% female x general association 0,000 (0,000)   
% female x specific association -0,001 (0,000)   
 
____________________ 
146  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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% female x trade union 0,001 (0,000) ** 
    
Constant 0,278 (0,010) *** 
F 11,49 ***   
R squared 0,319     
Root MSE 0,984     
Mean vif 2,98     
F test statistica 3,77 ***   
df 8     
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
a The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
The interaction terms are significant for both credentialism measures as 
well as for the trade union measure. Figure 31 shows the interaction 
between the credential inflation index and the proportion of female 
incumbents. Credentials that are awarded in an inflationary manner 
increase the probability of temporary employment considerably. This 
effect is relatively low or even nonexistent for occupations with below 
average proportions of female incumbents, and is large for occupations 
with above average proportions of female incumbents. Occupational 
incumbents whose credentials are not awarded in an inflationary manner, 
that is, who have mean or minimum values on the CIX, face a relatively 
constant risk of temporary employment, which is independent of their 
gender composition. 
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Figure 31: The interaction between the gender composition of 
occupations and the credential inflation index with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Figure 32 shows that the standardization of credentials has quite a 
different impact on the probability of temporary employment for male-
dominated occupations and female-dominated occupations. The 
probability of temporary employment is the lowest for incumbents of male 
dominated occupations if they have low levels of standardization. On the 
other side, there are female dominated occupations whose incumbents face 
the highest risk of temporary employment if their credentials have low 
7 Closing in on Closure 
 
[149|150] 
levels of standardization. Highly standardized occupations have relatively 
similar outcomes independent of their sex composition. Their probability 
of temporary employment is relatively constant. However, the overall 
effect size of standardization with regard to the gender composition 
remains relatively small. 
 
Figure 32: The interaction between the gender composition of 
occupations and the degree of standardization with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
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The probability of temporary employment is lower for incumbents of male 
dominated occupations that are represented by a trade union in 
comparison to incumbents of female dominated occupations (see figure 
33). The probability of temporary employment is relatively constant and 
independent from the gender composition for incumbents of occupations 
without trade union representation. However, the overall effect size of 
trade union representation is relatively small.  
Figure 33: The interaction between the gender composition of 
occupations and the representation by trade unions with regard to the 
probability of temporary employment 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
7.5 Occupational Closure and High-Risk Populations 
 
[151|152] 
7.5 Occupational Closure and High-Risk Populations 
I address two high-risk populations that almost always face a very high 
risk of temporary employment: poorly qualified individuals and young 
adults. To explore the potential differences in the impact of the closure 
sources on these two subpopulations within occupations, I change the 
dependent variable. The dependent variable now consists of the 
coefficients of the individual-level first-stage analyses - 𝛽‘Xot (see 
equation 1 in section 5.1). I am interested in the coefficient of young 
occupational incumbents (15-29 years) in comparison to incumbents of 
main working age (30-49 years), and in the coefficient of incumbents with 
low-level qualifications (completed basic schooling) in comparison to 
incumbents of the same occupation who have medium-level qualifications 
(completed upper-secondary education). The coefficients are in the logit 
metric, which is perfectly suited for linear regression analysis because it is 
symmetric and without limits
147
. 
With the change in the dependent variable also comes a change in the 
number of observations. There are fewer observations now because it is 
not possible to include occupations without temporary employment in this 
analytical design. There has to be variance with regards to temporary 
employment to measure differences between, for example, individuals 
with low-level and medium-level qualifications. Another reason for the 
reduction in the sample size is that, for some occupations, no coefficients 
were provided for the individual-level variables of interest because of the 
occurrence of perfect predictions. 
This change in the analytical design also allows me to check whether 
occupation-specific trade unions might contribute to the dualization of the 
workforce. This may happen if the unions concentrate on the core 
workforce and thereby put labor market entrants or low skilled workers at 
a disadvantage (hypothesis 10).  
Table 13 shows that only one occupational-level closure source 
explains significant and substantive differences between young and 
middle aged occupational incumbents. A change in the unit of the title 
____________________ 
147  Both logit variables show approximately normal distribution. 
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licensure variable changes the risk of temporary employment for young 
incumbents by 0.009 logit points. Because logits are not easy and 
meaningful to interpret, I transform them into odds using the inverse of the 
logit function. Occupations whose incumbents have a maximum of title 
licensure (minimum = 0.2 and maximum = 1) thus double the risk of 
temporary employment for young incumbents in comparison to their 
middle aged counterparts (𝑒(0.009∗80)   = 2.05). The risk is increased by two 
thirds for occupations with a mean value on the title licensure variable 
(𝑒(0.009∗57) = 1.67). 
 
Table 13: Explaining differences in the probability of temporary 
employment between young and middle-aged occupational 
incumbents within occupations using the different sources of 
occupational closure—a pooled linear regression with the individual-
level stage-one logit coefficients of young occupational incumbents as 
dependent variable148 
  Model 15 
Credential inflation index 0,151 (0,466)   
Standardization 0,032 (0,055)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,046 (0,158)   
Commonness of the task sets 0,413 (1,025)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association 0,046 (0,079)   
General association 0,100 (0,093)   
Title licensure 0,009 (0,003) ** 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union 0,070 (0,097)   
Constant 1,503 (0,073) *** 
F 9,18 ***   
R squared 0,173     
Root MSE 0,813     
Mean vif 3,12     
____________________ 
148  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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Note: N = 671,265 individuals in 1,060 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and economic sectors. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Table 14 shows that two occupational-level closure variables are 
significantly associated with the individual-level differences in temporary 
employment between incumbents of the same occupation with low- and 
medium-level qualifications: the title licensure measure and general 
occupational associations. A change in the unit of the title licensure 
variable changes the risk of temporary employment of the low-
qualification group by 0.007 logit points. Occupations with a mean value 
on the licensed titles variable increase the risk of temporary employment 
for incumbents with low-level qualifications in comparison to their 
counterparts with medium-level qualifications by one half
 (𝑒(0.007∗57) = 
1.49)
149
. General occupational associations also increase the temporary 
employment risk of poorly qualified incumbents in contrast to the 
incumbents with medium-level qualifications by one quarter (𝑒(0.229∗1) = 
1.26). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
149  It is not meaningful to display the odds for the maximum value on title licensure, 
because occupations with incumbents with low-level qualifications cannot reach 
the maximum value.  
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Table 14: Explaining differences in the probability of temporary 
employment between occupational incumbents with low- and 
medium-level qualifications within occupations, using the different 
sources of occupational closure—a pooled linear regression with the 
individual-level stage-one logit coefficients of occupational 
incumbents with low-level qualifications as the dependent variable150 
  Model 16 
Credential inflation index 0,286 (0,351)   
Standardization 0,130 (0,071)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,235 (0,179)   
Commonness of the task sets 
-
1,046 (0,966)   
Associations (omitted category = no 
association)       
Specific association 0,073 (0,094)   
General association 0,229 (0,109) * 
Title licensure 0,008 (0,003) * 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union 0,119 (0,113)   
Constant 0,754 (0,086) *** 
F 12,91 ***   
R squared 0,213     
Root MSE 0,914     
Mean vif 3,12     
 
Note: N = 671,265 individuals in 1,060 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and economic sectors. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
____________________ 
150  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
On first glance, it seems odd that general occupational associations 
increase the risk of temporary employment for poorly qualified 
incumbents. On second glance it becomes clear, however, that this odds 
ratio is the result of a decrease in the risk of temporary employment for 
incumbents with medium-level qualifications, which is induced by general 
associations. 
Both analyses showed not the predicted association between the 
occupation-specific trade unions and young incumbents or poorly 
qualified workers (hypothesis 10). Occupation-specific trade unions do not 
contribute to the dualization of the workforce by concentrating on the 
traditional core workforce, which would put these two populations at an 
even greater disadvantage. 
7.6 Solving the (Academic) Credentialism Conundrum 
I have argued that the conventional credentialism measure—the 
proportion of occupational incumbents with tertiary degrees—does not 
theoretically capture the restricting supply closure mechanism. In section 
6.2.1, I provided empirical evidence that occupations in which credentials 
are awarded in an inflationary manner have the highest proportions of 
members with tertiary degrees. However, Bol and Weeden (2014), 
Giesecke and Verwiebe (2009), and Groß (2009, 2012) provide empirical 
evidence for an association between occupational closure and tertiary 
degrees for Germany. To resolve this inconsistency, I will use the same 
analytical strategy as in the last section and regress the individual-level 
logit coefficients of occupational incumbents with tertiary-level 
qualifications (reference = incumbents with medium-level qualifications) 
on the various sources of occupational closure. 
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Table 15: Explaining differences in the probability of temporary 
employment between highly and moderately qualified occupational 
incumbents within occupations, using the different sources of 
occupational closure—a pooled linear regression with the individual-
level stage-one logit coefficients of highly qualified occupational 
incumbents as the dependent variable151 
  Model 17 
Credential inflation index -0,860 (0,425) * 
Standardization 0,090 (0,062)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,264 (0,181)   
Commonness of the task sets 2,039 (1,310)   
Associations (omitted category = no 
association)       
Specific association -0,162 (0,092)   
General association -0,055 (0,111)   
Title licensure 0,005 (0,003)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union 0,132 (0,110)   
Constant 0,981 (0,100) *** 
F 8,77 ***   
R squared 0,201     
Root MSE 1,063     
Mean vif 3,13     
 
Note: N = 671,265 individuals in 1,060 occupations; Heteroscedastic consistent Huber-White 
standard errors in parentheses. All models control for time, skill level, small organizations, large 
organizations, region, further education, %female, %non-German citizens, and economic sectors. 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the 
Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 
2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data base of the Federal Labor Office of 
____________________ 
151  The full table with all control variables is shown in the appendix. 
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Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational associations conducted by 
Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
 
Two closure sources have significant associations with different levels of 
risk of temporary employment for highly qualified incumbents (completed 
tertiary education) in comparison to medium-level qualified incumbents of 
the same occupations: the credential inflation index and specific 
occupational associations. Specific occupational associations are only 
significant on a 10 percent level and have a relatively weak impact: They 
decrease the risk of temporary employment for highly qualified 
incumbents by one fifth (𝑒−0.162)  in comparison to incumbents with 
medium-level qualifications. The credential inflation index also decreases 
the risk of temporary employment for highly qualified incumbents in 
comparison to incumbents with medium-level qualifications. The effect 
size is large. An increase in CIX of one unit reduces the temporary-
employment risk of highly qualified incumbents by -0.86 logit points or 
more than 100 percent (Odds = 2.3). To put the large effect into 
perspective: Individuals with tertiary degrees have a higher risk of 
temporary employment than individuals with non-tertiary occupation-
specific credentials (see section 6.1). Additionally, for the majority of 
occupations (eight out of ten), credentials are not issued in an inflationary 
manner (see section 6.2.1). However, occupations for which credentials 
are awarded in an inflationary manner do not put incumbents with tertiary 
credentials at a disadvantage. Quite the contrary: Employers who are faced 
with an inflation of credentials in a given occupation rely on the signaling 
value of tertiary degrees when deciding who to hire permanently. 
7.7 Sensitivity Checks 
I conducted a large array of additional analyses to ensure the stability of 
the analyses. One series of additional analyses involved the inclusion of 
additional variables. The check for linear associations between the 
dependent and independent variables revealed a weak quadratic function 
for the width-of-task-range variable
152
. Hence, I ran every model with an 
____________________ 
152  A graph of the quadratic association is shown in the appendix. 
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additional quadratic term. The results remained substantially the same. 
Because the quadratic function was weak and did not provide additional 
insights, I decided to only present the more easily accessible models 
without the additional quadratic term. I also ran all my models with the 
task licensure variable instead of the title licensure variable. Again, no 
substantial changes occurred. However, in models where the title licensure 
variable had significant effects, the task licensure did not
153
. 
In addition to testing an alternative coding of the licensure closure 
source, I also tested an alternative coding of the task complexity measures. 
I tried to implement one comprehensive task complexity variable that 
replaced the four density measures of task complexity. When I did this, 
the results of the models changed substantially: Most closure measures 
had larger effect sizes and almost all closure measures were statistically 
significant. The reason for this large impact is that the four task 
complexity levels are not easily transformed into one joint index. Their 
impact on temporary employment does not increase in a linear fashion 
with each level of complexity. 
I also tested for time effects. I ran the main model three times and 
consecutively dropped one of the three years I had pooled in my analyses. 
All of the results remained substantially unchanged. I also tested for size 
effects. First, I excluded all occupations with less than 100 incumbents. 
The results remained stable. Second, I excluded all occupations with more 
than 1000 incumbents. Again, the main results remained stable. Both 
sample size reductions roughly equaled a 15% reduction in the overall 
sample size of the occupations. However, excluding small occupations 
helped the general associations to become significant. Excluding large 
occupations also made the standardization measure significant. In 
addition, I directly controlled for the size of occupations by including a 
relative size measure in the main model, but the results again remained 
unchanged. No closure measures became (in)significant or changed 
substantially. 
 
____________________ 
153  There were only two exceptions: Task licensure was significant in the model with 
interactions between the routine/labor tasks and the closure variables, and was 
significant on the 10 percent level in the young vs middle aged incumbents 
model. 
  
8 Summary 
Temporary employment is often associated with low wages, poor working 
conditions, high labor turnover, and limited career opportunities. Despite 
the many negative aspects, temporary employment might also act as a 
bridge into (permanent) employment. Nevertheless, given the choice, 98-
99 percent of all temporary employees would prefer to be permanently 
employed. The fact that, irrespective of their preferences, some employees 
are temporarily employed while others are not, is usually explained using 
human capital theory, internal labor market theory, and the transaction 
costs approach. Following the arguments of these theories, the risk of 
temporary employment is dependent on the amount of general human 
capital and specific human capital an employee has. It is also dependent 
on how difficult it is for the employer to evaluate/monitor the productivity 
of employees directly. Governance structures may separate firm-internal 
from firm-external labor markets, a process which additionally affects the 
employees’ risk of temporary employment. 
In this book, I have expanded on the standard predictions of these 
theories using arguments drawn from closure theory, which allow for a 
long-term occupation-specific skill scarcity that is established and 
maintained by closure barriers. By doing so, I have been able to address 
two critical gaps in the arguments of these theories and in the research on 
temporary employment: First, labor markets do not consist of employees 
who only differ in their level and amount of qualifications and skills. 
Labor markets consist of employees whose qualifications and skills are 
related to occupation-specific task fields. Hence, labor markets are 
segmented by occupations because these qualifications and skills cannot 
be simply reassigned from one occupational task field to another. Second, 
the reasons why firms award long-term employment contracts may thus 
not only relate to problems of investment in specific human capital, 
employment in firm-internal labor markets, control, and work complexity; 
they may also be used as part of employers’ human resource strategies. 
Employers use these strategies to manage the outcomes of occupational 
closure, using permanent employment contracts to secure scarce 
occupation-specific skills. The outcomes of occupational closure are 
theoretically based on the restricting supply mechanism, the increasing 
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diffuse demand mechanism, and the channeling demand mechanism, 
which alter the equilibrium between the supply of and demand for the 
occupation specific workforce. In order to adapt Weeden’s (2002) original 
approach to fit this modified research focus—that is, shifting from earning 
inequalities to temporary employment—I subsumed the signaling quality 
closure mechanism under the channeling demand mechanism, because 
occupations that successfully signal quality channel the employers’ 
demand to their incumbents. Based on Weeden’s (2002) seminal work, I 
identified closure sources that might trigger the three closure mechanisms 
and thereby change the occupational incumbents’ risk of holding 
temporary employment contracts. I constructed a new measure, the 
credential inflation index, which establishes the link between the 
credentialism closure source and the restricting supply mechanism. The 
standardization closure measure addresses the variance of credentials in 
their signals of quality, which theoretically triggers the channeling 
demand mechanism. I introduced a closure measure that captures the 
strength of the boundaries around occupational task niches. Incumbents of 
occupations with well-defined boundaries cannot easily be substituted by 
incumbents of other occupations, because their sets of tasks and skills are 
relatively unique. I constructed a new closure source that measures the 
degree of occupational task specialization, which triggers the channeling 
demand mechanism if the sets of tasks and skills are narrow. Task 
specialization has a signaling value for employers that improves their 
ability to assess the potential fit between the occupations incumbents’ 
skills and the skill requirements of vacant positions, and thus triggers the 
channeling demand mechanism. If the sets of tasks and skills are wide, 
occupations may trigger the increasing diffuse demand mechanism 
because they theoretically grant access to a wide range of positions. I 
subsumed both measures—the relative uniqueness of occupations’ task 
niches and the task specialization of occupations—under the new 
occupational specificity closure source. I included three more closure 
sources—licensure, association representation, and unionization—which 
are not novel but are operationalized differently. 
Based on a special version of the German Microcensus, I analyzed 
detailed occupations using a two-step multilevel model. The two-step 
approach allowed me to circumvent various obstacles related to the binary 
character of the dependent variable. The results showed great variation in 
temporary employment across the occupations, with occupations having a 
minimum of 0 percent temporary employment and a maximum of 64 
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percent temporary employment. The analyses confirmed the argument that 
occupational closure influences employees’ risk of temporary 
employment. Specifically, the two measures of occupational specificity 
and the credential inflation index have substantive and statistically 
significant effects on temporary employment. The strong impact of unique 
and common sets of tasks suggests that occupational task niches that are 
surrounded by well-established boundaries provide their incumbents with 
relatively unique sets of tasks and thereby restrict employers’ choice of 
alternative workers. Occupational task niches with relatively common sets 
of tasks do not restrict employers in their choice to replace an 
occupation’s incumbents with members of other occupations and are thus 
not able to trigger the channeling demand mechanism. The empirical 
results support the argument that occupations with a high degree of task 
specialization (narrow ranges of tasks) have a high signaling value that 
might allow employers to achieve a better fit between the requirements of 
vacant positions and potential candidates. Because this fit is uncertain for 
incumbents of occupations with relatively wide ranges of tasks, employers 
might use temporary employment contracts more often to prolong their 
probationary periods. The findings also support the argument that an 
inflationary supply of occupation-specific credentials reduces the 
competition between employers for these credentials and simultaneously 
increases the competition between the credential holders, and thereby 
results in an increased risk of temporary employment. 
The weak effects of associational representation could be interpreted as 
confirming Weeden’s (2002: 91) conclusion that the associations’ efforts 
are largely symbolic. However, the absence of a substantial impact might 
also be the result of a reversed causal order. In this case, associations 
would be formed as a response to worsening employment and working 
conditions. Occupational associations that are well-established and “old” 
might already have improved the situation for the incumbents of the 
occupations they represent, whereas “young” associations are just 
beginning to improve the employment and working conditions. Future 
research may check the validity of this argument using data on the date of 
formation of the associations. Occupation-specific trade unions also only 
have a weak effect. This might be explained by the German tariff 
uniformity principle (Tarifeinheit). This principle allows only one 
collective bargaining agreement for each organization, which is usually 
agreed by large industry-level unions. Starting in the 2000s, this principle 
began to be actively challenged, as more and more occupation-specific 
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trade unions started to compete with the large industry-level unions and 
began to bargain for occupation-specific collective agreements, 
culminating in the legal suspension of the tariff uniformity principle in 
2010. Because my analytical time frame focuses on these formative years, 
more up-to-date data might show a stronger impact of occupation-specific 
trade unions on their incumbents’ risk of temporary employment because 
they have successfully confirmed their right to bargain for competing 
collective agreements
154
. Standardization and licensure each have a weak 
and non-significant impact. However, additional analyses revealed that 
this weak impact is due to confounding effects, which can be addressed by 
adding interaction terms. 
Whereas the first set of empirical results lends credit to the closure 
arguments, I am also interested in expanding the conventional human 
capital account by analyzing its interrelation with occupational closure. 
An empirical relationship seems to be inevitable because both theories 
focus on credentials and skills, albeit from different angles (e.g., Weeden 
2002; Werfhorst 2011). Tests of the interrelation between occupational 
members’ participation in further work-related education and training and 
the degree of standardization of the incumbents’ credentials revealed two 
opposing results. Standardization has its predicted effect on the probability 
of temporary employment only for occupations whose incumbents rarely 
participate in further education: Incumbents of occupations with highly 
standardized credentials face a lower risk of temporary employment than 
incumbents of occupations whose credentials have a low degree of 
standardization. Occupations whose incumbents frequently participate in 
further education are presented with a reverse outcome. Following the 
main thrust of human capital theory, I have theoretically argued and 
empirically confirmed that the initial disadvantage of holding 
unstandardized credentials is offset by further education. The results 
indicate that the uncertain productive value of occupational incumbents 
____________________ 
154  The weak effects of associational representation and union representation might 
also be due to an endogeneity problem: Both associations and occupation-
specific trade unions might successfully push for closure through lobbying 
processes and as a result might change the observable outcomes of the other 
closure sources. In this case, the main closure effect is already controlled for 
through the other closure sources. 
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with relatively unstandardized credentials is modified by additional 
training, and that this additional training results in a sharp drop in the risk 
of temporary employment faced by these incumbents. Unfortunately, the 
data do not allow me to distinguish between further education that is 
financed by the incumbents and by the employing organizations. 
However, the results indicate that the latter is the case. The main argument 
of human capital theory—that human capital investments increase the 
organization’s interest in securing these investments—is only true for 
occupational incumbents whose credentials signal a low or uncertain 
productive value. Contrary to the theory’s arguments, additional increases 
in human capital barely affect the probability of temporary employment 
for incumbents of occupations whose credentials already signal a high 
productive value. 
In the theory section I introduced two competing theoretical 
arguments—Spence’s (1973) signaling argument and Iversen and 
Soskice’s (2001) mobility argument—that explain why the composition of 
occupation-specific tasks and skills might affect their incumbents’ risk of 
temporary employment. By relating the width-of-tasks measure to 
occupational incumbents’ further education, I can rule out parts of the 
mobility argument. The thrust of this argument is that incumbents of 
occupations should benefit from having a wide range of skills because it 
allows their employers to easily reassign them to new positions and tasks 
if necessity dictates it. However, the initial analysis revealed that 
occupations with narrow skill and task profiles benefit their incumbents 
more than occupations with wide profiles. Additionally, only incumbents 
of occupations with narrow sets of skills and tasks benefit from increases 
in their human capital. This result suggests the existence of mobility 
barriers for incumbents of occupations with a narrow range of tasks. These 
barriers are broken down by additional education and training. The joint 
effect of the initially high signaling value of occupations with narrow 
tasks sets and the enhanced intra-organizational mobility through 
additional training allows for an easier reassignment of the incumbents if 
the market or the technology changes. On the other hand, incumbents from 
occupations with wide sets of skills and tasks seem not to benefit from an 
initially higher intra-organizational mobility and benefit little from 
additional training, which theoretically would improve the poor initial fit 
between their skills and their job requirements. 
The main sources through which occupations trigger the closure 
mechanisms and thereby bestow benefits on their members could be 
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neutralized by employers, who could instead use additional training and 
education programs to counter the relative scarcity of occupation-specific 
skills. Rare skills are either indicated by the credential inflation index or 
the relatively unique set of tasks in one occupation. Occupations that 
maintain relatively unique task niches restrict employers’ choice of 
workers from alternative occupations (channeling demand) and thus 
reduce the incumbents’ probability of temporary employment. In contrast 
to the initial findings, the results are completely reversed for relatively 
unique occupations whose incumbents strongly participated in further 
education. Unique tasks niches become a trap when additional education 
and training courses also provide these relatively unique skills. Their 
incumbents thus face increased competition. This competition cannot 
easily be avoided by choosing other kinds of jobs, because of the 
relatively unique nature of the incumbents’ tasks. To use an analogy: The 
relatively impermeable boundaries around the occupations’ task niches 
become semipermeable and let new incumbents in more easily, but they 
do not let established incumbents out. However, there is no such 
association between the credential inflation index, further education, and 
the probability of temporary employment. 
Empirical tests of the interrelation between internal labor markets and 
occupational closure did not provide much in the way of further insights, 
probably due to the lack of a suitable measure for large organizations. The 
German Microcensus only allows me to label organizations as large when 
they have 50 or more employees. However, the findings suggest that the 
closure theory complements the internal labor market approach: Just 
because the use of temporary employment contracts is more cost effective 
for large organizations does not mean that large organizations use 
temporary employment contracts more often than small organizations. The 
empirical findings indicate that large organizations only use temporary 
employment contracts more often for incumbents of occupations whose 
credentials are available in excess. For the incumbents of the majority of 
occupations—for which credentials are not awarded in an inflationary 
manner—employment in large firms barely increases their probability of 
temporary employment. The result stresses the importance of one of my 
main closure arguments: Organizations use permanent employment 
contracts as a means of securing credentialed occupation-specific skills 
that are not abundantly available.  
The most noteworthy point from the exploratory tests for the possible 
interaction between the skill level of tasks, occupational closure, and 
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temporary employment is that analyzing each skill level of tasks reveals a 
very different picture than one would find by using a composite measure 
for the skill levels of tasks. The exploratory analysis shows, for example, 
that the licensure closure source has an impact on the probability of 
temporary employment that is different for each skill level of the tasks 
performed by the occupational incumbents. It also shows that relatively 
unique sets of tasks are highly disadvantageous in occupations where 
managerial tasks dominate. These results may point to a new strategy that 
may be adopted by future research seeking to confirm the suitability of 
composite skill measures in analyses that include occupational-level 
phenomena. It might also be a way for future research to further explore 
the varying associations between temporary employment, licensure, and 
the skill level of tasks. 
Occupational closure is not independent of regional differences in the 
tightness of the labor markets. The small and insignificant effect size of 
licensing in the main model becomes large and significant in its effect size 
when interactions between region and occupational closure are allowed. In 
tight labor markets with high unemployment rates, every distinguishing 
signal makes the difference in terms of permanent or temporary 
employment contracts. Incumbents of occupations who lack these 
additional signals in the form of licensed titles are at a disadvantage. 
Further analyses also confirm that the credentialism closure source is not 
independent of possible gender biases that are induced by the educational 
institutions providing the occupation-specific credentials. Adding 
interaction effects between the gender composition of occupations and 
occupational closure reveals that the standardization of credentials has an 
impact on temporary employment. It does not show up in the main model, 
because the effect of standardization on temporary employment is 
reversed for female dominated and male dominated occupations. The 
analysis also shows that credentials awarded in an inflationary manner put 
the incumbents of female dominated occupations at a much greater 
disadvantage than incumbents of male dominated occupations. The 
different impact of the credential inflation index on male or female 
dominated occupations might be due to the fact that women are 
concentrated in relatively few detailed occupations, whereas men are 
widely distributed. However, it remains an open question why credentials 
awarded in an inflationary manner are highly disadvantageous for 
incumbents of female dominated occupations but not for male dominated 
occupations: This could be a promising avenue for future research. 
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To check whether occupational closure affects all incumbents of the 
respective occupations equally, or whether the impact varies within the 
occupations, I extended my analyses as follows: I compared the 
differences in the probability of temporary employment of poorly 
qualified individuals with individuals with medium-level qualifications, 
and also compared the differences in probability of temporary 
employment of young adults with adults in the prime working age; I then 
regressed these differences on my closure variables. The analyses of these 
high-contrast groups indicated that occupational closure does not 
generally differ within occupations. However, I found two exceptions: 
Title licensure increased the risk of individuals with low qualifications and 
young individuals, whereas general occupational associations altered the 
probability of temporary employment to the detriment of the low-qualified 
group. The reason for young employees’ disadvantage with regard to title 
licensure might be that employers only benefit from the signaling function 
of licensed titles when few incumbents have licensed titles. The distinction 
between occupational incumbents decreases if many or even all 
incumbents of an occupation have protected titles. If this is the case, and 
the signaling value of licensed titles is low, employers may rely on 
alternative signaling sources, like experience. Experience, for example, is 
clearly age related and would put labor market entrants with a licensed 
title in highly licensed occupations at a bigger disadvantage than labor 
market entrants with licensed titles in occupations with a low degree of 
title licensure. The same argument is broadly true for low-qualified 
incumbents who do not gain licensed titles because they have no 
credentials at all. This negative distinction becomes more important and 
more disadvantageous the more incumbents of an occupation have 
licensed titles. The results for occupational incumbents with low-level 
qualifications and for general occupational associations also support the 
argument that associations increase the diffuse demand for the occupations 
they represent through advertising and lobbying. However, poorly 
qualified members of an occupation are usually not represented in the 
associations’ attempts to advertise and lobby for their occupations, as 
these attempts decidedly emphasize the excellent qualifications and skills 
of the incumbents they represent. Poorly qualified incumbents will thereby 
not benefit from the achievements of their occupational associations. 
I have theoretically argued and empirically shown that the conventional 
credentialism measure—the proportion of occupational incumbents with 
tertiary degrees—does not capture the restricting supply closure 
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mechanism. To determine the relationship between tertiary degrees and 
occupational closure, I analyzed whether the differences between 
incumbents with tertiary degrees and incumbents with upper-secondary 
qualifications in the probability of temporary employment might be 
explained by the various sources of occupational closure. The analysis 
revealed that the risk of temporary employment decreases steeply for 
incumbents with tertiary degrees in occupations where credentials are 
awarded in an inflationary manner. While credential inflation always 
increased the probability of temporary employment in the other analyses, 
it is beneficial for occupational incumbents with tertiary degrees and 
decreases their risk considerably. In situations where employers face a 
vast pool of potential candidates who all have credentials that match the 
requirements of a vacant position, they fall back on other legitimized 
means of selection
155
. These other forms of selection might be based on 
the employers’ belief in the higher cultural value of academic credentials, 
or it might just be a practical instrument to limit the potential candidate 
pool by setting artificially high thresholds and requiring them to have 
academic degrees (e.g. Collins 1979; Parkin 1979; Bourdieu 1987; 
Weeden 2002; Werfhorst 2011). Either way, academic credentials signal 
quality, but only to the benefit of occupational incumbents with academic 
degrees and only for occupations with an unrestricted supply for newly 
credentialed incumbents. Weeden’s (2002) argument that academic 
credentials are linked to occupational closure is therefore true, but limited. 
The analyses I presented are unprecedented in four ways. First, it is the 
first time that the determinants of temporary employment have been 
analyzed on the occupational level. The results emphasize that 
occupations constitute labor market segments that affect their incumbents’ 
risk of holding temporary employment contracts by adjusting the 
equilibrium between the supply of and demand for the occupation-specific 
workforce. Conventional analyses of the determinants of temporary 
employment performed previously were not able to account for the fact 
that skills and qualifications are related to occupation-specific task fields. 
The occupational specificity of these skills (unique or common skills) 
____________________ 
155  Even if the pool of credentialed candidates might be large, candidates 
nevertheless differ in the training tracks through which they acquired their 
credentials. 
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determines whether and to what extent these skills are applicable in other 
occupations. The degree to which occupation-specific credentials are 
awarded in an inflationary manner is decisive for the competition between 
the occupational incumbents and the competition between employers over 
the occupational incumbents. An occupation’s relative task specialization 
signals the potential quality of the fit between the employees’ skills and 
the job skill requirements. Hence, labor market fragmentation follows 
occupational boundaries.  
Second, I complement the empirical literature on occupational closure 
by developing new closure measures. The conventional credentialism 
measure is only partially able to link the restricting supply mechanism to 
the credentials. To solve this problem, I utilized the institutionalized link 
between the education and training system and the labor market in 
Germany to develop the credential inflation index, which measures the 
quantity of the newly credentialed labor supply. I also introduce the new 
occupational specificity closure source. This allowed me to capture the 
exclusivity of the occupations’ task niches. The concept of the task niche 
is often used in the literature on professions, but it had rarely been applied 
in quantitative research designs on occupational closure. The new closure 
source also allowed me the novelty of capturing the occupations’ task 
specialization, a feature that is often the subject of heated discussions with 
regard to its effect on employees’ employments security (e.g., 
Emmenegger 2009; Streeck 2011). All three measures make substantial 
contributions to the explanation of the varying probabilities of temporary 
employment. 
Third, I have presented analyses showing that measures of occupational 
closure are not independent of the varying degrees of economic pressure 
or the gender composition of occupations. In tight labor markets like the 
one in the new Länder, the relevance of occupational closure theoretically 
increases. Empirically, I can verify that title licensure has a substantial 
impact on the probability of temporary employment when the regional 
differences are allowed to interact with the closure measures. It is also not 
enough to control for gender composition when the education and training 
system is not gender neutral and, thus, provides gendered credentials. 
Interaction terms are needed to account for the gendered impact of 
credentialism measures. Additionally, the use of composite skill measures 
on the occupational level is called into question by the finding that each 
skill level of tasks varies in its association with the dependent variable as 
well as with the closure variables. Further research is necessary to 
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examine whether this result is specific to temporary employment or to the 
skill-level-of-tasks variable, or whether composite skill measures are 
generally not suitable as control variables in occupational-level analyses. 
Fourth, the analyses I have presented complement human capital theory 
and the internal labor market approach. By extending the analyses from 
simply controlling for human capital and internal labor market variables to 
analyses that allowed for interactions between human capital and internal 
labor market variables, I have increased the reach of these theories by 
complementing them with closure arguments. I have established the 
critical link between occupational closure and temporary employment, 
although much work remains to be done to capture the interplay of 
closure, human capital, and internal labor markets, both theoretically as 
well as empirically. 
  
9 Conclusions 
Extending closure theory to encompass temporary employment allows us 
to take a glimpse at the wider picture of labor market inequality and 
occupational closure. Although we now have insights into some facets of 
the inner workings of labor markets with regard to earning inequalities, 
temporary employment, and occupational closure, there is still more to 
explore. There are more forms of non-standard work arrangements to be 
considered, like part-time work, on-call/day-labor work, temporary-help 
agency work, contract work, and self-employment, for which closure 
theory might contribute new insights. Moreover, occupational closure 
theory should also provide new insights with regard to the duration and 
the long-term consequences of non-standard work. Occupational closure 
may also be an important determinant in organizations’ outsourcing and 
offshoring decisions. However, before we delve into these specific topics, 
we still have to extend closure theory to the most basic dimensions of 
social inequality – individuals’ opportunities to actively pursue careers in 
the labor market. Closure might affect the likelihood of being hired, of 
participating in employer-provided training, of moving up the career 
ladder, or it may affect the risk of being laid off. 
Established knowledge about the association between the closure 
sources and individuals’ labor market related risks is still specific to 
earnings inequalities and individuals’ risks of being employed on a 
temporary basis. Therefore, policy implications should be considered with 
caution because the various closure sources may differ in their impact on 
individuals’ careers depending on how advanced their career trajectories 
are. The most prominent illustration of how the various closure sources 
work differently is the standardization of credentials: It might determine, 
on the one hand, individuals’ chances of being hired. Incumbents of 
occupations with standardized credentials should experience improved 
employment chances because the credentials signal instant and high 
productivity. On the other hand, standardization might directly be linked 
to individuals’ unemployment risks: Standardized credentials reduce 
employers’ search and induction costs and might thereby increase 
individuals’ risk of being laid off by being replaced with competing 
incumbents from the same or related standardized occupations. Hence 
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there is still a long way to go to provide a concise picture of the impact of 
occupational closure on individuals’ employment security, career 
prospects, and entire employment biographies. 
However, one would be hard pressed to imagine a scenario in which the 
restricted supply of individuals with occupation-specific credentials results 
in adverse effects for the incumbents of occupations. I will therefore 
conclude with two policy implications for this specific closure source. 
First, the information provided by the credential inflation index could be 
utilized to identify occupations without a restricted supply of occupation-
specific credentials. This information could help individuals to avoid 
occupational choices that are too popular and that would increase their risk 
of holding temporary employment contracts. The vocational information 
and guidance program (Berufsberatung) in Germany can use this 
information to improve the permanent employment and career chances of 
those seeking advice. Second, the credential inflation index could also be 
used to introduce modified temporary employment legislation that is 
targeted towards occupations for which individuals receive their 
occupation-specific credentials in an inflationary manner. In these 
occupations, the negative consequences of temporary employment 
contracts (low wages, poor working conditions, high labor turnover, and 
limited career opportunities) will prevail, whereas positive effects will be 
absent (bridge into permanent employment, low unemployment rates). 
The positive effects will be absent because labor supply and labor demand 
are not balanced. Targeted legislation could help to alleviate the negative 
effects of temporary employment in these occupations and at the same 
time increase the employees’ chances of becoming permanently 
employed, by, for example, prolonging the maximum duration of 
temporary employment contracts without objective reasons to three or four 
years. By doing so, the potential productivity loss would increase for 
employers if temporary contracts were not converted into permanent 
employment contracts, and if experienced workers were replaced by new 
and inexperienced workers. The prolonged contract time would also 
increase the chances of the temporary employees to use their temporary 
employment as a stepping stone and finding new employers who regularly 
use permanent employment contracts. Polavieja (2003, 2005) has shown 
for Spain that targeted temporary employment legislation can be very 
detrimental for the targeted population because employers do not only use 
temporary employment contracts to increase their external flexibility. 
They use it to reduce employment costs, too. To avoid such a substitution 
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scenario where permanent employees are replaced by temporary 
employees, the legislation on temporary employment should only allow 
for increased flexibility but not for cost reductions. This can be achieved 
by increasing the costs of temporary employment contracts for employers, 
and by increasing the employers’ contributions to the national 
unemployment insurance system and the old age pension system. 
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Appendix 
A Demonstration of the Problems of Conventional Logistic Regression in 
Comparison with Exact Logistic Regression 
To demonstrate the problems of conventional logistic regressions, table 16 
presents a comparison between conventional logistic regression and exact 
logistic regression for a sample occupation - farmers (Landwirte). This oc-
cupation is reasonably large with 234 employees. However, only 17 farm-
ers were temporarily employed in 2004. 
 
Individual-level logistic regression on temporary employment of farmers 
in 2004 – a comparison between conventional asymptotic results and exact 
statistic results 
 
Conventional logistic regression 
 
Exact logistic regression 
  Coef Sign. 
robust 
Std. Err. 
95% Conf. 
Interval   Coef Sign. Suff. 
95% Conf. 
Interval 
High education 1,86 *** 0,84 0,22 3,51   1,71   2,0 
-
0,76 3,73 
Medium education 
(reference)                       
Low education 1,11   0,79 
-
0,44 2,66   1,06   3,0 
-
0,87 2,70 
Elderly adults (50-
64) 0,50 * 0,79 
-
1,04 2,05   0,46   4,0 
-
1,41 2,18 
Adults (30-49) 
(reference)                       
Young adults (15-
29) 1,16 ** 0,62 
-
0,05 2,37   1,11   8,0 
-
0,26 2,59 
Old Länder (refe-
rence)                       
New Länder 0,90   0,55 
-
0,18 1,97   0,85   11,0 
-
0,42 2,25 
Not in public ser-
vice (reference)                       
Public service 0,89   1,02 
-
1,12 2,90   0,85   1,0 
-
3,40 3,71 
Male (reference)                       
Female 0   omitted       -1,64 * 0 -Inf 0,18 
 
N (conventional logistic regression) = 193; N (exact logistic regression) = 
234; *p<0.05 and **p<0.01 
Source: RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Offices of 
the Länder, Microcensus, survey year 2004, own calculations. 
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The major difference becomes evident in the widely differing 95% confi-
dence intervals. For example: Individuals with high education have the 
lower boundary of the interval at 0.22 with asymptotic methods, whereas 
sufficient statistic based confidence intervals places the lower boundary at 
-0.76. There are also differences in the coefficients and their respective 
significance levels. Estimated with asymptotic methods, the coefficient of 
farmers with high education is significant at the 1% significance level, 
whereas it is not significant and it has a lower value when estimated using 
exact logistic regression. Another difference between both models is how 
they deal with perfect predictions. The category female is dropped in the 
conventional model because no women are temporarily employed. As I 
have already mentioned above, exact statistics allow empty cells within 
the model, and thus, it does not drop the gender variable. 
A Count of the Various Education and Training Tracks that Award Cre-
dentials for the Same Occupation 
 
Differentiation of occupations by the number of education and training 
tracks that award credentials 
Number of occupations  
 2000 2004 2007 
without occupation-specific credentials 102 98 97 
with credentials from 1 training track 203 189 197 
with credentials from 2 training tracks 60 77 73 
with credentials from 3 training tracks 8 7 6 
with credentials from 4 training tracks 1 3 3 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own 
calculations 
Appendix 
Bivariate Correlations of All Occupation-level Covariates 
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. All models control for 
time, skill-level, small organizations, large organizations, region, further 
education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
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Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own 
calculations; RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Of-
fices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own 
calculations; Berufenet internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational as-
sociations conducted by Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
A Graphical Presentation of the Weak Quadratic Function of the Width-
of-task-range Variable 
 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. All models control for 
time, skill-level, small organizations, large organizations, region, further 
education, %female, %non-German citizens, and industries. *p<0.05, 
**p<0.01, and ***p<0.001 
Sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own 
calculations; RDC of the Federal Statistical Office and the Statistical Of-
fices of the Länder, Microcensus, survey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own 
calculations; Berufenet internet data-base of the Federal Labor Office of 
Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the total population of occupational as-
sociations conducted by Schroeder, Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
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Full Tables for All Presented Models 
All tables are based on the following sources: Statistisches Bundesamt a, 
b, c, d, e, f, g, h, i, j 1999-2008, own calculations; RDC of the Federal Sta-
tistical Office and the Statistical Offices of the Länder, Microcensus, sur-
vey years 2000, 2004, 2007, own calculations; Berufenet internet data-
base of the Federal Labor Office of Germany; Haupt 2012a; Survey of the 
total population of occupational associations conducted by Schroeder, 
Kalass and Greef, own calculations. 
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Full table for model 1 from chapter 7.1 
  Model 1     
Credential inflation index 0,185 (0,051) *** 
Standardization -0,016 (0,007) * 
Width of the sets of tasks       
Commonness of the task sets       
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association       
General association       
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed       
Title licensure       
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union       
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,153 (0,030) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,034 (0,031)   
Managerial tasks 0,078 (0,027) ** 
Small organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,009 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,031 (0,024)   
% non-German citizenship -0,001 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000)   
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,000 (0,000)   
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,000 (0,000)   
Constant 0,281 (0,009) *** 
F 14,38 ***   
R squared 0,272     
Root MSE 0,101     
Mean vif 2,94     
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001 
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Full table for model 2 from chapter 7.1 
  Model 2 
Credential inflation index       
Standardization       
Width of the sets of tasks 0,065 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,504 (0,113) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association       
General association       
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed       
Title licensure       
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union       
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,170 (0,031) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,035 (0,032)   
Managerial tasks 0,087 (0,023) *** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,010 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,042 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) * 
Constant 0,272 (0,009) *** 
F 15,65 ***   
R squared 0,286     
Root MSE 0,100     
Mean vif 3,15     
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001 
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Full table for model 3 from chapter 7.1 
  Model 3     
Credential inflation index       
Standardization       
Width of the sets of tasks       
Commonness of the task sets       
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,014 (0,010)   
General association -0,018 (0,011)   
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed       
Title licensure       
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union       
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,145 (0,030) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,019 (0,031)   
Managerial tasks 0,119 (0,025) *** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,010 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,036 (0,024)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000) * 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,002 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,000 (0,000)   
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,000 (0,000)   
Constant 0,285 (0,009) *** 
F 13,99 ***   
R squared 0,263     
Root MSE 0,102     
Mean vif 2,86     
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001 
Appendix 
Full table for model 4a from chapter 7.1 
  Model 4a     
Credential inflation index       
Standardization       
Width of the sets of tasks       
Commonness of the task sets       
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association       
General association       
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed -0,030 (0,017)   
Title licensure       
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union       
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,146 (0,030) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,015 (0,031)   
Managerial tasks 0,110 (0,023) *** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,010 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,038 (0,024)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000) * 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,002 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,000 (0,000)   
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,000 (0,000)   
Constant 0,28 0,009 *** 
F 14,59 ***   
R squared 0,263     
Root MSE 0,102     
Mean vif 2,96     
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001
Appendix 
Full table for the model 4b from chapter 7.1 
  Model 4b 
Credential inflation index       
Standardization       
Width of the sets of tasks       
Commonness of the task sets       
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association       
General association       
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed       
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union       
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,117 (0,034) ** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,031 (0,032)   
Managerial tasks 0,106 (0,023) *** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,012 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,040 (0,024)   
% non-German citizenship -0,001 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000) * 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,002 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,000 (0,000)   
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,000 (0,000)   
Constant 0,278 (0,009) *** 
F 14,62 ***   
R squared 0,263     
Root MSE 0,102     
Mean vif 3,05     
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001
Appendix 
Full table for the model 5 from chapter 7.1 
  Model 5 
Credential inflation index       
Standardization       
Width of the sets of tasks       
Commonness of the task sets       
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association       
General association       
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed       
Title licensure       
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,042 (0,015) ** 
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,134 (0,029) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,027 (0,032)   
Managerial tasks 0,114 (0,023) *** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) * 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,010 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,039 (0,024)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,002 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,000 (0,000)   
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,000 (0,000)   
Constant 0,283 (0,009) *** 
F 14,85 ***   
R squared 0,271     
Root MSE 0,101     
Mean vif 2,92     
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001
Appendix 
Full table for model 6a from chapter 7.1 
  Model 6a 
Credential inflation index 0,172 (0,048) *** 
Standardization -0,008 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,055 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,437 (0,111) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,002 (0,010)   
General association -0,007 (0,011)   
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed -0,002 (0,017)   
Title licensure       
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,028 (0,016)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,170 (0,030) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,041 (0,031)   
Managerial tasks 0,083 (0,028) ** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,008 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,040 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) * 
Construction 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000)   
Constant 0,279 (0,010) *** 
F 13,470 ***   
R squared 0,300     
Root MSE 0,099     
Mean vif 3,02     
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 6b from chapter 7.1 
  Model 6b 
Credential inflation index 0,171 (0,048) *** 
Standardization -0,009 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,052 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,445 (0,109) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,001 (0,010)   
General association -0,008 (0,011)   
Task licensure (omitted category = not licensed)       
Licensed       
Title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,028 (0,015)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)     
Routine tasks 0,150 (0,035) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,048 (0,032)   
Managerial tasks 0,081 (0,029) ** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,009 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,043 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) * 
Construction 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,000) * 
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) * 
Constant 0,278 (0,009) *** 
F 13,590 ***   
R squared 0,301     
Root MSE 0,099     
Mean vif 3,07     
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 7 from chapter 7.2 
  Model 7 
Credential inflation index 0,152 (0,049) ** 
Standardization -0,014 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,051 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,304 (0,131) * 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,008 (0,010)   
General association -0,014 (0,011)   
Title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,026 (0,016)   
Further edcuation x closure strategies:       
Further education (FE) -0,002 (0,001) * 
FE x CIX 0,007 (0,004)   
FE x standardization 0,001 (0,000) ** 
FE x narrow/wide tasks 0,003 (0,001) * 
FE x unique/common tasks -0,023 (0,011) * 
FE x title licensure 0,000 (0,000) 
 FE x general association 0,002 (0,001) ** 
FE x specific association 0,002 (0,001) * 
FE x trade union -0,001 (0,001)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks 0,161 (0,036) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,052 (0,032)   
Managerial tasks 0,076 (0,029) ** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001) * 
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,006 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,052 (0,024) * 
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) * 
Construction 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) * 
Constant 0,279 (0,010) *** 
F 12,54 ***   
R squared 0,321     
Root MSE 0,098     
Mean vif       
F test statistica 3,27 **   
df 8     
 
Appendix 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 8 from chapter 7.2 
  Model 8 
Credential inflation index 0,209 (0,052) *** 
Standardization -0,008 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,054 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,430 (0,106) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,002 (0,010)   
General association -0,007 (0,011)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,029 (0,015)   
Large organizations x closure strategies:       
Large organizations (IL) 0,001 (0,001)   
IL x CIX 0,006 (0,003) * 
IL x standardization 0,000 (0,000)   
IL x narrow/wide tasks 0,000 (0,001)   
IL x unique/common tasks -0,006 (0,004)   
IL x title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
IL x general association 0,001 (0,000)   
IL x specific association 0,000 (0,001)   
IL x trade union -0,001 (0,001)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks 0,138 (0,036) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,058 (0,035)   
Managerial tasks 0,075 (0,029) * 
Small organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) * 
% female 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,009 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,033 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) * 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,000) * 
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) * 
Constant 0,284 (0,010) *** 
F 11,90 ***   
R squared 0,310     
Root MSE 0,099     
Mean vif 2,89     
F test statistica 1,52     
 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 9 from chapter 7.3 
  Model 9  
Credential inflation index 0,152 (0,050) ** 
Standardization -0,015 (0,007) * 
Width of the sets of tasks 0,059 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,160 (0,147)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association 0,003 (0,010)   
General association -0,012 (0,010)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000) ** 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,026 (0,016)   
Skill-level of tasks (skill) x closure strategies:       
Skill x CIX 0,273 (0,361)   
Skill x standardization -0,016 (0,028)   
Skill x narrow/wide tasks -0,033 (0,074)   
Skill x unique/common tasks -1,561 (0,607) ** 
Skill x title licensure 0,005 (0,002) ** 
Skill x general association -0,033 (0,048)   
Skill x specific association 0,021 (0,046)   
Skill x trade union 0,007 (0,040)   
Control variables       
Routine tasks 0,098 (0,038) * 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,021 (0,034)   
Managerial tasks 0,040 (0,038)   
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) * 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,012 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,061 (0,025) * 
% non-German citizenship -0,001 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,000) * 
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) * 
Constant 0,265 (0,011) *** 
F 12,06 ***   
R squared 0,324     
Root MSE 0,098     
Mean vif 3,24     
F test statistica 3,23 **   
df 8     
 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 10 from chapter 7.3 
  Model 10 
Credential inflation index 0,161 (0,048) ** 
Standardization -0,007 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,049 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,176 (0,150)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,018 (0,011)   
General association -0,001 (0,012)   
Title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,036 (0,015) * 
Skill-level of tasks (skill) x closure strategies:       
Skill x CIX -0,157 (0,251)   
Skill x standardization -0,013 (0,036)   
Skill x narrow/wide tasks 0,099 (0,094)   
Skill x unique/common tasks -1,177 (0,640)   
Skill x title licensure -0,007 (0,002) *** 
Skill x general association 0,137 (0,053) * 
Skill x specific association -0,081 (0,056)   
Skill x trade union 0,126 (0,069)   
Control variables       
Routine tasks 0,243 (0,039) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,029 (0,036)   
Managerial tasks 0,110 (0,031) *** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,001 (0,001) * 
% female 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,005 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,044 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship 0,001 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) * 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,000 (0,000) * 
Transportation and information services 0,000 (0,000)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) * 
Constant 0,284 (0,010) *** 
F 13,34 ***   
R squared 0,338     
Root MSE 0,097     
Mean vif 3,21     
F test statistica 5,56 ***   
df 8     
 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 11 from chapter 7.3 
  Model 11 
Credential inflation index 0,186 (0,048) *** 
Standardization -0,009 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,054 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,422 (0,125) ** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,017 (0,011)   
General association -0,013 (0,012)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000) ** 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,030 (0,016)   
Skill-level of tasks (skill) x closure strategies:       
Skill x CIX -0,189 (0,154)   
Skill x standardization 0,018 (0,042)   
Skill x narrow/wide tasks 0,041 (0,085)   
Skill x unique/common tasks 1,306 (0,570) * 
Skill x title licensure -0,004 (0,002) * 
Skill x general association -0,121 (0,060) * 
Skill x specific association -0,072 (0,075)   
Skill x trade union -0,031 (0,065)   
Control variables       
Routine tasks 0,191 (0,033) *** 
Skilled tasks 0,075 (0,043)   
Managerial tasks 0,124 (0,042) ** 
Small organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,012 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,044 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship -0,001 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) ** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Constant 0,271 (0,011)   
F 11,82 ***   
R squared 0,324     
Root MSE 0,098     
Mean vif 3,35     
F test statistica 3,38 ***   
df 8     
 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 12 from chapter 7.3 
  Model 12 
Credential inflation index 0,186 (0,052) *** 
Standardization -0,014 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,050 (0,019) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,444 (0,176) * 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,010 (0,010)   
General association -0,008 (0,010)   
Title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,041 (0,017) * 
Skill-level of tasks (skill) x closure strategies:       
Skill x CIX -0,037 (0,344)   
Skill x standardization -0,056 (0,035)   
Skill x narrow/wide tasks -0,034 (0,076)   
Skill x unique/common tasks -0,212 (0,341)   
Skill x title licensure 0,005 (0,001) *** 
Skill x general association -0,059 (0,047)   
Skill x specific association 0,011 (0,054)   
Skill x trade union -0,151 (0,098)   
Control variables       
Routine tasks 0,247 (0,049) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,033 (0,033)   
Managerial tasks 0,102 (0,032) ** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) * 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,007 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,038 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship 0,001 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) ** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,000) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,000) * 
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Constant 0,292 (0,011) *** 
F 13,75 ***   
R squared 0,312     
Root MSE 0,099     
Mean vif 3,37     
F test statistica 1,99 *   
df 8     
 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 13 from chapter 7.4 
  Model 13 
Credential inflation index 0,167 (0,050) ** 
Standardization -0,010 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,051 (0,018) ** 
Commonness of the task sets 0,482 (0,111) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,001 (0,011)   
General association -0,010 (0,011)   
Title licensure -0,001 (0,000) * 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,020 (0,015)   
New Länder x closure strategies:       
New Länder (NL) 0,002 (0,001) ** 
NL x CIX 0,005 (0,005)   
NL x standardization -0,002 (0,001)   
NL x narrow/wide tasks 0,001 (0,002)   
NL x unique/common tasks -0,004 (0,008)   
NL x title licensure 0,000 (0,000) *** 
NL x general association -0,001 (0,001)   
NL x specific association -0,002 (0,002)   
NL x trade union 0,000 (0,002)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks 0,147 (0,033) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,041 (0,031)   
Managerial tasks 0,085 (0,029) ** 
Small organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,001 (0,001)   
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,010 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,033 (0,024)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,000 (0,000) * 
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,000) * 
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Constant 0,285 (0,010) *** 
F 13,52 ***   
R squared 0,330     
Root MSE 0,976     
Mean vif 2,88     
F test statistica 4,94 ***   
df 8     
 
Appendix 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 14 from chapter 7.4 
  Model 14 
Credential inflation index 0,135 (0,048) ** 
Standardization -0,001 (0,008)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,042 (0,019) * 
Commonness of the task sets 0,438 (0,112) *** 
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,005 (0,013)   
General association -0,003 (0,012)   
Title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union -0,037 (0,016) * 
% female x closure strategies:       
% female 0,000 (0,000) ** 
% female x CIX 0,004 (0,001) ** 
% female x standardization -0,001 (0,000) * 
% female x narrow/wide tasks 0,000 (0,000)   
% female x unique/common tasks 0,001 (0,003)   
% female x title licensure 0,000 (0,000)   
% female x general association 0,000 (0,000)   
% female x specific association -0,001 (0,000)   
% female x trade union 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks 0,155 (0,036) *** 
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,029 (0,035)   
Managerial tasks 0,106 (0,032) ** 
Small organizations -0,001 (0,001)   
Large organizations 0,000 (0,001)   
New Länder 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Further education -0,002 (0,001) ** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,009 (0,008)   
Year 2007 0,038 (0,025)   
% non-German citizenship 0,000 (0,001)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Mining, electricity, gas -0,001 (0,001) ** 
Construction 0,000 (0,000) * 
Distributive trades and repair services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,000) * 
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,000)   
Business services 0,001 (0,000) *** 
Miscellaneous services 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Non-profit organizations 0,002 (0,000) *** 
Public service 0,001 (0,000) ** 
Constant 0,278 (0,010) *** 
F 11,49 ***   
R squared 0,319     
Root MSE 0,984     
Mean vif 2,98     
F test statistica 3,77 ***   
df 8     
 
Appendix 
a
 The contrast for the model fit statistics is model 6b. 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 15 from chapter 7.5 
  Model 15 
Credential inflation index 0,151 (0,466)   
Standardization 0,032 (0,055)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,046 (0,158)   
Commonness of the task sets 0,413 (1,025)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association 0,046 (0,079)   
General association 0,100 (0,093)   
Title licensure 0,009 (0,003) ** 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union 0,070 (0,097)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks -0,303 (0,270)   
Skilled/managerial tasks -0,064 (0,214)   
Managerial tasks -0,306 (0,212)   
Small organizations 0,001 (0,005)   
Large organizations 0,010 (0,004) * 
New Länder -0,011 (0,004) ** 
Further education 0,003 (0,004)   
% female 0,000 (0,001)   
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 -0,199 (0,062) ** 
Year 2007 -0,389 (0,173) * 
% non-German citizenship 0,007 (0,006)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture 0,000 (0,003)   
Mining, electricity, gas -0,002 (0,003)   
Construction -0,005 (0,002) *** 
Distributive trades and repair services -0,001 (0,002)   
Transportation and information services 0,001 (0,002)   
Financial and insurance services 0,000 (0,002)   
Business services -0,001 (0,002)   
Miscellaneous services -0,003 (0,002)   
Non-profit organizations 0,000 (0,002)   
Public service 0,003 (0,002)   
Constant 1,503 (0,073) *** 
F 9,18 ***   
R squared 0,173     
Root MSE 0,813     
Mean vif 3,12     
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 16 from chapter 7.5 
  Model 16 
Credential inflation index 0,286 (0,351)   
Standardization 0,130 (0,071)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,235 (0,179)   
Commonness of the task sets -1,046 (0,966)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association 0,073 (0,094)   
General association 0,229 (0,109) * 
Title licensure 0,008 (0,003) * 
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union 0,119 (0,113)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks -0,814 (0,284) ** 
Skilled/managerial tasks 0,361 (0,273)   
Managerial tasks -0,181 (0,257)   
Small organizations 0,012 (0,005) * 
Large organizations -0,001 (0,004)   
New Länder -0,001 (0,003)   
Further education 0,008 (0,006)   
% female -0,006 (0,001) *** 
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 0,214 (0,072) ** 
Year 2007 -0,123 (0,197)   
% non-German citizenship -0,011 (0,006)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture -0,001 (0,003)   
Mining, electricity, gas -0,003 (0,006)   
Construction -0,004 (0,002) * 
Distributive trades and repair services -0,001 (0,002)   
Transportation and information services -0,004 (0,002)   
Financial and insurance services 0,003 (0,003)   
Business services 0,003 (0,002)   
Miscellaneous services -0,007 (0,002) ** 
Non-profit organizations -0,005 (0,002) * 
Public service 0,003 (0,002)   
Constant 0,754 (0,086) *** 
F 12,91 ***   
R squared 0,213     
Root MSE 0,914     
Mean vif 3,12     
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Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001  
Appendix 
Full table for model 17 from chapter 7.6 
  Model 17 
Credential inflation index -0,860 (0,425) * 
Standardization 0,090 (0,062)   
Width of the sets of tasks 0,264 (0,181)   
Commonness of the task sets 2,039 (1,310)   
Associations (omitted category = no association)       
Specific association -0,162 (0,092)   
General association -0,055 (0,111)   
Title licensure 0,005 (0,003)   
Unionization (omitted category = no union)       
Trade union 0,132 (0,110)   
Control variables       
Complexity of work-tasks (omitted category = skilled tasks)       
Routine tasks -0,769 (0,382) * 
Skilled/managerial tasks -1,173 (0,302) *** 
Managerial tasks -1,609 (0,251) *** 
Small organizations 0,011 (0,007)   
Large organizations 0,002 (0,005)   
New Länder 0,000 (0,005)   
Further education 0,008 (0,005)   
% female -0,001 (0,002)   
Time (omitted category: 2004)       
Year 2000 0,106 (0,086)   
Year 2007 -0,383 (0,251)   
% non-German citizenship 0,002 (0,008)   
Industries (omitted category = manufacturing)       
Agriculture -0,002 (0,004)   
Mining, electricity, gas 0,001 (0,010)   
Construction -0,003 (0,003)   
Distributive trades and repair services -0,005 (0,003)   
Transportation and information services -0,003 (0,003)   
Financial and insurance services -0,005 (0,003)   
Business services -0,004 (0,003)   
Miscellaneous services -0,003 (0,003)   
Non-profit organizations -0,003 (0,002)   
Public service -0,006 (0,002) * 
Constant 0,981 (0,100) *** 
F 8,77 ***   
R squared 0,201     
Root MSE 1,063     
Mean vif 3,13     
 
Appendix 
Note: N = 677,080 individuals in 1,118 occupations; Heteroscedastic con-
sistent Huber-White standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, 
and ***p<0.001 
Sources Used to Compile the Credential Inflation Index and the Standard-
ization Index 
Year 2008 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2009/10, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2010 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2009/10, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2010 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2009/10, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2010 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2009/10, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2010 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2008, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 4.1a, 2009 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2007 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2008/09, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2009 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2008/09, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2009 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2008/09, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2009 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Appendix 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2008/09, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2009 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Graduates: no data available 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2006 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2007/08, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2008 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2007/08, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2008 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2007/08, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2008 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2007/08, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2008 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2006, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2007 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2005 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2006/07, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2007 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2006/07, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2007 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2006/07, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2007 
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Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2006/07, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2007 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2005, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2006 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2004 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2005/06, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2006 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2005/06, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2006 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2005/06, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2006 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2005/06, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2006 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2004, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2005 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2003 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2004/05, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2005 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2004/05, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2005 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
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Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2004/05, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2005 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2004/05, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2005 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2003, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2004 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2002 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2003/04, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2004 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2003/04, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2004 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2003/04, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2004 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2004/05, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2004 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2002, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2003 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2001 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2002/03, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2003 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
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Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2002/03, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2003 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2002/03, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 8.8, 2003 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2002/03, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2003 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2001, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2002 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
 
Year 2000 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2001/02, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2002 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2001/02, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2002 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2001/02, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 9.8, 2002 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2001/02, Fachse-
rie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2002 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 2000, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2001 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“  
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Year 1999 
Vocational full-time schooling (not recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2000/2001, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.1, 2001 
Vocational full-time schooling (recognized) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2000/2001, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 4.8.2, 2001 
Trade, technical, and master’s schools 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2000/2001, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 2, Tabelle 9.8, 2001 
Schools of the healthcare sector 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Schuljahr 2000/2001, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 2, Anhang 7, 2001 
Apprenticeship training (dual system) 
Statistisches Bundesamt „Bildung und Kultur“ Berufliche Bildung 1999, 
Fachserie 11, Reihe 3, Tabelle 6a, 2000 
Tertiary education at universities 
Special compilation of data created upon request from Statistisches Bun-
desamt, „Bestandene Prüfungen nach 1. Studienfach, zusammengefassten 
Abschlussprüfungen und Prüfungsjahren“ 
